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Abstract
This dissertation offers a robust philosophical examination of a phenomenon that is morally,
socially, and politically significant – microaggressions. Microaggressions are understood to be
brief and routine verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities that, whether intentional or
unintentional, convey hostility toward or bias against members of marginalized groups.
Microaggressions are rooted in stereotypes and/or bias (whether implicit or explicit) and are
connected to broader systems of oppression.
Microaggressions are philosophically interesting, since they involve significant ambiguity,
questions about speech and communication, and the ability for our speech to encode and transmit
bits of meaning. Microaggressions prompt reflection about the nature of blameworthiness and
responsibility, especially for unintended acts and harms. They involve questions about how we
perceive and treat one another, and whether or not people are treated as true equals in our social
and political worlds. For all of these reasons, microaggressions are a critical area in need of
philosophical reflection, specifically reflection in feminist philosophy, philosophy of language,
moral philosophy, and social and political philosophy.
This dissertation seeks to advance the philosophy of microaggressions through three distinct aims:
a conceptual aim (chapters 2 and 3), an epistemological aim (chapters 1 and 2), and a moral aim
(chapters 4 and 5). The conceptual aim involves clarifying how we should understand and
categorize microaggressions. The epistemological aim involves identifying some of the
epistemological assumptions undergirding discussions of microaggressions in the literature,
including assumptions made by critics of microaggression theory, and arguing for an alternative
epistemological framework for theorizing about microaggressions. The moral aim involves better
understanding the harms of microaggressions, including their role in reinforcing structures of
oppression and unjust social hierarchy.
Taken together, these chapters make some progress on the conceptual, epistemological, and moral
questions that microaggressions generate, and which philosophers have not yet adequately
analyzed. It thus offers a meaningful contribution to the conversations philosophers are beginning
to have about the morally and politically salient phenomenon of microaggressions.
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Summary for Lay Audience
My research focuses on the power that language has to shape our social and political worlds, often
in subtle and difficult to detect ways. Our society is stratified along lines of race, ethnicity, religious
affiliation, socioeconomic class, gender identity, sexual orientation, dis/ability status, body size,
and more. I am interested in the ways that our linguistic practices (e.g., how we use speech and
engage in communication with one another) contribute to, or reinforce, problematic forms of social
stratification and hierarchy. One speech phenomenon that I argue contributes to oppression and
reinforces social hierarchy is what has been called “microaggressions.” Microaggressions are
frequent and subtle comments (or gestures or features of our social environments) which function
to reinforce stereotypes or biases about members of structurally marginalized groups. My work
aims to get clear on what microaggressions are, how we should understand and study them, in what
ways they can be harmful to their targets, and why they warrant our moral concern.
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Introduction
I. The Value of Philosophy to Thinking About Microaggressions
Broken sticks and broken stones
Will turn to dust just like our bones
It’s words that hurt the most now, isn’t it?
-Brandi Carlile, “Again Today”

Let me begin with a quote that I believe captures a sentiment at the very heart of this thesis. The
quote, which comes from the fictional character Albus Dumbledore of the Harry Potter fiction
franchise, goes as follows: “Words are, in my not-so-humble opinion, our most inexhaustible
source of magic – capable of both inflicting injury, and remedying it” (Rowling 2007, 708). The
core of Dumbledore’s statement, here, is that words contain immense power. What we do with our
words can have a profound influence in our social worlds, and importantly, on the lives of others.
Our words can lift people up, empower them. But – and this will be the focus of this thesis – our
words can also bring about tremendous harm.
The focus of this thesis is on one particular speech phenomenon, microaggressions, which have, I
contend, significant power in shaping our moral, social, and political relationships to one another.
The term “microaggression” refers to brief and routine verbal, behavioral, or environmental
indignities that, whether intentional or unintentional, convey hostility toward or bias against
members of marginalized groups (definition adapted from Sue 2010).1 Microaggressions, although
quick and easy to commit, and seemingly benign from the perspective of those committing them
(hence the “micro” prefix), are, as I will go on to argue, significant from the perspective of those

Here, and throughout the thesis, the use of the word “convey’ should not be taken to imply anything about the
speaker’s intention. To the contrary, as will become clearer throughout the thesis, my view holds that speaker intention
is not relevant to whether a microaggression has occurred, or whether a microaggression is consequential. The use of
“convey” here should be taken in the ordinary sense: to suggest, communicate, or express some bit of information, in
this case, information relating to stereotypes, bias, and/or hostility toward members of marginalized groups.
1

2

on the receiving end, and for their role in perpetuating systems and structures of social inequity
and injustice.2
Microaggressions, as myself and others understand them, are frequently occurring in the lives of
socially marginalized people. In other words, those who experience microaggressions tend to
experience them often, in a variety of settings (e.g., in academic settings, in medical settings, in
legal settings, and beyond). Microaggressions are also widely understood to be tightly connected
to social oppression, and specifically widely held stereotypes and biases about oppressed groups.3
Microaggressions function by picking up on, and reproducing, bits of prejudice and bias that exist
in the broader social landscape (or, as Fricker 2007 calls it, the “social imagination”).
Microaggressive speech (verbal or otherwise) or actions are rooted in these stereotypes and biases,
which can be either implicitly or explicitly held by the microaggressor (i.e., the stereotypes or
biases can be explicitly and consciously endorsed by the microaggressor, or can be the result of
implicit bias).4
I present this thesis as an integrated article thesis, which brings together five chapters to offer a
robust philosophical picture of microaggressions. The thesis, as I will discuss in section IV below,
has three distinct aims: a conceptual aim, an epistemological aim, and a moral aim. The conceptual
aim involves clarifying how we ought to understand and categorize microaggressions. The

2

For more justification for the use of the term microaggression, see discussion in chapter 3 of this thesis. Also see
Rini (2020, 29-31) for a discussion of the “micro” prefix. As Rini sees it, the “micro” prefix needn’t be about relative
size, but rather can denote a certain sort of relation, specifically, a part-whole relation (e.g., in the way microeconomics
refers to part of the system or study of economics; Rini 2020, 30). Rini writes: “The point is this: a microeconomy is
not a little economy in the way that a micropig is a little pig. Rather, a microeconomic actor is a part of a more
complete system. Similarly, a microaggression needn’t be simply a little aggression. It is a part of a more complete
system – in this case, a system of oppression” (Rini 2020, 30).
I follow Blum (2004) in understanding stereotypes as “false or misleading generalizations about groups held in a
manner that renders them largely immune to counterevidence.” As Blum argues, stereotypes “powerfully shape the
stereotyper’s perception of [the] stereotyped groups,” making stereotypers more apt to only see stereotypical features,
to ignore non-stereotypical characteristics or counterevidence, and to homogenize all members of the group.
Microaggressions, as I will be understanding them, are in a feedback loop with stereotypes: microaggressions are
rooted in stereotypes (e.g., the more deeply embedded the stereotypes, the more pervasive the microaggressions are
likely to be) and microaggressions reflect and reinforce stereotypes (e.g., microaggressions encode and reify the
content of the stereotypes). Microaggressions and stereotypes, then, are closely related.
3

4

See Saul (2014) for a discussion of implicit bias. Also see Holroyd (2017).

3

epistemological aim involves identifying some of the epistemological assumptions undergirding
discussions of microaggressions in the literature, including assumptions made by critics of
microaggression theory (e.g., Lukianoff & Haidt’s 2017 claim that microaggressions are not that
serious, which assumes the perspective of those who are not likely to be impacted by
microaggressions) and also assumptions made by other microaggression theorists (e.g., the
assumptions underlying Sue’s 2010 account and taxonomy of microaggressions, which, not unlike
Lukianoff and Haidt (2017), presupposes the perspective and standpoint of those committing
microaggressions, at the expense of the standpoint of those on the receiving end). The second
component of the epistemological aim involves defending a particular epistemological approach ‒
what is called “feminist standpoint epistemology” ‒ for guiding our theorizing about
microaggressions (on feminist standpoint epistemology see, for example, Toole 2019). Adopting
the epistemological approach of feminist standpoint theory helps justify a transition in
microaggressions theory and research that places more explicit attention on the perspectives of
those on the receiving end of microaggressions (i.e., structurally oppressed people) and what they
claim to be true about their experiences with microaggressions. The moral aim involves better
understanding the harms of microaggressions, including their role in reinforcing structures of
oppression and unjust social hierarchy.
The main theme unifying the articles in this dissertation is microaggressions. However, as I will
discuss in section V below, certain concepts are of central importance to the dissertation as well.
These include harm and oppression. Discussions of harm and oppression are woven throughout
each of the chapters, and, given their central importance to the thesis, I will make clear how I am
understanding and employing the concepts of harm and oppression in section V below.
In the remainder of this introduction, I will do the following. In section II, I will offer a general
overview of the development of microaggression theory within the field of psychology, from the
origin of the concept in the 1970s through research in the present day. In section III, I will explain
how philosophy is valuable to the study and understanding of microaggressions, despite the fact
that, until quite recently, philosophers have paid very little attention to the phenomenon. In section
IV, I will clarify the aims I hope to achieve in the dissertation, and offer summaries of the chapters,
with reference to how they go about making good on those aims. In section V, I overview

4

assumptions that I make in the thesis, and also clarify how I am understanding central concepts
(e.g., power, privilege, oppression, and harm). Finally, in section VI, I offer brief concluding
remarks to the introduction.

II. Background on Microaggression Theory
Before I begin laying some of the theoretical groundwork for my dissertation, it might be of use
to say something about my interest in this topic, and how I think it fits within the domain of
philosophy. To do so, some background on microaggression theory is in order.
The term “microaggression” was first coined by a Black psychologist at Harvard University by the
name of Chester Pierce in the 1970s. Pierce came to the concept of microaggression rather
creatively. Specifically, he began observing the Harvard football team and thinking about what
made a significant impact in game play. In examining what, for example, the coaches focused on
and grilled players about, he noticed that, perhaps contrary to what many might assume, much of
the emphasis was not on the macro-elements or major, overarching strategies of the game, but
rather on the more minor, or micro, dimensions of the game. For example, there was focus on
slight changes in body position or foot movements, or in the angle or spin of the ball. These
seemingly minor adjustments resulted in macro level effects – points gained or lost, and thus games
and championships won or lost. There was a recognition, among the coaches and players, that the
seemingly small-scale actions had an immense impact on the big picture (Pierce 1970, 269-270).
And yet, for those observing the game – especially those untrained in the technical aspects of the
game – these minor changes are hardly noticed (while the macro-scale things are quite obvious to
all watching the game).5 Thinking about the significance of these micro-elements of game play in
football, Pierce began to think about how this related to his own experience as a Black faculty
member at an elite academic institution. He thought about the daily, subtle, seemingly minor acts
of discrimination that he encountered. He thought about how, while noticeable and impactful for
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This is a matter of perspective, or standpoint, specifically regarding what one is trained to (and thus better able to)
see and appreciate in a given situation. Though the facts might be the same for all observing them, different people
(in light of their different training or experiences) will be more or less able to pick out certain features of that situation.
I develop this point in chapter 2.
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him, they are likely to go unnoticed to other, outside observers. In pulling this thinking together,
Pierce coined the term “microaggression.”
In reflecting on his own experience, Chester Pierce identified an important, previously unnamed
phenomenon, likely to register to many structurally marginalized people. Consider Pierce’s
description of an interaction with a subtly hostile white student, about which he writes the
following:
One could argue that I am hypersensitive, if not paranoid, about what must
not be an unusual kind of student-faculty dialogue. This I concede. What I
cannot explain, but what I know every black will understand, is that it is
not what the student says in this dialogue, it is how he approaches me, how
he talks to me, how he seems to regard me. I was patronized. I was told,
by my own perceptual distortions perhaps, that although I am a full
professor on two faculties at a prestigious university, to him I was no more
than a big black n*****. (Pierce 1970, 277; N-word edited out by me).
Pierce thought this was how racist aggression could be done well: how it could withstand civility
culture and elite desires for “multiculturalism” and “color-blindness.” Instead of the overt, oldfashioned forms of racist aggression, aggression could be achieved in more savvy ways – ways
that could happen right out in the open, even by “nice white folks.” It was the subtle build up and
repetition of minor acts and comments, which could fly under the radar of even the most wellintended bystanders. But, at its core, it was still a way of asserting racial superiority and, in Pierce’s
case, making him feel as if he didn’t, and never really could, belong at a place like Harvard. And
this is at the core of how we now understand microaggressions. Through these seemingly minor
acts, people can act in ways that reflect white supremacy, misogyny, homophobia, or transphobia,
but still have the protective guise of ignorance and/or innocence. And, these acts build up over
time to reinforce these unequal power relations. Pierce notes that:
Most offensive actions are not gross or crippling. They are subtle and
stunning. The enormity of the complications they cause can be appreciated
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only when one considers that these subtle blows are delivered incessantly
(Pierce 1970, 265).
In recognizing this feature of oppression – that it often happens in “broad daylight” by those who
can lay claim to their ignorance and/or innocence – Pierce was onto something incredibly
insightful and important. He was articulating one way in which oppressive social hierarchies can
remain so firmly intact, even in our contemporary society that, for the most part, rejects overt and
explicit instances of racist macro-aggression or violence. However, despite his astute observations,
Pierce’s work, and the concept of microaggression, didn’t really gain much traction in the
academic literature. The concept sort of faded into the background. That remained the case for a
few decades until a Chinese-American psychologist at Columbia University, Derald Wing Sue,
put the spotlight back on the concept.
Though Sue and his colleagues began publishing on microaggressions around 2007 (see Sue et al.
2007), it wasn’t until 2010 that the concept of microaggressions really gained steam. This was,
primarily, the result of Sue’s 2010 monograph, Microaggressions in Everyday Life. In this book,
Sue launched what is now a robust research agenda for microaggressions. He overviewed the
concept and illuminated it with a number of examples and developed a now widely-cited taxonomy
for classifying microaggressions as one of three distinct types: microinsults, microassaults, or
microinvalidations. He also described three different mechanisms for microaggression (verbal,
non-verbal (behavioral), and environmental).
In order to illuminate the phenomenon of microaggressions, and the three mechanisms by which
they occur, let’s consider a few examples. There will be a number of additional examples
throughout the thesis. I offer these examples now to get us thinking about the broad range of cases
which can be described as instances of microaggression. I will follow Sue’s lead here and describe
microaggressions which are verbal, behavioral, and environmental.6
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While this breakdown of the mechanisms of microaggressions is Sue’s (2010), these examples are my own.
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a. Verbal Microaggressions:
These are microaggressions which are spoken aloud, most often in the forms of comments or
questions. Consider the following:
•

Femme-Erasure: A femme-presenting woman is chatting with a group of people at a
social event and is asked about her dating situation. She responds that she identifies as gay
and has recently been seeing a new woman. A person standing in the circle immediately
blurts out, “Really!? But you don’t look gay!” Such a statement invalidates her identity as
gay, because (as a result of stereotypes about what gay women look/dress/act like), it
assumes and suggests that she couldn’t really be gay. It also undermines her testimony,
insofar as it casts doubt on an assertion she just made, about her own identity. On account
of each (having her identity invalidated and her testimony undermined) she might cease to
feel welcome or included in that particular conversation or environment or feel as if her
sense of self-worth has been compromised. This is a microaggression, rooted in
stereotypical assumptions about what gay people (and specifically, gay women) “look”
like, as well as biases against femme-presenting queer women.7 It reflects the pernicious
ignorance (cf. Dotson 2011) in society about queerness and the many varieties of queer
identity, experience, and presentation.

•

International Student: An international graduate student from China arrives at a new,
predominantly white North American academic institution. Upon arriving, he finds that
very few people attempt to talk to him at the new graduate student orientation. The time
comes for the new students to go around the room and each share their names. When it is
his turn, he says his name, “Wei Xin.” Immediately the professor says, “That one is tough!
Say it again?” to which Wei Xin complies, stating his name a second time. After repeating
his name for the second time, the professor responds, “I am going to have a tough time
with that one!” The professor never tries to address Wei Xin by name again, instead calling
on him by pointing at him or saying “hey!” Mostly, he just ignores him outright and calls
on the white students, always by name. This is a microaggression because it singles out the
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student as “different” or “exotic”, which can have the consequence of making him feel like
an Other, or outsider, in the classroom space. There is no effort made to include him or
make him feel as if he genuinely belongs.

b. Behavioral Microaggressions:
These are microaggressions which take the form of unspoken actions, gestures, or body language.
Let’s consider a few examples:
•

Needing Directions: A Black man is visiting a new city and isn’t sure where to find the
transit station. Unfortunately, after long hours of travel, his cell phone has died. He sees a
white woman across the street, preparing to get into her car, and thinks that she must be
from around there. He calls out to her “Excuse me!” and starts crossing the street to ask
her for directions. She immediately scrambles to quickly unlock her car door, jumps in,
locks her doors, and starts her car. She does not wait to roll down her window and see what
he needs. She pulls off, leaving him standing on the sidewalk. This is a microaggression
because it signals that, although he hasn’t given her any explicit reason to feel unsafe, she
nevertheless feels fearful of him. This automatic tendency to fear (and flee from) Black
men is rooted in pervasive social stereotypes that Black men are violent or dangerous.

•

Bus Seat: There is a pandemic going on that is broadly thought to have originated in
Wuhan, China. As a result, there has been significant anti-Chinese rhetoric and fearmongering, including from high profile politicians and celebrities. An older Japanese man
is sitting on a crowded bus and the only remaining seat is next to him. A young white man
gets on the bus, looks around, sees the empty seat next to the Japanese man, and instead
goes and stands in the aisle. The Japanese man pats the seat next to him to offer it up, in
case the white man had not seen the available seat. The white man shakes his head and
continues to stand. This is a microaggression because it suggests that the white man is made
uncomfortable by, or doesn’t want to be near, the Japanese man. It also reflects the

9

tendency for North American people to lump all Asian people together, reinforcing them
as non-white Other.8

c. Environmental Microaggressions:
Environmental microaggressions are interesting because they lack a direct agent (e.g., they are not
the result of the speech or action of a particular, identifiable agent). Rather, this final type of
microaggression involves features of our built environment or the aesthetics or design of our
physical spaces. Consider the following examples:
•

Toy Shop: A young Black girl receives a gift card for her birthday to a new toy shop in
town. On the drive to the shop to pick out her gift, she tells her mom how she really wants
a doll that looks like her. As she sits in the seat, she imagines playing with the doll’s hair,
braiding it, and taking the doll to church with her on Sundays. She gets really excited.
When they arrive at the toy store, she looks around at the dolls on display. There are many,
many different dolls, however, they are all of fair complexion. Almost all of the dolls are
peach skinned, with blonde hair and light eyes. A few have light skin and straight, brunette
hair. There is no doll with dark skin or curly hair like her own. She looks the aisle up and
down and eventually asks her mom if she can get a basketball instead. This is a
microaggression because it reflects a world in which she is not represented, and in which
she is made to feel as if she does not fully belong. Girls like her have not been considered
or valued in the design of toys. They are not reflected or represented in the world more
broadly. She cannot see herself in the toys, or in the world they are meant to represent.

•

Dream Proposal: A lesbian woman has just had the proposal of her dreams. Her partner
got down on one knee atop their favorite hiking destination, overlooking the mountains
that remind her of her family and her home. She is over the moon, and, when they return
home for their trip, she is eager to jump into wedding planning. She texts her friends who
have recently been married for their wedding planning recommendations. They send her
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As Blum (2004) makes clear, stereotypes (and I would add microaggressions) worsen this tendency to erase
differences due to their flattening effect. In other words, stereotypes (and the microaggressions rooted in them) tend
to flatten diversity and homogenize members of a group (in this case, by lumping all Asian people together).
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all of their favorite bridal websites and catalogs. Back at home, she sets up a station at her
desk to start pouring over them, finally ready to plan her dream wedding. However, when
she starts turning the pages and scrolling the sites, she feels a bit uneasy. Not only are there
no lesbian couples represented at all within the pages of photos, but virtually everything is
packaged as “his and hers” and “bride and groom” sets. Suddenly, her excitement turns to
a knot in her chest – her eagerness to plan her wedding transforms into anxiety about
whether she will be able to find venues and vendors willing and able to meet her and her
partner’s needs. This lack of representation is a microaggression because, in centering
heterosexuality and representations of heteronormative love, it erases and fails to recognize
the love between queer people – even in the most special and intimate of times. It makes
her feel as if these companies, oriented toward celebrating love, are unable or unwilling to
celebrate her love. She feels left out of something really deeply important to her –
something that was easy and natural for all of her heterosexual friends.
Though each of these examples might strike you as quite different, they all share some underlying
features. One feature they appear to share is that, in each case, the intention of the person (or
company, or institutions in the latter examples) committing the microaggression is unclear or
ambiguous, perhaps even to those committing the microaggression. For example, in “Needing
Directions,” the woman who quickly jumps in her car and locks the door instead of seeing what
the Black man needed might not have done this on purpose; rather, she might have acted
automatically and unreflectively, driven by implicit associations that link together Black men and
violence or danger. The same can be said for the white guy who doesn’t take the seat next to the
Japanese man on the bus (“Bus Seat”); it is entirely possible that he didn’t even think about his
decision as to whether he should take the seat or not, but rather acted automatically. In either case,
we can give the benefit of the doubt that these people did not intend to send racist or xenophobic
messages or to reinforce stereotypes or biases against Black men or Asian Americans respectively.
And yet, in both cases, this is precisely what happens. Similarly, in “Toy Shop,” the toy companies
producing toy dolls might be responding to social demand (e.g., for toys resembling white
children) which itself is informed and driven by racial hierarchy and white supremacy. As Young
(2011) makes clear, sometimes oppression is reinforced simply by going along with the status quo.
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Another commonality between the examples above is that, regardless of the intentions involved,
they send deeply problematic messages to the recipients (and reinforce problematic social
stereotypes, or ideals, along the way). Consider the examples of “Needing Directions” and “Bus
Seat.” Though, from the prospective of the white woman in the “Needing Directions” example or
the white guy in the “Bus Seat” example, these actions might seem insignificant or benign, a
number of things nevertheless happen: the person on the receiving end internalizes the message
(“I am frightening,” or “I am Other”); the person committing the microaggression acts on (and
thus fails to challenge or compensate for) their internalized biases or stereotypes; and, when others
are present and bystanders witness or overhear these things happening, that can reinforce, or
function as confirmatory evidence for, their own biases. Importantly, all of these things can happen
in incredibly subtle, difficult to detect ways (or, at least ways that are difficult to detect for the one
committing them). But, even when we are not fully aware of them, microaggressions contribute to
broader systems of oppression, propping up the stereotypes and biases that reinforce social
hierarchy and keep perverse relations of power, privilege, and oppression in place. And this is
precisely why I believe microaggressions are ripe for philosophical analysis, a point to which I
will return below.

III. Why a Philosophy Dissertation Devoted to Microaggressions?
As I have just indicated, I believe that microaggressions offer fertile ground for philosophical
inquiry. I believe this for a number of reasons. One reason is because microaggressions involve
vast ambiguities of the sort that philosophers enjoy puzzling over (e.g., “Did that person mean “X”
in the way I have understood it?” “What is being conveyed here?” “What is encoded in this
particular bit of speech?”). Microaggressions involve questions about how we communicate with
one another, often in subtle ways. Microaggressions prompt reflection about the nature of
blameworthiness and responsibility, especially for unintended acts and harms. Microaggressions
involve questions about how we perceive and treat one another, and whether or not people are
treated as true equals in our social and political worlds. For all of these reasons, and likely for
many more, microaggressions are a critical area in need of philosophical reflection, specifically
reflection in philosophy of language, moral philosophy, and social and political philosophy. And
yet, philosophers are, as it were, coming late to the party.
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I suggest that philosophers are arriving late here because, as I have indicated in the previous
section, the concept of microaggressions has been around since the 1970s and has been studied
rather extensively in disciplines such as psychology and sociology for the past decade following
the publication of Sue’s 2010 monograph (see for example Dominguez & Embrick 2020; Levchak
2018; Owen et al. 2014; Williams 2019, Williams 2020; Wong et al. 2014). Philosophers, however,
have (until very recently) mostly ignored the concept. For the reasons mentioned above (e.g., on
account of the sorts of questions about language and morality that microaggressions generate), I
think this is a mistake. I believe philosophers can, and should, have a lot to say about the
phenomenon of microaggressions, as well as a role to play in shaping and refining the research
agenda that is mostly carried out through social science research. Though I think there is much
more for philosophers to say about microaggressions, I will briefly canvas the work that
philosophers have done on this topic so far. I will then suggest what sort of work remains for
philosophers to do on the concept of microaggressions, and how I see this thesis as making some
strides in this domain.
To my knowledge, the first philosophical article to offer sustained engagement with the
phenomenon of microaggressions is Jeanine Weekes Schroer’s article, “Let’s Give Them
Something They Can Feel: On the Strategy of Scientizing the Phenomenology of Race and
Racism” (2015). In that article, Schroer examined connections and overlap between the empirical
research on microaggressions, and that of a separate phenomenon, stereotype threat (on the
phenomenon of stereotype threat, see Spencer et al. 2016). In this piece, she warns that the attempts
to “scientize” the study of race and racism, and to quantify the harms that result from such
phenomena as microaggressions and stereotype threat, can have the perverse effect of excluding
the testimonies and direct knowledge of those on the receiving end of these phenomena. Her call
is for research and attempts to understand oppressive (here: racist) phenomena to center the
testimonies of those who live and experience racism directly, and to center those testimonies when
trying to understand and give texture to the “what it is like” of living as a non-white person under
white supremacy. Importantly, this is not to say that we should abandon our empirical study of
phenomena such as microaggressions and their consequences, but rather that we should not reduce
our understanding of the phenomena to that which is measurable. We must always seek to enrich
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our understanding of oppressive phenomena by appealing to the voices, testimonies, and
experiences of those on the receiving end of them.
Though much more research (including robust qualitative research) has been done on
microaggressions (and stereotype threat, for that matter) since the time Schroer’s article was
published, I think the heart of Schroer’s critique stands. Indeed, her central point coincides with
an underlying research commitment you will find throughout this dissertation – that is, that we
must center the rich testimonies of those who experience microaggressions directly, and not try to
minimize or erase them in the name of “objective, empirical” evidence. Testimonial evidence, I
believe, is a valuable source of evidence, specifically in regard to the “what it is like” of oppression
(i.e., what it feels like to be oppressed or to live as a target of oppressive systems and structures).
This is why you will find numerous first-hand testimonies throughout this dissertation. Centering
the relevant perspectives and voices, I believe, is a key component of doing ethical research on,
and philosophizing about, oppression.9
Following Schroer’s 2015 article, philosophical articles on microaggressions remained sparse for
the next few years. They include articles from Mark Tschaepe (2016), Saba Fatima (2017), Emily
McTernan (2018), and Christina Friedlaender (2018). All of these articles make important
philosophical contributions to thinking about microaggressions. However, one interesting point of
unity in them is that they all offer an uncritical engagement with Sue’s theory of microaggressions,
and his taxonomy for classifying microaggressions. Until the publication of an article by Lauren
Freeman and myself (included as chapter 3 in this dissertation), there had been no critical challenge
of Sue’s theoretical framework itself. Sue’s general theoretical orientation, and his specific
tripartite taxonomy for classifying microaggressions, had been uncritically adopted and taken for
granted in the budding philosophical literature on microaggressions. Since the publication of our
2018 article, Lauren Freeman and I have continued to build our challenge of Sue’s work across a
series of journal articles and book chapters, as well as a book manuscript currently in progress (see
for example Freeman and Stewart 2019, 2020, 2021). We believe that this sort of methodological
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critique – and a calling of attention to theoretical assumptions in research – is one important
contribution that we, as philosophers, can make to this growing research program.
There have been more articles and chapters written by philosophers since 2018, and, there are now
two book length treatments of the topic by philosophers. This includes an edited collection by
Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer, Microaggressions and Philosophy (2020) and a
recently published monograph by Regina Rini, The Ethics of Microaggression (2020). I see this
dissertation as contributing to a young but rapidly growing philosophical literature on the concept
and phenomenon of microaggressions.
Though philosophers are starting to weigh in on microaggressions, many questions remain
unanswered. As I will contend in this thesis, there is still a lot of conceptual work to do to clarify
the meaning and scope of the concept (see chapter 2). There is also more work to be done to
illuminate the specific harms experienced as a result of microaggressions (see chapter 3) and the
status of microaggressions in various applied contexts, such as medical contexts (see chapters 3
and 4) and academic contexts (see chapter 5).
Reflection about the nature and impact of microaggressions makes use of machinery in the
philosophy of language, as well as insights from moral, social, political, and feminist philosophies.
Moreover, it is an area of research that is inherently interdisciplinary – one that requires seeking
out constructive dialogue with researchers in psychology, sociology, and beyond, and listening to
those with different areas of expertise. It is for all of these reasons that I find the philosophical
study of microaggressions fruitful and enriching. But beyond the intellectual fruitfulness of the
project, I believe it is an area in which philosophical reflection can be translated into a positive
impact, aimed at improving our moral, social, linguistic, and communicative practices. That is why
I have chosen to pursue this project and this line of philosophical research.

IV. Aims of This Dissertation and Overview of Chapters
As noted above, this dissertation has three main aims. These are the conceptual aim, the
epistemological aim, and the moral aim, respectively. In what follows, I will offer a brief overview
of the chapters contained in this thesis. In so doing, I will briefly summarize the main contributions
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of each chapter and draw some connections regarding how the chapters connect to one another,
and to each of these three aims.
Chapter 1, “Sticks and Stones Can Break Your Bones and Words Can Really Hurt You: A
Standpoint Epistemological Reply to Critics of the Microaggression Research Program,” aims to
develop a systematic reply to the main critics of microaggression theory (e.g., Lukianoff and Haidt
2017; Lilienfeld 2017). The critics’ main claim is that microaggressions do not cause any serious
harm, and, as a result, are not worth paying attention to, researching, discussing, or trying to
intervene on. In order to respond to these critiques and defend the value of microaggressions
research, chapter 1 makes use of the concept of structural and systemic oppression (of which
microaggressions are a part) and also advocates for feminist standpoint epistemology as the best
epistemological starting point for theorizing about microaggressions. With a concept of
oppression, and the commitments of feminist standpoint epistemology in hand, microaggression
theory is defended as an important theoretical and practical pursuit. In offering a sustained defense
of microaggression theory against critics, this first chapter justifies the rest of the thesis, i.e., this
chapter gives us a sense of why it is of value to theorize about microaggressions at all, despite how
critics might (mis)understand and (mis)represent the concept. Moreover, in highlighting the
epistemological assumptions inherent in the critics’ understanding of microaggressions, and
arguing for a different epistemic starting point, chapter 1 goes some way toward the
epistemological aim of the dissertation, that is, to clarify and refine the epistemic assumptions
underlying and guiding microaggression theory.
Chapter 2, “Making Sense of “Microaggression”: On Family Resemblance and Standpoint
Epistemology” aims to make some progress on the conceptual aim of the dissertation. It does so
by responding to concerns about the clarity and coherence of the microaggression concept. By
appealing to a family resemblance approach of concepts, I demonstrate that the microaggression
concept is perfectly coherent, even in the face of definitional challenges (e.g., challenges locating
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept). In addition to shedding light on the conceptual
aim, chapter 2 makes use of the defense of feminist standpoint epistemology provided in chapter
1. Specifically, I argue that although microaggressions are difficult to pin down in practice, some
people (on the basis of their first-personal familiarity with microaggressions and more general
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experience with structural oppression), are generally epistemically advantaged when it comes to
recognizing and identifying microaggressions in practice. This argument aligns with the
epistemological aim, insofar as it helps to clarify an important point about our ability to
appropriately understand microaggressions. The main claim is that microaggressions are generally
best understood from the perspective of those most likely to be on their receiving end.
Building on the commitment that microaggressions ought to be understood from the perspective
of those most likely to be on the receiving end, chapter 3, “Microaggressions in Clinical Medicine,”
develops a novel conceptual approach to microaggressions that takes as its starting point the
perspectives, experiences, and testimonies of those who experience microaggressions directly,
viz., structurally oppressed people. This novel approach constitutes a significant departure from
the dominant approach to microaggressions (cf. Sue 2010). Instead of being “act-based” (e.g.,
classifying microaggressions on the basis of the actions undertaken by the person committing
microaggressions), this novel approach, which is developed within the context of medical practice,
is “harm-based.” This means that the focus on how to conceptualize and categorize
microaggressions is placed on the harms that they cause for their recipients, instead of on the acts
that are undertaken by those who commit microaggressions. This shift in focus helps illuminate
the moral seriousness of the short- and long-term harms of microaggressions and centers the
perspectives of those on the receiving end. Chapter 3, then, makes progress on two of the main
aims of the dissertation: the conceptual aim and the moral aim. With regards to the former, the
chapter helps clarify how microaggressions should be understood and theorized. With respect to
the latter, the chapter helps illuminate the moral significance of microaggressions for those who
experience them.
Chapter 4 constitutes a shift in the thesis. While the first three chapters are more conceptual, the
final two chapters (chapters 4 and 5) are more applied. Chapter 4, “Hearing Queer Voices in the
Clinic: On the Prevention of Clinical Microaggressions for Better Communication and Care,”
zeroes in on one group that is likely to be on the receiving end of microaggressions – LGBTQ+
patients in medical settings. Applying many of the insights developed in chapter 3 about the shortand long-term impacts that microaggressions can have on patients, this chapter focuses on the
seriousness of microaggressions for queer patients in particular (a patient population that already
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experiences significant health vulnerabilities and health disparities). In an effort to reduce and
offset the harmful impacts of microaggressions, this chapter advocates for a number of strategies
that can be developed to better listen to, respect, and include patients in clinical encounters.
Finally, Chapter 5, “Paving the Road to Truly Free Speech: Establishing a More Just Free Speech
Infrastructure on Campus and Beyond,” uses the phenomenon of microaggressions as a focal point
for thinking through debates about free speech on college and university campuses. Though some
microaggression skeptics and free speech absolutists contend that efforts to reduce
microaggressions on campus constitute a violation of their free speech and/or academic freedom,
I argue, contrarily, that efforts to reduce microaggressions on campus are in fact an essential part
of developing a free speech infrastructure that is more just, more equitable, and more attentive to
the distorting impacts that power and oppression have on speech norms and practices. Reducing
microaggressions is one necessary step in creating the conditions that allow certain (read:
structurally marginalized) community members to speak and be taken seriously when they do so.
As such, efforts to reduce these acts are not an affront to free speech, but rather a boon to it. This
chapter, then, suggests that we have a moral obligation to consider the impacts that
microaggressions have on our broader speech climates, and who is truly free to speak (and be
heard) within them.
Taken together, these chapters aim at a philosophical analysis of different dimensions of
microaggressions, and specifically, the ways in which microaggressions factor into our moral,
social, and political lives, and shape our linguistic norms and practice in tangible ways. I hope that
these chapters help us get clearer not only on how we should think about and understand
microaggressions, but also why we should care about them in the first place. To this end, this thesis
goes some way toward the project of clarifying and justifying microaggressions research, and also
toward advocating for more just speech practices, and ultimately, greater social and political
justice.
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V. Guiding Assumptions
In order to achieve my three aims – the conceptual aim, the epistemological aim, and the moral
aim – I will make a number of theoretical assumptions and draw on several philosophical concepts.
I will now introduce these in turn.
First, I will say something about my guiding commitments. This dissertation is guided by a deep
commitment to intersectional, queer and trans-inclusive, feminist, anti-racist scholarship. I follow
in the tradition of Black feminist, and queer and trans scholars, and take many claims as given
(that is, I do not argue for certain baseline assumptions about the existence of social stratification,
the existence of structural and systemic oppression, and so on). For my purposes, it is taken as
given that the context of writing this dissertation is a society with a history and present situation
of colonialism, white supremacy, and cis-heteropatriarchy. None of these background assumptions
are up for debate, as far as I am concerned. Neither is the legitimacy of queer and trans experiences,
or the value of Black, Brown, and Indigenous lives. I operate with all of these assumptions, and
with the assumption that these background social and political conditions influence our social and
political lives: e.g., the ways we perceive and treat one another, and the stereotypes and biases that
pervade our social world.
With these background commitments in mind, I will now set out some of the concepts that I will
use and refer to throughout the dissertation, which I will not necessarily define again upon each
subsequent use. Since the nature of these concepts can be contested, I want to make clear precisely
how I am understanding and employing them throughout the dissertation.
First, I rely on an understanding of power, and the way power informs social relationships and
dynamics, including communicative dynamics and linguistic exchanges. Put most simply, power
involves who has control over whether or not they can actualize their desires and pursuits and who
doesn’t. The more power one has, the more they can shape their world in accordance with their
own desires and ends. The less power one has, the more they are subjected to the desires and ends
of others (see Allen 1998; 2016). Power is relevant to microaggressions because, generally,
microaggressions flow from a person with relatively greater social power (in a given context or
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exchange) to a person with lesser social power (in that context or exchange). Microaggressions are
both a manifestation of power imbalances, and also serve to reinforce them.
The concept of power is related, in many important respects, to the concept of privilege. Privilege,
as Peggy McIntosh (1989) explains it, is like an invisible knapsack of benefits that one carries with
them, and which they can draw upon whenever necessary. Benefits of privilege that one might
carry with them include “special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports,
visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks,” which make one’s navigation of the
world much easier (McIntosh 1989, 29). Although privilege is often invisible to those who have
it, and thus often goes unrecognized and unacknowledged, it influences how one sees and moves
about the world. As Alison Bailey explains, privilege confers a whole host of “unearned
advantages” on people, who have not earned, and thus do not deserve them (see Bailey 1998).
When it comes to microaggressions, I believe that privilege not only makes one more immune to
microaggressions and their harmful effects than those who lack it, but also makes
microaggressions more difficult to see and recognize. Insofar as microaggressions are not
something that the comparatively privileged have to worry about as a routine feature of their
existence, microaggressions are less “on the radar” of those who have significant social privilege.10
This point factors into the argument made in chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation; specifically, I
think those with more privilege generally lack the appropriate standpoint from which we can best
understand and generate robust knowledge about microaggressions.
Related to power and privilege is the concept of oppression. In thinking about oppression, I borrow
heavily from feminist philosophers Marilyn Frye (1983) and Iris Marion Young (1990). Both help
us to see the way that oppression is structural and systemic. In her well-known and often-cited

I qualify this point and say “significant social privilege” here because, privilege is not something that one necessary
has (or lacks) in all domains. Taking intersectionality seriously, I accept that a person can be privileged in some regards
(e.g., on the basis of race) while lacking privilege in others (e.g., on the basis of gender or sexual orientation). So, one
who is privileged in some respects might experience microaggressions on account of those other dimensions of their
identity which are lacking in privilege. While someone with more limited privilege (e.g., someone who benefits from
white privilege but lacks gender, sexual orientation, or class privilege) might experience microaggressions frequently
on the basis of gender, sexuality, or class, while someone who is more privileged (e.g., privileged in most, or all social
domains) would not.
10

20

account of oppression, Marilyn Frye likens oppression to a birdcage, where the experience of
oppression is one of being caged in by a system of interconnected and interlocking forces. On
Frye’s metaphor, it becomes clear that oppression can be difficult to see and recognize because the
structure – the connections between all of the parts – is often obscured from sight (e.g., because
one gets caught up examining a single wire, or barrier, at a time, losing focus on the larger
structure), and/or because the structure comes to be viewed as normal or benign. Iris Marion Young
(1990) adds further development to the view that oppression is structural, arguing that oppression
becomes deeply embedded into our everyday social norms and practices, so as to render it
invisible, and to make it something that even well-intentioned actors, going about their daily lives,
come to perpetuate (for a longer discussion of the views of Frye and Young on oppression, see
chapter 1).
Adding to the difficulty of seeing and recognizing oppression (both for oppressors and the
oppressed themselves) is the fact that oppression can become “mystified” (Bartky 1979). When
oppression becomes “mystified,” it becomes obscured from sight, increasingly difficult to see,
understand, and intervene on. One reason that oppression becomes obscured in this way is because
oppression, and oppressive beliefs, can become internalized by those on the receiving end. To be
psychologically oppressed, Bartky writes, is “to be weighed down in your mind; it is to have a
harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem” (Bartky 1979). Importantly, those experiencing
psychological oppression become their own oppressors, that is, they come to exercise harsh
dominion over their own self-esteem. Putting this point succinctly, Bartky writes: “psychological
oppression can be regarded as the internalization of intimations of inferiority” (Bartky 1979). I
believe that this sort of psychological oppression (and the mystification of oppression that results)
is a symptom of pervasive microaggressions. Microaggressions are so routine, so subtle, and such
a normal feature of our everyday lives, that they become increasingly harder to detect. Moreover,
the messages, especially to the extent that they are repeated, often become internalized by the
targets. The targets can even, over time, adopt and integrate these stereotypical and biased beliefs
about themselves as their own.
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In addition to becoming internalized and mystified, oppression can be what Jean Harvey (1999)
calls “civilized.”11 Harvey argues that oppression is “civilized” when its violence is not overt nor
clear to victims, perpetrators, or bystanders, and thus is particularly harmful because the actual
impact of the harm is obscured. In many ways, this claim is similar to Bartky’s claim that
oppression becomes mystified, but the significant difference here is that on Harvey’s view, it isn’t
entirely because of the internalization of oppression that oppression becomes obscured from sight,
but also because of how… normal it is in our daily social interactions. In other words, when
oppression is civilized, it comes to feel like a perfectly normal, acceptable even, part of our society
and social lives. Microaggressions, I believe, are like this; they are routine, common-place, and
even seem benign, and yet, they are an important force for perpetuating oppression and
maintaining systems of power and domination. Their “normalness” within society, paired with the
fact that they are often committed by well-intended people (even those close to us) makes them
harder to see. They seem, in this regard, more ‘civilized’ than other, more overt or obvious,
mechanisms of oppression. The “civilized” nature of microaggressions (that they are something
that we see as acceptable in our academic, clinical, legal, and neighborhood spaces) is part of what
obscures their significance and allows their harms to continue.
Microaggressions are a mechanism of oppression, one that is often mystified and is often
interpreted as civilized. Oppression, and the condition of being oppressed, is a harm. It follows,
rather straightforwardly, that microaggressions, insofar as they reflect and perpetuate oppression,
are harmful. I will be making the claim that microaggressions are harmful in various places
throughout the dissertation, that microaggressions are harmful. As such, it is worth saying some
general things about how I am understanding harm.
First and foremost, I believe that, for feminist ends, we need a working conception of harm that is
broader than many dominant understandings of harm, and which can capture important, nonphysical categories of harm, whether emotional, epistemic, or otherwise. Following Carolyn

11

Harvey (1999) describes civilized oppression as serious but subtle forms of oppression which involve neither
physical violence nor the use of law, but which nevertheless have serious implications for those on the receiving end.
I think this description does, quite clearly, fit with the phenomenon of microaggressions.
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McLeod (2010; 2020), I first contend that the concept of harm can be teased apart from the concept
of wrong (where a wrong is when one is deprived of something to which they are entitled; McLeod
2020, 50). McLeod (2010; 2010) argues that it is a mistake to assume that all harms are wrongs;
the concept of harm is broader (McLeod 2010, 16).12 But, like McLeod, though I believe that the
concept of harm is broader than many theorists do, I also believe the concept of harm is still
constrained (e.g., not all instances of disappointment or unpleasantness amount to harm (McLeod
2020, 51))13. Following Joel Feinberg (1984), McLeod describes harm as a “setback to an interest,”
where an interest is something in which we have a stake (e.g., our families, our reputations, our
ability to provide testimony and receive uptake, our equal social standing, our self-respect). For
most people, an instance of frustration or disappointment isn’t sufficient to set back their interests
(though, repeated instances of disappointment might be, a point which McLeod acknowledges).
It is notable that McLeod’s account (following Feinberg) allows for non-normative harms, namely,
harms which are not (or are not obviously) wrongs. Such a view of harm is valuable for feminist
projects, including my own, and in particular can help make sense of how certain phenomena such
as implicit bias, stereotype threat, and microaggressions can be harms without necessarily being
wrongs. As many forms of oppression are subtle in these ways, a notion of harm which can capture
the harmfulness of such phenomena without needing to prove that they also constitute moral
wrongs is invaluable. Importantly, I believe, a non-normative account of harm such as the one
McLeod endorses is better equipped to make sense of harms which are cumulative in nature. There
are many types of harm for which any single instance might not constitute a wrong, but which,
taken together over time and across multiple instances, might.

12

McLeod gives some examples of things that, though they would be excluded from some accounts of harm, are
plausibly harmful (even if not wrongful). These include, for example, being driven out of business by someone who
sets up shop across the street and lures over one’s customers, or being driven to tears by someone who implies unjustly
that one is a reprehensible person (McLeod 2020, 51). I agree that the situations described in these examples, while
perhaps not constitutive of moral wrongs, cause the subjects harm.
Marilyn Frye (1983) makes a similar point in “On Oppression,” namely, that not all instances of bad luck or
misfortune reflect oppressive harms. For example, a rich white guy who breaks his leg skiing in Aspen has certainly
experienced a setback, but not one that is reflective of structural and systemic oppression. In this dissertation, I am
interested in harms that do share this link to oppression. In order to find out when harms are connected to oppression,
Frye says we are too look at those harms “in context” to see if they are part of an “enclosing structure” that works
together with other elements to systematically cage one in (Frye 1983, 13).
13
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A second noteworthy feature of McLeod’s account is that it allows for the possibility of one’s
causing harm to another without their express intent to do so, and irrespective of their explicitly
held attitudes or beliefs. For example, when discussing pharmacists’ conscientious refusals of
emergency contraception (EC), McLeod discusses the potential, given features of our social
context, for pharmacists’ refusals to reify sexist and/or racist stereotypes. Importantly, this could
occur despite, and indeed in spite of, pharmacists’ intentions to contribute to such stereotypes, and
indeed, without their explicitly endorsing those stereotypes. These mechanisms of reinforcing
social structures by reinforcing stereotypes – without the explicit intention to do so – are certainly
harmful and need to be accounted for in feminist accounts of harm. As such, feminists need an
account of harm that can make sense of harm which is not necessarily intentional.
The ability to cause harm without intending to do so might sound, at first blush, counterintuitive.
But, upon reflection, I think that many things that we would all likely intuitively agree are harmful
can be unintentional. Take a really easy example. You come to visit my house. Upon leaving, and
while backing out of my driveway, you hit my beloved dog. My beloved dog dies. You did not
intend this. But my dog is now dead. I have been harmed by this. Your intention is not relevant to
the question of whether harm is caused. It might be relevant for the question of whether you are
blameworthy, but it is not relevant to the question of whether your action (e.g., backing up the car)
brought on an action that caused harmed to me (e.g., my dog dying). For the sake of identifying
harm, intention and impact can come apart.
McLeod’s broadening of the concept of harm is useful for her specific purposes (specifically, her
focus on whether or not women are harmed by the conscientious refusals of health care providers
to provide them with reproductive care, such as emergency contraception). I believe this
broadening, and this understanding of harm, is useful for my objectives as well. Feminist and antioppressive projects, such as the one I am undertaking, need an account of harm with at least the
two traits I have identified. Specifically, an account of harm which is useful for feminist and antioppressive theorizing demands the ability to capture and make sense of (1) harms which do not
necessarily constitute wrongs, and (2) harms which result independent of the intentions of the
agent who causes the harm. Such an account is better able to account for more subtle mechanisms
of oppression (e.g., microaggressions, implicit bias, and stereotype threat), as well as the myriad
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types of non-physical harm which feminists are concerned with (e.g., epistemic harm, emotional
harm, and others). Such an account, then, fits well for my purposes.
Going beyond McLeod’s account of harm, I will add a final point about how I am understanding
harm in this thesis. Harms, I contend, can be objective. This is a contentious claim, so I will unpack
it and offer at least some reasoning for making it. While some might be inclined to think that
something is only harmful if one consciously perceives and/or experiences the harm as such, I
believe, contrarily, that one can experience a harm without being fully aware of it. I think this can
happen in two types of situations.
The first type of situation in which one can be harmed without being aware of it is when one is
harmed by something that is slow and cumulative in nature. Consider a slow poisoning by leaking
carbon monoxide in my home. It makes good sense, I believe, to say that I am being harmed by
this poisoning, long before I realize it. Another case might be climate change. There is a sense in
which I am being harmed by the build-up of climate change, long before I personally feel (in a
direct and obvious way) the impacts of climate disaster. I believe in cases like this, harm is
occurring, even if I am not (yet) aware of it. In some ways, microaggressions are like this. They
chip away at one’s self-esteem, self-trust, and sense of who they are. But they are often degrading,
or causing one to internalize oppression, in slow, building ways; importantly, this can happen
without one being aware of it. It is still, despite this lack of immediate awareness, harmful.14
The second type of situation in which we can be harmed without our awareness is the sort of case
in which something sets back our interest without our knowing it, and we are unlikely to ever find

14

In her recently published book on the ethics of microaggression, Regina Rini (2020) makes a similar point in order
to offset the critique that microaggression simply cause hurt feelings, not harm. To respond to this, Rini points out
that the harm lies in the repeat nature and the systematicity of microaggressions. She writes: “Ordinary rudeness
happens randomly, unpredictably, without any pattern or regularity. But microaggression happens to certain people
again, and again, and again. For example, consider the way that some strangers insist upon touching black women’s
hair, often without asking. Just once, this might happen to almost anyone, and then it might be best to shrug off the
discomfort. But some black women are approached by curious hair-touchers all the time. When an uncomfortable
experience becomes systemic, the nature of the discomfort changes. You might begin to worry that you are never
completely free to just be among other people, interacting as people, without some ignorant person treating you like
a pet. Writer Maisha Johnson puts it this way: ‘Everyone who asks me if they can touch follows a long line of people
othering me – including strangers who touch my hair without asking. The psychological impact of having people
constantly feel entitled my personal space has worn me down’” (Rini 2020, 25).
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out that this has been the case. (Note that this is different from the examples above, in which the
harm builds up slowly toward some tipping point, at which point I am likely to realize I have been
harmed: e.g., when I start to feel the effects of the poisoning or experience climate disaster).
Consider the following as an example of the second sort of case (one in which my ever becoming
aware of the harm is unlikely). I have a lot of money in my bank account.15 A very savvy thief
begins slowly withdrawing micro-increments from this account, so slowly that I do not notice at
first. Indeed, I never catch on. They go on doing this for so long that they end up enjoying a great
benefit. Each seemingly insignificant withdraw adds up for them (and thus, adds up the overall
loss for me). You might think that, in this loss, I have suffered a harm – despite my lack of
awareness. Insofar as maintaining and building my wealth, and not having someone steal my hardearned money from me, are interests that I have, the thievery constitutes a setback to meaningful
interests that I have. This, I believe, would be harmful. And I think the harm occurs regardless of
my awareness or recognition of it.
Take another example. I am a queer identified woman. I apply for a job that I am incredibly
qualified for in the deeply conservative, Bible-belt south. Upon reading my personal statement,
members of the hiring committee find out that I am queer. Previously, based on my CV, they
thought they would offer me an interview. The knowledge that I am queer then changes several
members of the committees’ mind, and they do not, in the end, offer the interview. The hiring
committee chair sends an email saying I was less qualified than the other candidates. I have, in
many relevant senses, experienced discrimination, although I will never find out that this has taken
place. This is an unjustified setback to an interest I have in being fairly considered for the job, for
which I am qualified. In this setback to this significant interest, I am harmed. This is true even if I
do not come to find out.
Consider one final example. OB/GYNs in training are taught how to administer routine pelvic
exams on young women who are under anaesthetic for unrelated procedures (see Goldberg 2020;
Green 2019). In going in for a minor surgery, I sign an “informed consent” form agreeing to allow
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I am a graduate student, and a graduate student in philosophy, no less. So, this is, of course, a fabricated example.
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this procedure to be a “teaching procedure.” To my knowledge, I am allowing medical students in
the room to observe and learn from the surgical process. I am not explicitly informed that the
learning might go beyond the procedure that I have come in for. While I am asleep, multiple
students take turns practicing how to give pelvic exams upon my unconscious body. When I wake
up from my scheduled procedure, I am never made aware that this has taken place. Multiple people
have seen, and had physical contact with, my genitalia, without my knowledge. I have a significant
interest in my own bodily integrity, and especially as it pertains to my sexual and sexed body. Am
I harmed by what has taken place? I think so. And, as in the savvy thief example, I believe that the
harm has occurred irrespective of my ever becoming aware of what has taken place.
My contention is that microaggressions can be like this – they can be sources of undetected harm.
For the reasons indicated above (microaggressions being an example of “civilized oppression,”
oppression becoming “internalized” and “mystified”), microaggressions are not always readily
obvious or detected, even by those at whom they are directed. And yet, the harm(s) can take place.
So, throughout the remainder of the thesis, it will be assumed that, as a mechanism of oppression,
microaggressions are harmful. This harm can occur regardless of the intention of the person
causing it, and this harm can (and often does) occur without the awareness or recognition of the
person(s) experiencing it.
These are the central theoretical commitments and underlying conceptual assumptions that will
factor into the forthcoming arguments in this dissertation. I hope that they help to clarify the
arguments to come.

VI. Concluding Remarks
As the quote that I opened this introduction with reflects, I believe that words have immense power.
Microaggressions are no exception. Microaggressions play a role in many important social
phenomena: they set norms (e.g., of permissibility, of how we see and treat one another), police
boundaries (e.g., of communities, and who is treated as welcome or included within them), and in
very tangible ways, shape our (social and political) worlds. I hope to have made clear in this
introduction why microaggressions are important – both in general, and more specifically, as an
avenue for philosophical reflection and theorizing.
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Chapter 1
1. Sticks and Stones Can Break Your Bones and Words Can Really Hurt
You: A Standpoint Epistemological Reply to Critics of the
Microaggression Research Program

Abstract:
This chapter responds to a series of objections that have been raised against
what has been called the “microaggressions research program” (MRP)
(e.g., Lilienfeld 2017a; Lilienfeld 2017b; Haidt 2017; Lukianoff and Haidt
2018). These objections aim to challenge the legitimacy of continued
research on and advocacy around microaggressions in addition to calling
into question whether or not so-called victims of microaggressions are
indeed experiencing any real or significant harm. This chapter introduces
the conceptual tool of structural oppression and the epistemological
framework of feminist standpoint epistemology as a way to respond to
these objections, by arguing that members of historically and systemically
marginalized groups are generally epistemically advantaged with respect
to recognizing and identifying instances of oppression. As such, members
of structurally oppressed groups can know different things—and/or know
them better—than those who are comparatively privileged or possess
greater social power (Wylie 2003). Developing replies to the critics’
objections is an important part of both legitimizing the claims of those in
structurally oppressed groups who are harmed by repeated experiences of
microaggression, and of justifying continued academic and public
discussion of, and research around, microaggression theory. Our approach
to the MRP critics, rooted in feminist standpoint epistemological
commitments, offers a step in this direction.
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Introduction
This chapter aims to respond to a cluster of objections that have been raised against what has been
called the “microaggressions research program” (MRP) (see for example Lilienfeld 2017a, 2017b;
Haidt 2017; Lukianoff and Haidt 2015, 2018).16 Taken together, the objections call into question
whether or not self-proclaimed victims of microaggressions are indeed experiencing any real,
substantial harm. In broad strokes, critics of MRP advance the following argument:
microaggressions are often committed via the expressions of words and because words cannot
constitute a real form of violence or inflict serious harm, microaggressions are not serious
infractions worthy of our empirical study, time, or moral attention (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015;
Campbell and Manning 2018; Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 204-205; Pinker 2018). Furthermore,
even if words could result in real harm, we cannot demonstrate this empirically (at least not yet)
(Lilienfeld 2017). On the basis of this argument, critics have called for a moratorium on
microaggression awareness campaigns and trainings, as well as any further discussion of
microaggressions, until there is firm research to confirm that microaggressions are indeed
damaging to their recipients and can be empirically measured as such (ibid.).
This chapter offers a two-fold response to the first part of this objection concerning the legitimacy
and seriousness of harm caused by linguistic expressions of microaggressions. In order to do so,
we provide a working conception of systemic oppression and introduce feminist standpoint theory
as a way of arguing that members of historically and systemically marginalized groups generally
have an epistemic advantage with respect to recognizing and identifying instances of oppression,
relative to their comparatively privileged counterparts. We take this conception and methodology
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This chapter is a revised version of a published chapter, co-authored with Lauren Freeman. The citation for the
published version is as follows: Freeman, Lauren and Heather Stewart, “Sticks and Stones Can Break Your Bones and
Words Can Really Hurt You: A Standpoint Epistemological Reply to Critics of the Microaggression Research
Program,” Microaggressions and Philosophy (Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer, eds.), Routledge Press,
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American Philosophical Association and the 2018 meeting of the Midwest division of US SWIP. This chapter has also
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and Rob Stainton.
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as premises of our argument. In other words, we will not argue for the existence of structural and
systemic oppression, experienced by certain groups on the basis of race, gender identity, sexual
orientation, or other marginalized identity categories. Nor will we argue for the validity of feminist
standpoint epistemology as an epistemic approach, though such defenses have been offered (see
for example Collins 1990; Harding 1993; and Wylie 2003, 2012). With both of these assumptions
in hand (e.g., the existence of structural oppression and the validity of the feminist standpoint
theory approach to understanding oppression), we develop a response to the growing criticisms
against MRP. We do so in such a way that situates recipients of microaggressions and the harms
they experience at the centre of our understanding of the phenomenon, and by legitimating the
kinds of knowledge one’s social position and daily experiences of oppression grant them.
This chapter unfolds in five parts. In section 1.2, we define what microaggressions are and provide
an example of the phenomenon. In section 1.3, we reconstruct the grounding claims of the main
objection against MRP outlined above (that is, that microaggressions aren’t that serious). In section
1.4, we develop an argument as to why an understanding of oppression is relevant to this
discussion, insofar as oppression is a form of harm (also see the introduction to this thesis). We
present two methodological tools – the concept of structural and systemic oppression and an
account of feminist standpoint theory – that will allow us to properly respond to the MRP critics.
Using these concepts, in section 1.5, we respond to each objection. Our chapter only claims to
offer a theoretical grounding for reconceptualising the harms of microaggressions and does not
discuss in detail how to measure those harms empirically. Nevertheless, we conclude the chapter,
in section 1.6, by mentioning some of the philosophical and empirical work that has already begun,
and which holds great promise for responding to the second part of the objection (that is, that
microaggressions cannot be studied empirically). Our main claim is that responding to these
objections by pointing to the larger context of structural and systemic oppression in which
microaggressions occur is of paramount importance. Moreover, theorizing microaggressions via
an alternative epistemology – feminist standpoint epistemology – offers a fruitful way forward for
justifying the continuation of the MRP, and doing so in a way that centers and legitimizes the
claims of recipients of microaggressions, namely, that they are experiencing real, serious, and
enduring harm.
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Before getting started, two clarificatory points are in order. One might be wondering why serious
philosophers should address these critiques at all. They are, after all, not made by philosophers,
nor are they very philosophically sophisticated arguments (e.g., there is slippage between terms
that philosophers tend to use with precision, lack of clarity about how terms such as “harm” are
being employed, and there is shallow and superficial engagement at best with philosophical
concepts and ideas, such as “intersectionality”). With respect to the first point, it is worth
responding to this line of critique because it is having a social and political effect. As a result of
their reach on multiple platforms (popular press articles, YouTube videos, podcast appearances),
the critics’ views have infiltrated popular consciousness, including students in our classrooms.
Insofar as the position the critics advocate is getting mainstream uptake, it warrants address. With
respect to the second point, it is worth noting that, methodologically, we are extrapolating their
arguments and giving them philosophical form, based on what appears across a series of popular
books and articles. We attempt to formalize their arguments in order to offer a systematic response.
Such a response helps justify ongoing concern about microaggressions in our social, political, and
academic realms.

Microaggressions
Microaggressions refer to brief, commonplace, often subtle verbal, behavioral, and environmental
indignities. They can be either intentional or unintentional and are rooted in (implicit or explicit)
prejudice and/or racial, ethnic, gender, sexuality, religious, disability, or other stereotypes that are
directed at members of marginalized groups (see for example Sue et al., 2007; Sue 2010; Nadal
2013, 2018; Nadal et al. 2011; Torres et. al 2010; Torres et. al 2019). A common example of a
microaggression occurs when a person of color is asked “Where are you from?” and when they
respond with, “New York, just like you,” the questioner persists in asking, “But where are you
really from?” This exchange is considered to be a microaggression, since it presupposes that
there’s an important difference between a white person and a person of color who are both from
the United States. Even if unintentional, such a line of questioning sends the message to the person
of color that they aren’t a “true” American, or that they are really a foreigner or “Other” in their
own country. Microaggressions also occur when people of color, people of lower socioeconomic
standing, or people with unfamiliar accents are told, “Your English is so impressive!” or, “You’re

35

so articulate!” Here, though the speaker might think they’re complimenting their interlocutor, they
in fact send the message that members of these groups aren’t expected to be articulate and that
their being articulate comes across as surprising and anomalous (see Ayala 2020). Importantly,
microaggressions of this sort are never one-offs. Rather, when members of these groups routinely
hear such comments and questions, microaggressions can compound to create significant harm
(see Pierce 1978; also see Evans and Mallon 2020). In the first example regarding country of
origin, the harm is their resulting feeling that they don’t belong, even in their birth country.
Microaggressions are directed toward members of marginalized groups not because of who they
are as individuals but because of their membership in a systemically oppressed social group that
is defined on the basis of race, ethnicity, class, gender identity, sexual orientation, dis/ability status,
body size, or any combination thereof. The person of color who is asked “But where are you really
from?” is asked that question precisely because they are a person of color. Microaggressions are
subtle (yet highly effective) means of reinforcing the oppression of members of socially
marginalized groups, a point to which we return below.

Objections to Microaggression Research Program
In the past decade, there’s been heightened attention to microaggressions in popular and academic
venues, largely following the publication of psychologist Derald Wing Sue’s book,
Microaggressions in Everyday Life (2010). While many scholars and activists have found the
concept of microaggression to be helpful for explaining this strikingly common phenomenon and
have engaged in fruitful developments of the concept in the bourgeoning microaggressions
literature, there remain some vocal critics who deny the reality and/or seriousness of
microaggressions, and thus the value of researching or discussing them in academic and other
contexts.
In the introductory remarks above, we provided a sketch of a central argument that has been
launched against MRP, both in popular media outlets (Mac Donald 2014; Campbell & Manning
2015; Friedersdorf 2015a, 2015b; Lehmann 2018; Lukianoff and Haidt 2015; Harper 2018) and in
the academic literature (Haslam 2017; Lilienfeld 2017; Nagai 2017). The general idea is that
microaggressions do not cause serious and enduring harm, and that concerns over them are
overblown and unwarranted. They call for an end to microaggressions research as a result, and on
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account of various other concerns, such as threats to free speech, apparent obsession with “political
correctness,” and the creation of a culture of “victimhood.” A particularly noteworthy piece in this
vein is Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt’s 2015 piece in The Atlantic, “The Coddling of the
American Mind.” This piece forms the basis for their 2018 popular book, The Coddling of the
American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure.17
Their treatment of microaggressions in this book will be our main focus, since it builds the detailed
foundation upon which the more general argument discussed above is based.
In what follows, we reconstruct and assess four claims that are central to their critique: (1) the
concept “microaggression” is being taught to students on college campuses in order to police and
take down well-meaning professors and students (40-41, 46), thereby building both a problematic
call-out culture (71, 77) and a culture of victimization that is both dangerous and detrimental to
the aims and goals of higher education (46; also see Campbell and Manning 2015, 2017); (2)
students have a choice as to how to interpret so-called slights against them and the pervasive
microaggression culture is encouraging them to choose to interpret actions incorrectly, namely, as
harms that were intentionally committed toward them, when in fact, they were really just harmless,
unintentional actions that could just as easily be interpreted as such (40-42); (3) recipients of
microaggressions are wrong (verging on pathological) in their interpretation and understanding of
what they call “microaggressions” and the so-called harm they claim to experience as a result (3838, 41-42), and (4) there is only one worldview in the context of which microaggressions can be
understood, namely, the worldview of the agent committing them (40-46, 206) and that those who
do not occupy that worldview and who think otherwise are suffering “cognitive distortions” that
demand psychological intervention (39). Taken together, these four claims constitute the general
critique. Let us now expand upon each claim.

17

Note, their critique of microaggressions offered in the book is just one strand of a broader investigation into what
they think is “going wrong on college campuses.” They also criticize things such as content warnings, safe spaces,
identity politics, and the like, all on the grounds that they are forms of “overprotection” which have net negative
implications for students.
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Claim 1: Professors and Administrators are Teaching Marginalized Students to See Slights Where
They Do Not Exist
It is clear throughout their discussion of microaggressions that Lukianoff and Haidt believe that
students who are members of marginalized groups arrive at university, naïve and inexperienced,
and upon their arrival are being indoctrinated about microaggressions and even encouraged by
(certain) professors and administrators to level the charge that (other) well-intentioned professors
and students have committed microaggressions against them (40-41). For example, they write the
following about what they take university professors and administrators to be doing, namely
“[t]eaching people to see more aggression in ambiguous interactions, take more offence, feel more
negative emotions, and avoid questioning their initial interpretations” (42). They suggest that this
is part of a plot to “scrub campuses clean of words, ideas, and subjects that might cause discomfort
or give offense” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015).18,19
Claim 2: Recipients of Microaggressions Choose to Interpret Actions Incorrectly, as
Microaggressions
Building upon (1), their account states that students who are members of marginalized groups who
believe that they have experienced a microaggression have a choice: they can interpret such
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This is directly related to the free speech concerns raised in academic contexts that I discuss in chapter 5 of this
thesis.
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It is worth flagging the irony here that Lukianoff and Haidt are discouraging a certain type of speech here, namely,
teaching about microaggressions, implicit bias, and the like. As such, they might not really be the robust free speech
advocates that they take themselves to be, at least not if the speech being exercised is about these phenomena (e.g.,
microaggressions).
One additional point worth mentioning here is that the way Lukianoff and Haidt characterize microaggressions, and
what professors teach about microaggression, doesn’t always seem to track how microaggression theorists understand
the concept, or how professors tend to teach about it. As such, at times we can simply be talking past one another, as
we might not be on the same page about what microaggressions are and how we should talk to students and others
about them. A parallel tension exists between critics of “critical race theory” and those who teach it. Specifically, the
recent panic around “critical race theory” seems, in many cases, not only to mischaracterize critical race theory itself,
but also to misunderstand how it is taught in classroom settings. So, the accusations of critics (e.g., about what they
believe professors are teaching students) might not have anything to do with what professors are teaching students
(e.g., about structural racism) in practice. When concepts like “microaggression” and “critical race theory” get taken
outside of the academy and unleased into our incredibly polarized social and political domain, good faith debates
about them get more difficult to have, as the debates are always already obscured by bad press and misinformed
presentations of the issues at hand.
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comments or actions “uncharitably” (41), that is, as microaggressive slights; or, just as easily, they
can interpret them more charitably, as benign comments.20 They write: “If a student feels a flash
of offense as the recipient of such statements, is he better off embracing that feeling and labeling
himself a victim of microaggression, or is he better off asking himself if a more charitable
interpretation might be warranted by the facts?” (41-42). 21 , 22 Moreover, they claim that by
encouraging students to develop an “extra thin skin,” we fail to teach them to “question their own
emotional reactions” and to “give people the benefit of the doubt” (ibid.). They write:
Yes, one certainly could interpret these everyday questions and comments
in this way, as tiny acts of aggression, rebuke or exclusion – and sometimes
that is exactly what they are. But there are other ways to interpret these
statements too. More to the point, should we teach students to interpret
these kinds of things as acts of aggression? (66).
Claim 3: Talk of Microaggressions and Harm is the Product of a Distorted Worldview
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See Schact (2008) and Thomas (2008) for a similar claim, namely, that microaggressions are no different from
interpersonal slights that all people experience, regardless of marginalized identity. Importantly, their criticism has
not been supported by empirical research (see, for example, Huynh 2012; Ong et al. 2013)
A key point of Lukianoff and Haidt’s critique of MRP (40-42) involves a discussion of the role of intentions in
microaggressions (and a critique of the shift of emphasis on college campuses away from “intent” to “impact” (43ff)).
Following a common understanding of aggression in psychology – which requires there to be intention behind the
action in order for it to count as an instance of aggression – their claim is that the concept of microaggression is
nonsensical since most instances of them do not involve the explicit intention by the agent to cause harm to the
recipient. Thus, their claim is that not only is this not an instance of aggression (or “microaggression”) but additionally,
the agent is not morally responsible for the consequences (since the action was not intentional), and therefore should
not be blamed or called out for their behavior. We do not have the space to respond to this point in full here; we do so
extensively in our longer response to the critique of MRP by Lukianoff and Haidt and others (Freeman and Stewart,
manuscript in progress). Suffice it to say that it is a mistake (phenomenologically, conceptually, and morally) to
understand aggression in the way that they do; as a result, and once again, their critique of MRP falls apart since they
are making a strawman argument.
21
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In another attempt to take the emphasis (and potential blame) away from those who commit microaggressions, they
write: “Wouldn’t our relationships be better if we all did a little less blaming and dichotomous thinking, and
recognized that we usually share responsibility for conflict?” (39, our emphasis). But what this really amounts to is an
instance of victim blaming, making it seem as though somehow members of marginalized groups are equally
responsible for the harms they experience, or, claim to experience, on account of microaggressions as those who
caused those harms. The onus here is not on those with less power in a given exchange.
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Their third main claim is that recipients of microaggressions are wrong in their interpretation and
understanding of what they call “microaggressions” and the so-called harm or “hurt feelings” (42)
they claim to experience as a result. Lukianoff and Haidt’s critique of microaggression is preceded
by a discussion of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) which is introduced as a method to “combat
maladaptive core beliefs” that lead to the development of schemas that “interfere with realistic and
adaptive interpretations of social situations” (38).23 Within the context of discussing CBT, they
claim that recipients of microaggressions both make unfair assumptions and also unfairly interpret
what’s occurred: “But it is not a good idea to start by assuming the worst about people and reading
their actions as uncharitably as possible” (41). They go even further to claim that such misreadings
of people’s actions are pathological: “This distortion is known as mindreading; if done habitually
and negatively, it is likely to lead to despair, anxiety, and a network of damaged relationships”
(ibid.). Lukianoff and Haidt’s position is that those who claim to have experienced
microaggressions have a skewed perception of reality, are sick, and need psychological
treatment/therapy in order to set themselves right (9, 40-43).24
Claim 4: There is only One Correct Worldview from Which to Understand Microaggressions: That
of Those Committing Them
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They also discuss the need for students who perceive microaggressions to receive CBT in their 2015 article, writing
that “[t]he goal is to minimize distorted thinking and see the world more accurately. You start by learning the names
of the dozen or so most common cognitive distortions (such as overgeneralizing, discounting positives, and emotional
reasoning…). Each time you notice yourself falling prey to one of them, you name it, describe the facts of the situation,
consider alternative interpretations, and then choose an interpretation of events more in line with those facts. Your
emotions follow your new interpretation. In time, this process becomes automatic. When people improve their mental
hygiene in this way—when they free themselves from the repetitive irrational thoughts that had previously filled so
much of their consciousness—they become less depressed, anxious, and angry” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015). It should
be noted that theirs is a very thin, at times questionable, articulation of CBT and mindreading that is not even consistent
within their own discussion. For a description of how they understand CBT, see Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 36.
Importantly, we do not deny the importance of CBT in some cases, we just think the prescription of CBT in response
to subtle acts of oppression is misguided – certainly when offered as a solution to the problem.
It is also worth noting that they recommend CBT – in their thin sense (see footnote 7) – to everybody, as a means
of “improving critical thinking skills” and “counteracting the effects of Great Untruths” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2018,
14). They explicitly state that since “everyone engages in [cognitive] distortions from time to time… CBT is useful
for everyone” (ibid., 39). They even go so far as to include a guide for their readers to self-practice CBT on themselves
(ibid., appendix 1, 275-278). Again, we think this is a fairly thin, potentially problematic conception of CBT, as it
tends to be understood as a clinical tool used to treat diagnosed or diagnosable mental health conditions, by trained
mental health care providers.
24
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Following from what Lukianoff and Haidt explicitly state in claim 3, the upshot of their account
of microaggressions is that that there is only one correct worldview on the basis of which such
interactions can be understood, namely, the worldview of those who are in positions of social
power (those who are white, male and though they do not discuss any identity categories other
than race (and marginally, gender), we can assume a normative status of physical ability,
heterosexuality, being cisgender, and so on).25 This position can be seen most clearly in a pattern
they set up throughout their discussion (i.e., 39, 41-42, 43, 46) where options for interpreting
microaggressions are boiled down to only two: the correct or “charitable” view (that of those in
dominant social positions) and the incorrect view of recipients (as discussed in claim 3, and also
in claims 1 and 2). Their point is that there is only one correct worldview in the context of which
microaggressions can be understood and (as discussed in 3) if you are a member of a marginalized
group and do not share this (dominant, and thus correct) world view, then you are simply wrong,
possibly even pathologically wrong, and need to be set straight, in some cases, even by CBT or
other professional measures (40-46).
Before moving on, in order to be as charitable as possible, it is worth trying to imagine the
perspective that leads the critics to their skeptical position. In this regard, a few things come to
mind. First and foremost is the sheer difficulty, or perhaps impossibility, of fully understanding
either the moral significance or the phenomenological “what it is like” of situations we have not
experienced first-hand. Consider a somewhat neutral example: one that is about the significance
of lived experience but is not about the specific experience of living under conditions of
oppression. The example is as follows: Heather has never experienced the condition of being
pregnant. Though she has read and listened to many accounts of what pregnancy is like, such that
she can get some indirect sense of this experience, she can never know, fully, what it is like from
the perspective of a pregnant person. There are certain (epistemic, phenomenological) dimensions
of the condition of pregnancy that are off limits to Heather, regardless of how much she tries to
listen and be empathetic to others who have had this lived experience.
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Not necessarily coincidentally, this is precisely the worldview that both Lukianoff and Haidt inhabit, given the
social positions they both occupy. They both possess a significant degree of social privilege.
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Conditions of oppression are like this too; being oppressed is a robust phenomenological and
psychological experience that cannot be fully understood – in a direct way – by those who have
not been on the receiving end of oppression. It is only from the perspective of one who is oppressed
that one can understand the full moral scope and seriousness of oppression, as well as the ways in
which being oppressed impacts one’s experience of the world. When we cannot experience such
things directly, there are strong moral reasons to defer to the testimony of those who have (cf.
Thomas 1993 on “moral deference.”). Here, it seems as if Lukianoff and Haidt have failed to
recognize the limits of their experience, and moreover, have failed to observe deference to those
with the relevant experience.
In addition to failing to recognize and respond to one’s own epistemic limitations (those which
arise on account of one’s lived experiences), another relevant factor that might explain the
perspective from which the critics are coming to the issue of microaggression is the following.
There tends to be a reluctance by those with social power or privilege to acknowledge and respond
to this power or privilege, or the ways in which their power or privilege might implicate them in
systems and structures of social injustice. Moreover, it can be really psychologically difficult to
grapple with, and ultimately take accountability for, the harms we cause to others. As such, there
is a tendency to doubt or deny our role in structures that cause harm. For example, many have
pointed to the phenomenon of “white guilt” (cf. Steele 2007; also see DiAngelo 2018 on “white
fragility”), or the tendency of white people to collapse into self-defeating and unproductive
feelings of guilt in the face of racial injustice. Experiences of such guild can lead white people to
shut down in the face of injustice, instead of stepping up and taking accountability for their role,
or complicity, in racial injustice and harm. Moreover, because guilt is an uncomfortable feeling,
many try to avoid this negative feeling by denying their involvement in racist systems or structures
that uphold white supremacy, and instead try to absolve themselves from responsibility as a selfprotective mechanism.
Acknowledging one’s complicity or participation in structures that cause harm is not easy, nor is
it comfortable. It is easier to try to absolve oneself of responsibility and claim “clean hands” than
to engage in the difficult work of self-reflection and moral growth. As such, people do not want to
feel as if they are having the finger pointed at them – they do not want to be “called out” for their
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wrongdoing. This puts people on the defensive, especially when they feel as if the conclusion to
be drawn (e.g., from claims that they have committed microaggressions) is that they are bad
people. Correcting this misconception – namely, that acknowledging the moral seriousness of
microaggressions and recognizing the harm one causes in committing them makes one a bad
person – is at least part of the challenge of responding to critics and challenging the broader
skeptical attitude toward microaggressions.
In suggesting these possible explanations for why the critics make the assumptions and draw the
conclusions about microaggressions that they do, the intention is not to let them off the hook.
Rather, the idea is to illuminate how these skeptical ideas regarding microaggressions – ones which
are informed by power and privilege – can emerge, and what sorts of responses might be necessary
to help respond to them. And, because this position is likely to arise as a result of power and
privilege, and a lack of direct experience with oppression, it remains relevant to engage with.
Doing so involves illuminating the connection between microaggressions and structural and
systemic oppression, and clarifying how microaggressions connect to, or are continuous with,
other mechanisms of oppression – many of which are deeply embedded into the very fabric of our
social lives (see Young 1990). An alternative epistemological framework is also needed – one that
can account for the differences in lived experiences, and how they shape and inform one’s
perspective on oppression. Specifically, a framework of feminist standpoint epistemology can help
to reinforce the importance of understanding this phenomenon from the perspective of those with
the relevant lived experiences. With both of these methodological tools in hand (the concept of
oppression and the alternative epistemological framework), we will be in a position to demonstrate
precisely how and why Lukianoff and Haidt’s objections to microaggressions fail.

Oppression and Standpoint Theory
1.4.1.

Oppression

Microaggressions are, in many ways, tightly connected to conditions of oppression (see
introduction to this thesis). This connection is bi-directional and mutually reinforcing. On the one
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hand, because microaggressions are rooted in widely held prejudicial stereotypes and biases, social
stratification and social oppression are the very preconditions that make microaggressions possible
and forceful (see chapter 2 of this thesis on the social context-dependency of microaggressions).
Moreover, insofar as microaggressions convey hostility toward or bias against marginalized
groups, microaggressions are one ubiquitous mechanism for more deeply embedding such bias
and hostility, and indeed rendering it so commonplace so as to seem socially normal or acceptable.
In this way, microaggressions contribute to the reinforcement of certain forms of social hierarchy
and subsequently, the oppression of some social groups.
In order to get clearer as to precisely how microaggressions are related to larger forms of structural
oppression, we need to have in hand a working concept of oppression. Most broadly, oppression
refers to "the existence of unequal and unjust institutional constraints,” where these constraints
involve harm to some social group and simultaneously benefit another social group (Cudd 2006,
25, 52). Such institutionally structured constraints can include "legal rights, obligations and
burdens, stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, conventions, norms, and
practices" (ibid., 50).
In her famous chapter “The Five Faces of Oppression,” Iris Marion Young refers to oppression as
“structural phenomena that immobilize or diminish a group (1990, 42). Oppressive phenomena are
structural insofar as they are not the result of a few people’s choices or policies; rather, their causes
are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, symbols, and policies, and in unquestioned
assumptions underlying institutional rules and of often ordinary, well-meaning people. Oppressive
phenomena are systemic insofar as an oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group.
That is to say, oppression need not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression
of one group by another. Rather, it is far more insidious than that. Given that oppression is
structural and systemic and is not, first and foremost, about individual oppressors, the individual
intentions behind any given act should be bracketed out of the equation as mostly irrelevant.
Because of its structural and systemic nature, one can indeed be a well-meaning individual and
still perpetuate oppressive norms.
To further parse Young’s claim mentioned above, a social “group” is “defined…by a shared sense
of identity…. It is identification with a certain social status, the common history that social status
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produces…that define the group as a group” (ibid., 44). Members of the same social group share
a common experience or way of life (ibid.), though importantly, groups are not homogeneous.
Groups are multiple, cross-cutting, and fluid and can be differentiated by race, age, gender, class,
sexuality, region, nationality, and so on. Moreover, all persons have multiple group identities.
Young places such emphasis on groups because oppression does not affect individuals qua
individuals; rather, it affects individuals insofar as they are members of a marginalized group or
groups.
Building on its structural and systematic nature, and in addition to the idea that individuals
experience oppression insofar as they are members of a marginalized group or groups, “all
oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities
and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings” (ibid., 40). In other words, oppression hinders
members of marginalized groups from achieving their goals, fulfilling their projects, or even
simply navigating the world with ease (or, at all). Young develops this position by elaborating
upon five “faces” of oppression which represent the myriad ways in which members of
marginalized groups can be oppressed. The faces she develops – exploitation, marginalization,
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence – often overlap with one another to create
complicated matrices of oppression.
The first three faces of oppression – exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness – refer to
structural and institutional relations of power and oppression that occur by virtue of the social
division of labor: who works for whom, who does not work, and how the content of work defines
one’s institutional position. Each of these faces pertains to our material lives, resources, and the
concrete possibilities we have or do not have in order to develop and exercise our capacities. Each
has to do with concrete power in relation to others.
But the fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism, differs from the previous three. For our
purposes and anticipating our response to the objections that have been leveled against MRP, we
focus primarily on cultural imperialism as a face of oppression. Before doing so, it is worth noting
Young’s final face of oppression, violence. As Young notes, some groups experience routine
physical violence, and, as a result, members of those groups have to live with the constant threat
of being met with such violence. Examples in the present day might include the persistent police
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brutality experienced by Black communities in America. Because this sort of violence is
heightened for members of the Black community, Black people live with constant anxiety that
themselves, or someone they love, will become a target of this sort of violence. The specter of
violence hangs over Black communities and informs how Black people interact with the world
(e.g., Black mothers often prepare their Black children for interactions with the police, and train
them on how they should or shouldn’t respond in order to minimize such risks). Another example
is sexual violence against women. Awareness of the pervasive sexual violence faced by women
and girls can lead women to move about the world differently (e.g., differently than their male
counterparts). The awareness of this sort of threat – namely, that members of one’s group are at
heightened risk for certain sorts of physical violence – is oppressive. Though this last face of
oppression (violence) might be relevant to microaggressions in some ways (e.g., some argue that
certain sorts of epistemic oppression, which might include some microaggressions, constitutes
“epistemic violence”; c.f. Dotson 2011), it can be set aside for now. This is because cultural
imperialism has the greatest explanatory power for responding to the critiques at hand. Let’s now
turn our attention back to the face of cultural imperialism.
Cultural imperialism occurs when the experiences, cultural symbols, and perspective of the
dominant cultural group are normalized and posited as universal for everyone, rendering other
groups who do not embrace such norms to be invisible, inferior, deviant, and 'Other.' Cultural
imperialism results in a situation in which those at the margins are defined from outside of the
cultural mainstream and placed at the social margins, away from the [dominant] center (see hooks
1984). Such placement as ‘Other’ becomes internalized insofar as the center constantly reinforces
it. For example, consider the negative bias against hairstyles such as cornrows and dreadlocks,
traditionally worn by Black people. Such hairstyles have been viewed as “unprofessional,”
“unnatural,” “unruly,” “unkempt,” “excessive,” “distracting,” “urban,” and “messy” (see, for
example, Jorie 2018; Nittle 2018; Sutton 2017) by (white) standards of professionalism; thus,
people who tend to wear those styles (i.e., Black people) experience bias and discrimination in
interviews and hiring processes.26 Internalizing this norm – or recognizing that failing to comply

26

Recently, as of July 2019, California and New York have become the first two U.S. states to ban discrimination
against (Black) people based on hairstyle (Folley 2019; Willon and Díaz 2019).
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with the norm makes landing a job more difficult – can cause Black people to adopt more
traditionally “white” hair styles (i.e., by straightening their hair, often in expensive, painful, and
dangerous processes that have been linked to cancer and reproductive health problems (Nittle
2018)) in an effort to conform to the dominant norms of professionalism (Janin 2016; Mar 2018;
Allen 2019). Yet, in these same professional contexts, white people can co-opt or appropriate these
hairstyles, and be celebrated for doing so (Blay 2015). 27 This is one example of cultural
imperialism – the prioritization and promotion of dominant culture at the expense of marginalized
identities and cultures, and the resulting double standards of who can engage in certain cultural
practices without stigma or backlash.
In order to further our understanding of cultural imperialism, Young draws upon the work of
W.E.B. Du Bois who called this kind of culturally oppressed experience “double consciousness”:
namely, “the sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in an amused contempt and pity” (cited in Young 1990,
60). To experience double consciousness means that a subject who is a member of a marginalized
group desires recognition as a human being who is capable of activity, thought, and personhood
(among other things), yet from the dominant culture, they receive only the judgment that they are
not only different, but inferior. According to Young, the injustice of cultural imperialism is “that
the oppressed group’s own experience and interpretation of social life finds little expression that
touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes on the oppressed group its
experience and interpretation of social life” (60). This dominant interpretation is one that demeans
the group in question, seeing them as inferior.
One final point that we’d like to introduce in order to better understand the phenomenon of
oppression and to explain how and why it can often be difficult for members of dominant groups
to see, is the classic birdcage analogy, introduced by Marilyn Frye in her 1983 book, The Politics
of Reality. Frye describes the analogy as follows:

For a photography project that explores this very point, see Endia Beal’s “Can I Touch It?” series, in which she has
white women adorn traditionally Black hair styles and have traditional corporate photos taken. See Rosenberg 2013,
Ely 2019.
27
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Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage,
you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is
determined by this myopic focus, you could look at that one wire, up and
down the length of it, and be unable to see why a bird would not just fly
around the wire any time it wanted to go somewhere. Furthermore, even
if, one day at a time, you myopically inspected each wire, you still could
not see why a bird would have trouble going past the wires to get
anywhere. There is no physical property of any one wire, nothing that the
closest scrutiny could discover, that will reveal how a bird could be
inhibited or harmed by it except in the most accidental way. It is only when
you step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and
take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see why the bird
does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment. It will require
no great subtlety of mental powers. It is perfectly obvious that the bird is
surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of
which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their
relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon
(Frye 1983, emphasis added).
The analogy illustrates how, under conditions of oppression, the complex network of barriers
(many of which, individually, are difficult to perceive on their own), function together to keep a
person caged in, namely, restricted or immobilized. Oppressed people experience the world in a
way that is confined and shaped by these forces and barriers, none of which are accidental, and all
of which are related to one another in a systematic fashion to keep the cage intact. Frye notes that
the cage metaphor helps to illuminate the reason that oppression can be so difficult to recognize
for those who are themselves not targets of such forces (i.e., those outside the cage), namely, that
when people try to study a singular element of an oppressive structure, and perhaps do so with
great care and good will, they still fail to see the structure as a whole. They examine single wires
(viz. a single phenomenon) but cannot see that there is a full cage of interlocking wires there (viz.
the systemic and structural entirety of oppression). Thus, they fail to see the full picture of how
and why people are caged in. In many cases, the one in the cage can’t help but be aware of the
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entire structure, because it is the structure as a whole which prevents their mobility or freedom.28
As Frye notes, “barriers have different meanings to those on opposite sides of them” (1983, 12).
The ability to recognize the full structure is enhanced or compromised by one’s relationship to it
and position within or outside of it.

1.4.2.

Standpoint Theory

The central claim of standpoint theory is that those who are subject to oppression and systems of
domination generally possess an epistemic advantage with respect to understanding experiences
of oppression and subjugation. As such, members of structurally oppressed groups can know
different things—or know them better—than those who are comparatively privileged (Wylie
2003). While early articulations of standpoint theory were Marxist, arguing for epistemic privilege
of the proletariat over matters concerning economics and sociology (Marx 1976, 1981), feminist
epistemologists have developed the standpoint approach to account for the unique experiences of
marginalized people who are oppressed on axes other than, or in addition to class, namely,
oppression that occurs on the basis of sex, gender, and/or race (see Collins 1990, 2004; Harding
1993; Hartsock 1998).
Despite critiques of standpoint theory which question it as a viable approach to epistemology (see
Longino 1993; Lugones and Spelman 1983), recent defenses and revised articulations of feminist
standpoint theory have helped to clarify the theory’s aims and scope, as well as to respond to some
early objections, iron out some initial misunderstandings, and make good on some of the original
limitations of the theory (see, for example, Wylie 2012). According to Alison Wylie (2003), the
central aim of feminist standpoint theory is to better understand how the systemic partiality of
authoritative knowledge arises and to account for the difficulties of both drawing attention to and
countering this partiality (26). In societies such as ours, which are stratified by race, ethnicity,

The phrase “in many cases” is added here because, as is explained in the introduction to this thesis, oppression can
be internalized by the oppressed, comprising, in some cases, the ability to see the forces at work in keeping one
oppressed. However, even when oppression is internalized, this does not happen in a way that is totalizing or complete;
oppressed people are still able to recognize, as a result of their lived experiences, that they are limited or restricted in
some way. Sometimes it takes active work to “demystify” oppression to allow one to better see the forces causing this
restriction.
28
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class, gender, sexuality, ability, and so on, where one falls within those stratifications can greatly
impact how one experiences the world, what one can see, and thereby, what one can know. As
such, a central tenet of feminist standpoint epistemology is that knowledge of oppression ought to
start from the position of marginalized lives (Collins 1990; Harding 1993; Wylie 2012). As Wylie
explains, “to do social science as a standpoint feminist is to approach inquiry from the perspective
of insiders rather than impose on them the external categories of professional social science, a
managing bureaucracy, ruling elites” (2003, 27). This move is made because those who are
systemically marginalized “have the especially salient advantage that they… [are] in a position to
grasp the effects of power relations in their own understanding and that of others” (Wylie 2003,
34). That is, those on the losing end of oppressive social systems are better suited to understand
those systems because they are the most directly affected by them. In other words, those who
occupy “the bottom” of a socially-stratified society have greater epistemic access to understanding
oppressive human relations, and to identifying problems to be explained in our social words
(Harding 1990, 443). Standpoint theory provides a framework for understanding how, based on
this greater understanding, certain kinds of diversity (i.e., racial, cultural, gender, class, etc.) can
enrich, rather than compromise, scientific and social inquiry (Wylie 2003, 26).
Furthermore, according to standpoint theory, we must be concerned not only with the production,
but also with the effects of systemically defined social locations (ibid., 31). What counts as social
location is structurally defined:
What individuals experience and understand is shaped by their location in
a hierarchically structured system of power relations: by the material
conditions of their lives, by the relations of production and reproduction
that structure their social interactions and by the conceptual resources they
have to represent and interpret these relations (ibid.).
Standpoint theory is thus committed to the situated knowledge thesis: that “social location
systematically shapes and limits what we know, including tacit, experiential knowledge as well as
explicit understanding, what we take knowledge to be as well as specific epistemic context” (ibid.;
also see Toole 2019). Importantly, standpoint theory does not endorse a thesis of automatic
epistemic privilege: it does not claim that those who occupy marginal positions automatically

50

know more, or know better, based on their social location (ibid., 28).29 Rather, more moderately,
the claim is that what we know is profoundly influenced and shaped by the social and material
conditions of our lives, a claim that casts into relief the contingent and historical nature of what
counts as knowledge and focuses attention on the processes by and in which knowledge is
produced (ibid.). Where people fall in social arrangements (that is, the social positions and
identities they occupy) can grant them epistemic privilege with respect to questions about those
social contexts, and more precisely, about what it is like to be oppressed within those contexts
(Toole 2019; also see chapter 1 of this thesis). Knowledge never happens in a vacuum; it is neither
ahistorical, nor translocational (ibid., 30-31). Rather, knowledge is produced within the context of
social structures and institutions where not all people occupy equal (social, political, material)
positions and therefore, not all people are privy to the same kinds of first-personal knowledge. It
is also worth noting that the first-personal knowledge of oppressed people is itself shaped by forces
of oppression. For example, people can experience psychological oppression (cf. Bartky 1979), or
other forms of self-doubt or self-deception, which is ultimately brought on by living under
oppressive circumstances. So, while the epistemic advantage that oppressed people have is not
perfect, complete, or infallible, oppressed people are, nevertheless, generally better positioned to
know, as a result of their lived experience, what oppression is like and why it is significant.
It is a perverse feature of oppression that knowledge systems are rendered distorted and partial. If
we take seriously the kinds of knowledge that people in marginalized positions tend to possess,
then, as Sandra Harding wrote, the result is the production of less partial, less distorted, ‘less false’
knowledge (1991, 185-187).
For the purposes of responding to the objections that have been launched against MRP, we take
the most significant theses of standpoint theory to be as follows:

29

Importantly, standpoint theory is not committed to an individualist thesis: it does not make claims about what
individuals qua individuals can know (Wylie 2003, 29). Rather, it is about what individuals qua members of
marginalized groups can know. This does not imply that all individuals of a given social group will agree about all
matters of oppression, nor that all members of oppressed groups will be right in all cases – all epistemic agents are
fallible. The claim is about who is better positioned, in a general sense, to know, and how the relevance of lived
experiences factors into processes of knowledge production.
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(i) Those who occupy systemically oppressed positions are more reliable
detectors of instances of oppression than those who occupy dominant
social positions;

(ii) People in systemically oppressed social positions are more likely to
understand the moral significance of oppression;
(iii) People in systemically oppressed social positions are better situated to
identify connections between more subtle instances of racism, sexism,
homophobia, etc. and larger, historical and ongoing systems of oppression.
In what follows, we will draw on both tools – the concept of structural and systemic oppression
and feminist standpoint epistemology – to respond to the criticisms against MRP.

Responses to Objections to the MRP
Our general response to Lukianoff and Haidt’s critique of microaggressions and “microaggression
culture” is that their objections fail for at least two reasons. First, they fail to take seriously the
structural and systemic nature of oppression and the larger social context in which
microaggressions take place, thereby failing to understand a condition for the possibility of the use
of the concept. Second, throughout their account, they consistently commit the fallacy of begging
the question; they assume, rather than argue for the position that the dominant epistemic location
of those who commit microaggressions is not only correct, but the only position from which
microaggressions can be reasonably understood. Employing the concepts of oppression and
feminist standpoint theory, we now elaborate upon this position by responding in turn to each of
the four claims that are central to their critique.30

30

As noted above, we will not be arguing in defense of feminist standpoint epistemology here, but rather are taking it
as a premise in our response. Others have argued for the validity of standpoint epistemology (see, for example, Collins
1990; Harding 1993; Wylie, 2003, 2012) and we are taking those arguments as valid and therefore, as a valid starting
point for our argument. Lukianoff and Haidt, on the contrary, neither provide, nor cite any justification for their
epistemological starting point or assumptions. It’s also worth underscoring that the goal of this chapter is not,
primarily, to defend the value of a standpoint theoretical approach to epistemology, but rather, to use that (previously
argued for) approach to defend MRP against what we take to be fallacious critiques.
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1.5.1.

Response to claim 1

Lukianoff and Haidt’s first claim is that some professors and university administrators are
indoctrinating marginalized students to see slights where they do not really exist. This is a
strawman argument. Students who are members of marginalized groups do not need to be taught
that they are experiencing microaggressions; rather, insofar as they are members of marginalized
groups, and given the pervasiveness of microaggressions (Sue 2010), chances are very good that
they’re already intimately acquainted with the phenomenon (even if they did not previously have
the language or concept available to describe it).31 Being on the receiving end of microaggressions
is not something that marginalized students are experiencing for the first time on university
campuses (even if microaggressions become heightened or more prevalent in academic settings).
As our account of oppression detailed above has indicated, oppression is both structural and
systemic. As has been argued in the introduction to this dissertation (and will be reiterated in
chapter 2), microaggressions are one of a variety of phenomena that bolster such oppressive
structures. Though at times oppressed people need some consciousness raising to see their
oppression (or, to have it “de-mystified”), they are not being taught to be oppressed or to
misinterpret things that are not oppressive as such. If anything, they are being given the language
and conceptual tools with which to name and frame something they already experience. In many
cases, oppressed people already possess this knowledge (that is, the knowledge of their experiences
with oppression) whether or not they have the term “microaggression” to name it as such. Such
knowledge is the result of lived experience and daily interactions with oppressive systems and
structures.32

In a very counter-intuitive move (given their overall position), Lukianoff and Haidt concede this very point: “It is
undeniable that some members of various identity groups encounter repeated indignities because of their group
membership” (44). However, in keeping with their larger project, they go on to argue that even so, once members of
these groups step back and see that these indignities were not intentional, and interpret them differently, that most of
the initial, superficial harm associated with them falls away. Below, we discuss how and why this understanding of
how microaggressions work fails to understand the nature of microaggressions and the context in which they occur
such that it is almost never simply a choice for those on the receiving end as to interpret them otherwise.
31

32

Still, a critic might argue that although members of marginalized groups have experienced oppression before, they
are now being taught to recognize certain ambiguous remarks as instances of oppression. Even if we grant this point,
that’s not the same as teaching students to be oppressed or to recognize oppression where it does not exist. Rather, it’s
just a matter of giving students a name to a phenomenon with which they are already intimately familiar, but which
they may lack the language or concepts to describe. Recall that in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968), Paulo Freire
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Part of Lukianoff and Haidt’s first claim is that not only are professors and administrators teaching
students about microaggressions, but that they are also teaching students to feel victimized when
they have not in fact been wronged. 33 Recall, they suggest that professors and others are
encouraging students to feel offended or to feel negative emotions in response to experiencing
microaggressions. This claim is also false. Professors and administrators who have a stake in and
who are committed to the wellbeing of their structurally marginalized students do not desire for
their students to feel negative emotions, even when such negative emotions are perfectly
reasonable responses. Rather, the opposite is true. The goal of professors and administrators who
aim to bring attention to microaggressions and other such behaviors is not to encourage negative
emotions (or otherwise feelings of discomfort) in those students, but rather to reduce or prevent
those negative experiences by bringing awareness of microaggressions to those committing them.34
The main target audience of most microaggression awareness campaigns is not marginalized
students or people– since they do not need to be told what microaggressions are, how they feel, or
the harms they cause; they already know this quite well as a result of their lived experiences.

argued that the first step to liberation and empowerment is ‘naming’ an oppressive event. What occurs when students
learn about “microaggression” is a rectification of a hermeneutical injustice, in Fricker’s sense of the term (2007).
Recall that one of her examples of a hermeneutical injustice (pp. 149-152) is women gaining the concept of ‘sexual
harassment,’ which helped make sense of what they were already experiencing, but previously did not have the
language and conceptual framework to properly describe; moreover, without the commonly accepted language, it was
far more difficult to see the systemic nature and frequency of the problem. Providing students with the language to
better understand and conceptualize what they are experiencing can potentially help them to both understand what
they are experiencing and also to avoid internalizing microaggressive messages (see Torino et al. 2019; 9, 15). For
Derald Sue’s response to Lukianoff and Haidt’s 2015 article, see Sue 2019.
For Sue’s response to this point, see 2019, pp. 238-240. I have also indicated in the introduction to this thesis that
harms and wrongs come apart; to name something as a harm does not necessarily mean that it is wrongful. It is not
clear that Lukianoff and Haidt are aware of or employing the distinction between harms and wrongs.
33

34

A quick sampling of microaggression workshops makes it clear that there are primarily two types: the first is aimed
at teaching people (who potentially or actually commit microaggressions) what microaggressions are, to identify when
they have committed them, and how to respond so as not to exacerbate the harm caused (see, for example, Banks
2015; Fine et al. 2018; Kite et al. 2013; Restorative Justice Center UC Berkeley; Microaggression Awareness
Campaign at Metro State University Denver). The second type of workshop is for students who have been recipients
of microaggressions, but the aim is not to teach students to identify harms where no harms exist, rather, they are to
impart resilience building strategies to cope with the harms experienced (see, for example, The New School for Social
Research Health Services website for information on both kinds of workshops https://www.newschool.edu/studenthealth-services/anti-violence/micro-aggression/).
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Rather, attempts to draw attention to microaggressions and their harms are aimed at those who are
not likely to be on the constant receiving end of microaggressions and other slights, and thus are
likely unaware of the real harm they cause. The idea is to educate those with greater social power
or privilege about the seemingly subtle ways in which they can reinforce and perpetuate structural
and systemic oppression, and ideally to get them to avoid doing so as much as possible.
Lukianoff and Haidt have missed the mark in their understanding and articulation of the aims of
microaggression research, education, and advocacy; as a result, they have attacked a strawman.
We contend that Lukianoff and Haidt make this strawman argument because of their fundamental
lack of understanding of structural and systemic oppression, and because they don’t recognize that
systemic oppression is the condition for the possibility of the occurrence of microaggressions.
Without an understanding of what it is and how it works, one will never understand precisely what
microaggressions are, and crucially, the enduring harms that they cause to those on the receiving
end of microaggressions. As is evident in Marilyn Frye’s birdcage analogy detailed above, those
caged in by the various dimensions of oppression (of which routine microaggressions are a part)
do not need to be taught or told about the various pieces of that oppressive system; this is their
everyday lived reality. It is those on the outside of the cage (Lukianoff and Haidt, for example)
who are unable to see the full system and how the pieces connect to one another to create and
maintain an oppressive structure. It is imperative to understand microaggressions within the
broader context of oppression and in relation to other oppressive forces that work alongside of
microaggressions.35 To fail to do so is to misunderstand the phenomenon entirely.

1.5.2.

Response to claim 2

The second claim made by Lukianoff and Haidt is that marginalized people who claim to have
experienced microaggressions have chosen to (mis)interpret someone else’s words or actions in a
way that is uncharitable to the agent. Again, their position entirely misses the mark, underscored
by their failure to understand what oppression is and how it works and the fact that they choose to

35

For a description of the ways in which microaggressions connect via a spectrum of aggression to other forms of
oppression and violence, see McClure 2019.
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understand microaggressions atomistically, isolated from the larger context of oppressive systems
in which they occur.36 In so doing, they make two assumptions. First, that microaggressions can
be simply brushed off, that is, that the experience of microaggressions can be separated from the
harm which results from them; second, that microaggressions tend to be one-off instances and
therefore, do not result in any cumulative harm. Both of these assumptions are false. 37 Members
of marginalized groups experience microaggressions on a routine basis. As Sue writes,
People

of

color

do

not

just

occasionally

experience

racial

microaggressions. Rather it is a constant, continuing, and cumulative
experience. Thus, racial microaggressions remind them that they live in a
country where persons of color are not frequently represented in Fortune
500 companies, that they continue to occupy the lower rungs of
employment, that segregation continues in many facets of their lives, that
they continue to receive inferior education and health care, and that they
continue to fill the ranks of the unemployed. They may be reminded that
history books never taught them about the contributions of their groups
and when they are presented, it is often a dysfunctional or pathological
portrayal (Sue 2010, 52-53).
Failure to acknowledge this pattern of microaggressions and their connection to larger
discriminatory acts might result in the notion that one can simply brush off a single slight or choose
to interpret it differently. But, for example, when a student of color is constantly asked if they are

Rini makes a similar point about how in Lukianoff and Haidt’s 2015 article on microaggressions, they ignore the
systematicity of the phenomenon (2018, 336); also see Friedlaender (2017, 5-6).
36

One can even return to Pierce’s original account of microaggressions to see that an emphasis in understandings of
the concept of microaggressions has always been on their repeat nature and the cumulative harms that they cause.
When he first introduces the term “microaggression,” Pierce writes that “[e]ven though any single negotiation of
offense can in justice be considered of itself to be relatively innocuous, the cumulative effect to the victim and to the
victimizer is of an unimaginable magnitude” (Pierce 1970, 266, our emphasis). Then several years later, he and his
co-authors underscore that “the cumulative weight of their never-ending burden is the major ingredient in black-white
interactions” (Pierce et al. 1978, 65). For an excellent account of the cumulative harms of microaggressions, see
Friedlaender (2017), especially section II. Also see Brennan’s discussion of the aggregative effects and patterns that
are relevant to understanding discrimination (2016, pp. 245-247).
37
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on a diversity scholarship, as opposed to a merit scholarship, or if a professor of color is mistaken,
on a weekly or daily basis, for a janitor, it becomes more and more difficult not to internalize the
message being sent – that one is getting a free ride to university because one is Black and not on
the basis of one’s accomplishments and intelligence, or that one does not belong in academia,
respectively.38 Here we are not at all concerned with the intentions behind the comments, which
might have no maliciousness behind them. Such comments, and the kind of internalized oppression
in which they result, are not easily brushed off, nor can one choose to interpret them more
charitably, so to speak, as we discuss in what follows, in light of an abundance of empirical
evidence.39 As Rini writes, “We need to keep in mind that when we ask how a victim ought to
respond to a microaggression, we are not asking how they ought to respond simply to a single
isolated incident. We are asking how they ought to respond to an incident which they know to be
just one piece in a much larger pattern” (2018, 335).
Second, their claim rests on the assumption that microaggressions can be brushed off because they
do not result in any real harm. This too is false. While we’ve all likely been told when we were
young that “sticks and stones can break your bones but words can never hurt you,” most of us
know that words can hurt you in a variety of ways, with a variety of short- and long-term
consequences, and that this is what Lukianoff and Haidt fail to take seriously. We have argued
elsewhere that recipients of microaggressions experience real and serious harms, epistemically,
emotionally, and in terms of their self-identity (see Freeman and Stewart 2018 and chapter 3 of
this thesis), and there has been substantial empirical research measuring the extent to which
microaggressions contribute to negative consequences (for an overview of such empirical work,
see Williams 2019, 13-16). It is not a matter of mere “hurt feelings” as Lukianoff and Haidt write

As O’Dowd notes, “[c]ritiques of microaggressions discourse has often ignored the lived reality of recipients and
the cumulative nature of the damage caused, as well as mischaracterizing those who complain in ways that bear the
hallmarks of epistemic oppression and injustice” (2018, 1231). Also see Tschaepe (2016, 88) for a contextualist
approach to microaggressions.
38

Bartky (1979) describes [internalized] psychological oppression as follows: “To be psychologically oppressed is to
be weighed down in your mind; it is to have a harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem. The psychologically
oppressed become their own oppressors; they come to exercise harsh dominion over their own self esteem. Differently
put, psychological oppression can be regarded as the ‘internalization of intimations of inferiority.’” For an account of
internalized oppression within psychology, see David and Derthick (2014).
39

57

(somewhat belittlingly, since even if recipients do feel hurt, we should still acknowledge and care
about that). Moreover, there is an abundance of empirical research that shows that negative affect
(such as that demonstrably brought on by microaggressions) is correlated with a myriad of
psychological and probably physiological harms. 40 Some of the real harms that have been
correlated with racial microaggressions as well as microaggressions that target other dimensions
of identity include lower self-esteem (Nadal 2009; Nadal et al. 2014), lower emotional well-being
(Ong et al. 2013), traumatic stress symptoms (Moody and Lewis 2019), feelings of alienation
within university communities (Solorzano, Ceja, and Yosso 2001), underage binge alcohol
drinking (Blume, Lovato, Thyken, & Denny 2012), increased depression (Nadal et al. 2014), being
in a chronic state of “racial battle fatigue” (Smith et al. 2011), and even increased thoughts of
suicide (O’Keefe et al. 2015). There is also empirical evidence of the harms associated specifically
with microaggressions experienced by members of the LGBTQ+ community; including
heightened self-scrutiny and internalized homophobia and/or transphobia among LGBTQ+
individuals (Nadal, Issa, et al. 2011; Nadal, Wong, et al., 2011); lack of belongingness in school
settings (Linville 2018); as well as feelings of alienation, loneliness, and being unlovable as who
one is (Munro et. al 2019).
When someone is harmed in any or all of these ways, they are not able to make a conscious decision
to “interpret” the actions committed against them differently (that is, as not harmful). Let’s
consider the analogy of physical harm in order to underscore the absurdity of saying otherwise.
When someone goes to the doctor with a leg that is clearly broken, rarely do health care providers
debate whether or not that person’s leg is in fact broken, whether that person is really in pain, or
whether they are suffering as a result of it. Nobody would tell that patient to simply choose to
interpret their injury differently, or to imagine the pain away. Nobody would even suggest that

40

For example, Watson and Clark (1988), demonstrate a correlation between negative affect and depression and other
negative health outcomes. Conversely, the following studies show that the presence of positive affect is a good
predictor of psychological health (Fredrickson et al., 2005; Ong et al., 2006; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004) and
longevity (Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001; Levy, Slade, Kunkel, & Kasl, 2002; Moskowitz, 2003; Ostir,
Markides, Peek, & Goodwin, 2001). Also see Sue (2010, chapter 5) for an account of the biological and psychological
stressors that result from microaggressions, in addition to some of the more long-term consequences on one’s physical
and psychological well-being.
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they should try. To do so would be absurd. Similarly, when one’s very identity is continually called
into question and diminished or when their heritage is denigrated by microaggressive actions or
comments – which can result in a different kind of non-physical pain, but pain nonetheless—it is
non-sensical, even offensive, to tell that person to just grow thicker skin and interpret the
microaggressor’s comment more charitably (e.g., as not harmful). Such a claim can only be made
by someone whose identity has never been called into question and who has never personally
experienced the harmful consequences of systemic oppression or discrimination. What Lukianoff
and Haidt fail to see is that what we are talking about is not a matter of mere interpretation, mere
“hurt feelings,” or merely “being offended” by a single comment or slight (6, 7). Microaggressions
cause serious and enduring harm because they are recurrent (Levchak 2019). People cannot choose
not to be harmed by comments that repeatedly call into question and diminish their identity and
personhood. Contrary to the popular children’s rhyme, sticks and stones can break your bones and
words can very much hurt you.
Yet Lukianoff and Haidt state that if only recipients of microaggressions would “look at the facts”
they’d see that their “interpretation” of the actions or comments was “uncharitable” (41-42). They
even go further to say that those who have been charged with committing microaggressions should
be given the benefit of the doubt.41 These are classic moves of privilege.42 Their view that the
recipient’s understanding is necessarily wrong and theirs – born out of their position of social

There are two additional issues here: (1) they assume that the feelings experienced aren’t real or reality-tracking in
some way, that recipients feel this way but they shouldn’t because they are contrary to the facts (that is, that the
feelings experienced on account of microaggressions do not meet some basic standards); and (2) even if one assumes
that those feelings are not ‘correct’, it does not necessarily make the one experiencing those feelings wrong to
experience them, nor does it show that one can easily disconnect the feelings from the causes.
41

It is worth drawing attention to the main focus of Lukianoff and Haidt’s moral concern here: they are more
concerned with the feelings and wellbeing of, and general fairness toward, those people who are committing
microaggressions (more often than not, more socially dominant or privileged people vis-à-vis those being
microaggressed), and they fail to consider the potential for harm to the person on the receiving end of those comments
and actions who already occupy vulnerable positions. Their only worry is that microaggressors are being wronged by
having their actions misinterpreted and their characters maligned (3). They write that recipients of microaggressions
ought to “transform a victimization story into a story about [their] own agency, and it would make it far more likely
that the interpersonal exchange would have a positive outcome” (42). (Positive, for whom, one might ask.) It is clear
from their normative statement that their loyalties lie with those who committed microaggressions and not with
recipients. This is resonant with Kate Manne’s (2017) conception of “himpathy,” where there is misplaced and
disproportionate empathy and concern directed at the person causing harm, and minimal (or zero) empathy, care, or
concern directed at that person’s victim or target.
42
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dominance or privilege – is necessarily correct, reflects their epistemically disadvantaged
positioning with respect to this particular question. Standpoint theory allows us to show just how
problematic their lack of perception is, and how it leads to this extremely shortsighted analysis.
Recall that Alison Wylie explains that “to do social science as a standpoint feminist is to approach
inquiry from the perspective of insiders rather than impose on them the external categories of
professional social science, a managing bureaucracy, ruling elites” (2003, 27). The reason why
standpoint epistemologists make this move to prioritize the social positions of those who occupy
the “bottom” of a socially-stratified society (the inversion thesis), is because those who occupy
this marginalized position generally have greater epistemic access to understanding [oppressive]
human relations, and to identifying problems to be explained in our social words (Harding 1990,
443). If you have never been harmed on the basis of your identity, chances are that it will be more
difficult for you to identify the nature, the consequences, and the severity of such harm. (Recall
Frye’s birdcage analogy described above, and how difficult it can be for those on the outside of
the cage to see the systemic ways in which the bars are interlocking, when they are only examining
one bar in isolation from the others.) Based on standpoint epistemology, we have good reason to
take seriously charges of microaggressions, since those who have systemically been on the
receiving end of them are more likely to know what microaggressions are and how to identify them
(thesis (i)), understand the significance of ongoing experiences with microaggressions and how
harmful they are (thesis (ii)), and are better situated to recognize the role that microaggressions
play in upholding oppressive structures, and how microaggressions relate to larger systems of
dominance and oppression (thesis (iii)).

1.5.3.

Response to claim 3

Lukianoff and Haidt’s third claim is that talk of microaggression and their harms is representative
of a distorted worldview and that those who possess this world view need to be cured of it by CBT
or other kinds of therapies and interventions. Importantly, and like their second point, this “claim”
is actually an assumption that they make rather than a claim for which they argue; once again, this
leads them to commit the fallacy of begging the question. In our overview of standpoint theory,
we noted that contemporary feminist standpoint theory rejects the thesis of automatic epistemic
privilege: “[S]tandpoint theorists cannot claim that those who occupy particular standpoints
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(usually subdominant, oppressed, marginal standpoints) automatically know more, or know better,
by virtue of their social location” (Wylie 2003, 28). However, from the reverse perspective (that
is, from the perspective of those with greater social power and privilege), an assumption of
automatic epistemic privilege is equally problematic and also exactly what Lukianoff and Haidt
have done: they have assumed, rather than argued for, the automatic, necessary superiority of their
epistemic position, not allowing for the possibility that those who receive microaggressions might
have some valuable insight into their own experiences. On their view, any perspective from a
marginalized position that deviates from their perspective is both wrong (as we discuss in our
response to claim 4), and, even more strongly, on their view, potentially pathological. What we’d
like to underscore is that they provide no argument for why their position is better, more correct,
or the only reasonable perspective from which to approach the question of microaggressions and
their harms. Rather, it is simply assumed.
Their position fails based on theses (i) and (ii) of standpoint theory. Based on (i), they fail to
recognize that those who occupy systemically oppressed positions are often more reliable detectors
of instances of oppression, including microaggressions, than those who occupy dominant social
positions. Based on (ii) they fail to recognize that people in systemically oppressed social positions
are more likely to understand the moral significance of oppression, including the harms of
microaggressions. When it comes to questions regarding the workings of oppression (including
microaggressions), those who experience oppression directly generally have the epistemic
advantage (acknowledging, in line with revised accounts of standpoint theory, that they are not
infallible).
Their position is also problematic for two additional reasons: first, it amounts to gaslighting
marginalized people; and second, it is based on a racist and sexist assumption. To the first point,
what Lukianoff and Haidt have engaged in by assuming their worldview is correct and leading
anyone whose worldview departs from it to believe that they are not only wrong, but pathological
is a textbook case of gaslighting. Kate Abramson defines gaslighting as “a form of emotional
manipulation in which the gaslighter tries…to induce in someone the sense that her reactions,
perceptions, memories and/or beliefs are not just mistaken, but utterly without grounds—
paradigmatically, so unfounded as to qualify as crazy” (2014, 3; also see McKinnon 2017 for the
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specifically epistemic harms of gaslighting). Telling members of marginalized groups that their
perceptions are “distortions of reality” (40) and that they should not “trust their feelings” (41) is a
clear case of this. Gaslighting is harmful because over time, it can cause people to lose their grip
on reality, to lose their sense of self, and/or to doubt themselves as competent knowers. Arguments
like the one Lukianoff and Haidt have provided have the consequence of making oppressed people
feel crazy for accurately perceiving and experiencing microaggressions. This is incredibly
damaging, both in the short and in the long term.
In addition to being a textbook case of gaslighting, the assumption that Lukianoff and Haidt make
has both racist and sexist undertones. This is because, the assumption that women, queer people,
and people of color are “crazy,” or, to use Lukianoff and Haidt’s language, hold “distorted views”
(40) and need to be subjected to various medical and psychiatric interventions has a long, painful
history for those groups.43 Calling people “crazy” when they speak out against their oppression is
a classic tool of power and privilege that has been long used to keep people in oppressed positions,
and to prevent them from challenging the status quo. Furthermore, the historical tendency to take
white, cis-men as the norm for intelligence, rationality, and epistemic agency has been incredibly
damaging to women and other oppressed groups, and has functioned to keep them out of positions
of power, status, and knowledge production (see, for example Harding 1982; Tallbear 2019; and
the now feminist classic, A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity
(Antony & Witt 2002)). These biases against the epistemic agency and credibility of women,
people of color, queer people, and others have been critically scrutinized (e.g., in the growing

For example, for centuries the label “hysteria” (which is actually derived from the ancient Greek word ‘hystra’,
which means uterus) was attributed to women and used to justify isolating them from other people or using abusive
“therapeutic” techniques on them (for an overview of this history, see Tasca et al. 2012; also see Kukla 2005). See
also the The Atlantic feature (Blazevich 2019), which focuses on how in the 1800s, “insane asylums” were used to
control women who had been deemed violent, difficult, or crazy, but who were likely just rebelling against the social
constraints of their time. Psychiatry has also been used as a tool to discriminate against and harm other marginalized
groups. Jonathan Metzl (2010) details how the schizophrenia diagnosis was weaponized against Black men who were
vocal advocates of civil rights and resisting their second-class status. He suggests that, at least in part, the sudden
influx of such diagnoses could be traced to a change in wording in the DSM-II which, compared to the previous edition,
added "hostility" and "aggression" as signs of the disorder. For more on the history of institutionalized racism and the
pathologization of Black people, see Fernando 2017. “Homosexuality” remained classified as a mental illness until
1973, allowing LGBTQ+ community members to “treated” by various psychiatric methods, including painful shock
therapies and other harmful methods of “conversion” (see Carr & Spandler 2019; Scot 2017).
43
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literature on epistemic injustice; see, for example, Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus Jr., 2017) and
Lukianoff and Haidt demonstrate a staggering lack of awareness of this harmful historical legacy,
and the abundance of intellectual work that has been focused on combatting it.

1.5.4.

Response to claim 4

Related to their third claim – that if you think microaggressions are real, you are living with a
cognitive delusion that needs to be fixed – is Lukianoff and Haidt’s final point: that is the
suggestion that there is only one appropriate worldview from which to understand and theorize
about microaggressions, namely, theirs. Recall the problem is that these interpretations reflect a
particular worldview most often fostered by those acting/thinking from the socially privileged but
epistemically disadvantaged position (on this particular issue). So only minds ordered like theirs
(i.e., people who occupy similarly socially-advantaged social positions) are in a position to see
everything clearly. This is a classic case of the privileged eye (or as Marilyn Frye (1983) calls it,
the “arrogant eye”). This is also, we contend, a clear instance of cultural imperialism (as Young
(1990) understands the term, and as we outlined in section 1.4.1 above). Remember that cultural
imperialism is a face of oppression that occurs when the experiences, cultural symbols, and
perspective of the dominant cultural group are normalized and posited as universal for everyone,
rendering other groups who do not embrace such norms to be invisible, inferior, deviant, and
'Other.' It results in a situation in which those at the margins are defined from outside the
mainstream and are subsequently placed at the social margins, away from center.
As with the previous two claims, Lukianoff and Haidt do not argue for the superiority of their
worldview; rather, they simply assume it.44 This allows them to act as if their worldview is the
only possible one, simply because it is the one that they inhabit and, as a result of being at the
cultural center, the only one they can see. But why should we readily accept the idea that there is
only one worldview from which to understand microaggressions, or that their worldview is the
correct one? Recall the three central theses of feminist standpoint theory outlined in section 1.4.2.
and developed in response to Lukianoff and Haidt’s third claim above. These tenets of feminist

44

Also see Sue’s response to the assumptions that Lukianoff and Haidt make (Sue 2019, 237-239).

63

standpoint epistemology have already given us strong reasons to doubt this (e.g., that the
worldview of those with relatively greater social power and privilege is more likely to be correct
when it comes to analyzing oppression).
The tenets of feminist standpoint theory, as we have elaborated on them, have also give us strong
reasons to trust and defer to the knowledge claims of those marginalized people who report their
own first-hand experiences with microaggressions. Lukianoff and Haidt do not even consider the
possibility that a different social location (and thus, a different worldview and different set of
experiences from which to approach the question), could be epistemically valuable, giving us
different information and better access to knowledge about the nature and harms of
microaggressions than they have access to (from their relatively dominant social positions).
Though they assume here, without argument, that there is an objective fact of the matter, and that
those who perceive that they have experienced (and furthermore have been harmed by)
microaggressions are simply getting those facts wrong, they fail to consider that it is indeed the
alternative position – namely, that microaggressions do not exist or are not harmful – that does not
align with the facts of the matter and the realities experienced by many oppressed people. 45
Returning to the birdcage analogy, for Lukianoff and Haidt, it is as though any insights that are
made or feelings that are experienced from inside the cage are a priori false and thus ought to be
discounted until that bird is freed and comes to see reality for what it is, on the outside of the cage.

Conclusion: Toward a Different Framework for Thinking About
Microaggression
In sum, our argument is this: understanding the systemic nature of oppression is crucial for
understanding what microaggressions are and how they work; it allows us to see the structural
context in which microaggressions occur, which in turn, foregrounds the fact that for members of
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See Clark and Spanierman (2019) for an account of how microaggressions can also negatively affect people in
dominant social positions. One of their claims is that those who benefit from a system of privilege and oppression
often have a skewed perception of social reality and are often unaware of how maintaining their privilege comes at
the social and economic expense of members of oppressed groups. They specify that the false sense of social reality
of those who occupy dominant social positions can lead to a denial of individual bias and an overreliance on an
egalitarian worldview whereby the privileged extend cognitive effort to appear nonbiased.
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marginalized groups, microaggressions are never just one-off instances that one can choose to
ignore or brush off, nor do they occur in a vacuum, disconnected from other structural and systemic
forms of oppression. Without rooting microaggressions in oppression, one will never arrive at an
accurate understanding of the concept/phenomenon. Additionally, standpoint theory provides an
epistemological justification for prioritizing the knowledge and experiences of marginalized
groups, which can legitimate the harms caused by microaggressions that are currently being called
into question by critics of the MRP. Using standpoint epistemology underscores the important
differences between trying to conceptualize microaggressions (or any oppressive phenomenon)
from the perspective of the perpetrator (which often gets things very wrong) and conceptualizing
it from the perspective of the recipients. It also provides a rationale for not only taking seriously
the position of members of marginalized groups, but for starting the analysis of microaggressions
from their perspective. Using oppression and standpoint theory to guide our understanding of
microaggressions thus renders all of Lukianoff and Haidt’s critiques moot. Moreover, such a
background for thinking about microaggressions can motivate the formulation of a revised account
of microaggressions – one that is more explicitly grounded in a different epistemological starting
point – which can then better assuage the concerns of critics like Lukianoff, Haidt, and Lilienfield.
Such an account would be guided by and would theorize from the perspectives of the recipients of
microaggressions, namely, structurally oppressed people, insofar as it puts the articulation and
description of harms that recipients of microaggressions experience at the center of the analysis,
as opposed to the actions or statements of those who commit microaggressions.46 In so doing, it
reflects a better awareness of how social situatedness and relative differences in social power
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Though we do not have the space to elaborate upon it here, we have provided such an account in Freeman & Stewart
(2018, included in this thesis as chapter 3) and are developing it more fully in Microaggressions in Medicine
(manuscript in progress). Our overall aim in both is to reconceptualize microaggressions from the perspective of those
on the receiving end, which motivates our development of a new, harm-based taxonomy of microaggressions:
epistemic microaggressions, emotional microaggressions, and self-identity microaggressions, named as such for their
corresponding harms, which are epistemic, emotional, and existential respectively. We contend that the defense of
microaggression theory provided above also serves as a justification for such a revised conception of microaggression,
namely, one which is more attentive to the harmful nature of microaggressions (and the precise nature of those harms),
and which starts from the perspective of those most likely to be on the receiving end.
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impact lived experiences and knowledge production, and centers those who, with respect to
oppression, are better epistemically positioned to know microaggressions well.47
While our argument here has focused on responding to the first part of the critics’ objection –
namely, that microaggression theory is misguided insofar as microaggressions do not cause any
real harm, and therefore, should not be taken seriously – we would be remiss were we not to briefly
mention (and briefly respond to) the second part of the criticism, namely, that even if
microaggression theory were worth doing, it cannot be done well, since microaggressions cannot
be studied reliably in an empirical way.
In a 2017 paper for the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science, Scott O. Lilienfeld argues
that the MRP rests on a number of unfounded assumptions, for which there is negligible empirical
support. His central claim there is that the concept ‘microaggression’ cannot be sufficiently
operationalized. Insofar as this is the case, he argues, microaggressions cannot be studied with
empirical accuracy, and thus, the harms of microaggression cannot be empirically measured or
verified. On these grounds, he calls for a moratorium on microaggression theorizing, as well as
microaggression awareness trainings and campaigns.
While it is beyond the scope of our present project to develop a comprehensive reply to this latter
point, we find it valuable to at least point the reader in the direction of growing literature that is
doing precisely what Lilienfeld (2017) has argued cannot be done, namely, empirically measuring
the harmful effects of microaggressions. (See, for example, Williams 2019).48 While our central
aim here was only to respond to the first part of the critique of MRP, what motivated this project
was the broader goal of defending the continuation of research and advocacy around
microaggressions, in other words, of justifying this research by showing that we have good reason
to believe that microaggressions are real, and that they cause real and enduring harm to those who
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Note that I address possible objections to this standpoint-based claim in chapter 2 of this thesis. The defenses and
clarifications of standpoint offered there should be taken to apply here, too.
We also cited some of this empirical literature above in our reply to Lukianoff and Haidt’s second claim. We would
also like to flag others who have responded to the claims made in Lilienfeld (2017), including Sue (2017), Parente &
Kaplin (2017), and Williams (2017) and (2019).
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routinely experience them. We leave it to those trained in the social sciences to continue the
important empirical work of quantifying the short- and long-term harms of microaggressions.
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Chapter 2
2. Making Sense of “Microaggression”: On Family Resemblance and
Standpoint Epistemology

Abstract:
Concerns have been raised regarding the coherency and usefulness of the
microaggression concept (Lilienfeld 2017a, 143-4). The primary concern
is that the concept has not been clearly defined, and as such, is not
practically (i.e., scientifically) useful. Despite the fact that philosophers are
beginning to pay heightened attention to the phenomenon of
microaggressions (e.g., their moral, social, and political impacts and
implications), philosophers have not yet provided a robust accounting of
the concept of microaggression. This is surprising, as philosophers are
uniquely positioned to help clarify the concept of microaggression and
explain its coherency in the face of such concerns. Specifically,
philosophers have the necessary tools to explain how a concept like
microaggressions can be useful, even where an exhaustive set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for defining the concept cannot be identified. In
this chapter, I address the mounting concerns about the clarity and
coherence of the concept of microaggression, and specifically the
difficulty in offering a precise definition of the concept. I argue that, even
in the absence of necessary and sufficient conditions, microaggression is a
perfectly fine and useful concept; there are plenty other strategies available
for explaining the concept without appealing to necessary and sufficient
conditions. I illustrate the possibility of conceptualizing microaggression
absent necessary and sufficient conditions by appealing to what Ludwig
Wittgenstein (1953) has called “family resemblance.” When applying a
family resemblance approach to microaggressions, we can see that one
way of understanding the concept of microaggressions is by recognizing
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that microaggressions share a set of common, overlapping features that
link related instances together, but are not necessarily all present in all
cases. We can recognize instances of microaggression insofar as they share
resemblances with other clear instances. In other words, we recognize clear
connections between phenomena called microaggressions, because they
share in a set of relevant, overlapping features. I offer a preliminary
accounting of such relevant features, which, taken together, can form the
basis for a family resemblance account of the concept of microaggression.
The ability to make sense of the concept of microaggression by way of
family resemblance is but one possibility for responding to concerns about
the inability to define microaggressions. The upshot is that even if we
cannot define microaggressions with necessary and sufficient conditions,
we can still make plausible sense of the concept and apply it meaningfully
in practice. Finally, despite the difficulties involved in pinning down
microaggressions in practice (e.g., determining what counts as an instance
of the concept), I argue that some people, in virtue of their social and
epistemic

locations,

are

better

suited

to

identify

and

name

microaggressions in practice. I argue this by drawing on the vast literature
in feminist standpoint epistemology (Alcoff and Potter 1993; Hill Collins
2004; 2008; hooks 1984; Harding 2004; 2008; Toole 2019; Wylie 2012).
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Introduction
The term “microaggression” was first coined by Chester Pierce (1970) and subsequently developed
to refer to the phenomenon of “subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which
are ‘put downs’” (Pierce et al. 1977, 66).49 In the past decade, the concept has experienced a
renewed attention, particularly in the field of psychology, following the work of Derald Wing Sue
(2010; Sue et al. 2007; 2008) and more recently that of his former student, Kevin Nadal (2013;
2018; Nadal et al. 2011; 2012; 2014) and others (Kanter et al. 2017; Williams 2020).50 It is now
widely accepted that “microaggressions” refer to brief and commonplace verbal, behavioral, or
environmental indignities which signal bias against or hostility toward members of marginalized
groups. They can be intentional (see Friedlaender & Ivy 2020) or unintentional, and are rooted in
prejudice or bias that is implicitly or explicitly held. Importantly, microaggressions are thought to
be a routine part of the experience of marginalized people. In other words, those who experience
microaggressions do not experience them only once, or as a “once off.” Rather, those who
experience microaggressions tend to experience them systematically (Rini 2020), from many
different people in various social and institutional contexts.
Let’s consider a few examples (and for additional examples, see the introduction to this thesis).
Misgendering Professor: A professor, P, is made aware that one of his students is trans, and is
told that, though the student has not yet been able to update their university profile, they go by a
different name and pronoun. Though the professor is told this (and indeed, is reminded more than
once in a faculty meeting), the professor continues to deadname and misgender the trans student.
One time, a colleague says something about the student (using their appropriate gender pronouns),

49

A shorter version of this paper is published in volume 37 of Southwest Philosophy Review (2021). I am grateful to
my audience at the annual Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy (CSWIP) meeting in 2019, held at the
University of Guelph, where a draft of this paper was presented. I am also grateful for endlessly fruitful conversations
about the nature of microaggressions as well as the insights of feminist standpoint epistemology with my friend and
collaborator, Lauren Freeman. Finally, I am grateful to Carolyn McLeod for helpful commentary and feedback during
the development of this paper, as well as Rob Stainton for invaluable feedback and redirection that has greatly
benefitted the paper.
50

For a more detailed background on the development of microaggression, see the introduction to this dissertation.
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only to have the professor, P, interrupt to insert the wrong pronouns. This does not happen in front
of the student this time, but has on several other occasions.
“That’s So Gay!”: A group of friends are hanging out together. One friend in the group is openly
gay. In listening to an account of a negative experience one of the friend’s is describing, one of the
friends blurts out “That’s so gay!”. The gay friend hangs his head, saying nothing.
Reductio: A student is dealing with mental health issues and has been called “insane” by their
family members. While sitting in logic class, watching their professor demonstrate a reductio ad
absurdum, the professor repeats, several times “that conclusion would be insane!” The word insane
is used several times in the class, to describe what could otherwise be called a contradiction.
“Real Mom”: A young Chinese girl is on a walk with her white adoptive mother. They stop to
play at the park. While playing, a new friend asks the young Chinese girl where her mother is. The
young Chinese girl points at her mother. The new friend asks, “Oh, but what about your real
mom?” The young Chinese girl suddenly feels confused, and a bit sad.
“That’s ‘Dr.’ To You”: A junior professor, who happens to be a woman, is thrilled to start
teaching her first classes as a newly minted PhD. However, she finds that all of her students refer
to her, in email and in person, as “Ms.” She is rarely, if ever, addressed as “Prof.” or “Dr.”, though
her male colleagues always are.
Purse Clutching: A white woman is walking down the street. As she passes an alley, a Black man
who is taking a shortcut on his way home from work appears in the alley. Upon catching his eye,
the woman quickly and tightly clutches her purse. The Black man sees this, drops his gaze to the
ground, and decreases his walking pace so as to not further startle her.
You might be asking yourself – what are the commonalities here? Or, what makes each of these
distinct examples recognizable as instances of the same phenomenon: microaggression? Such
questions motivate this chapter, and I will return to them below. They are all, I believe, examples
that most microaggression theorists would want to call instances of microaggression. And yet, as
I will show, they each have different aspects which complicate attempts to provide a neat and tidy
definition of microaggression. Despite their apparent differences, I believe that it is imperative for
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the microaggression theorist to be able to explain how each of these examples fit together and fall
within the extension of the concept of microaggression. This chapter will offer one way of unifying
these examples and ones like them, namely, via an appeal to family resemblance theory. In so
doing, I show that should it be difficult to find an exhaustive set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for the concept of microaggression, this does not render the concept meaningless;
rather, there are other possible ways for theorizing the concept, including by way of family
resemblance.
The chapter will proceed as follows. In section 2.2 I will set up the problem. Specifically, I will
take seriously the concerns that the concept of microaggression is elusive and requires
clarification. I will demonstrate the difficulty involved in pinning down necessary and sufficient
conditions for the concept. In section 2.3, however, I will argue that the inability to identify
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept does not render the concept meaningless. Many
perfectly useful and coherent concepts lack clear necessary and sufficient conditions, or otherwise
face some of the same definitional challenges faced by microaggression. There are ways out of the
definitional problem, namely, philosophers have conceived of additional ways for making sense
of concepts that resist narrow and fixed definition. Though there are multiple such ways of
understanding concepts, I will illustrate the coherence of the microaggression concept by drawing
on one of them, namely, family resemblance theory. I will provide an overview of such an account,
suggesting that understanding microaggression as a family resemblance concept is a perfectly
reasonable way of making sense of the concept. Taking seriously the concern that
microaggressions are elusive and hard to identify in practice, in section 2.4 I argue that one’s
epistemic standpoint is relevant for how well suited one is to identify the central features of
microaggression as described in section 2.3 (and ultimately, instances of microaggression), in
practice. I raise and respond to some objections in section 2.5.

Setting Up the Problem: Definitional Challenges and Conceptual
Confusion
The phenomenon of microaggression is incredibly complex. As they are most often understood,
microaggressions target a diverse range of marginalized identities, drawing on myriad stereotypes
and biases. They can take many forms: verbal, gestural/behavior, or environmental. As a result,
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the range of things understood as falling within the extension of “microaggression” is incredibly
broad. Moreover, there is debate, even amongst microaggression theorists, regarding what
characteristics of microaggressions, if any, are essential and how we ought to conceptualize them
(for some characteristic examples of attempts to identify what is necessary to the microaggression
concept, see McTernan 2018; Rini 2020).
Some have expressed concern that this amounts to a serious flaw with respect to the concept of
microaggression, which threatens its scientific significance and practical usefulness. For example,
psychologist Scott Lilienfeld (2017a) argues that the scientific basis of the microaggression
research program hinges on the coherence and soundness of the microaggression concept, which
he believes has not, to this point, been effectively demonstrated by microaggression theorists. He
writes, “In the case of the microaggression concept, it is dubious whether its definition is
sufficiently clear or consensual to permit adequate scientific progress. (143).
Despite such challenges from critics of microaggression theory, there has been very little effort on
the part of philosophers to engage in the project of clarifying the concept. Most philosophers
working on microaggressions have focused their attention on the moral, social, and political issues
that microaggressions raise. For example, Christina Friedlaender (2018) has taken up the project
of elucidating how we can attribute moral responsibility for the harms of microaggressions. Emma
McClure (2019) has ventured to make sense of how microaggressions fit on a “spectrum of
aggression” with other acts of oppression and violence. Regina Rini (2020) has attempted to
articulate strategies for combatting or offsetting microaggressions and their harms and has offered
normative recommendations for how we ought to respond to microaggressions when they occur.
This is all incredibly important work – work that philosophers are well-suited to do!
However, despite the recent increase in attention to microaggressions among philosophers, they
have not yet used their training and skills to attend to the concept of microaggression itself: to
answer to the questions of how we ought to understand the microaggression concept and speak to
concerns about its coherence. This general lack of engagement with the conceptual issues
generated by microaggression registers as a mistake, or at least a serious oversight. The lack of
conceptual clarity is one grounds for dismissal of the usefulness of the concept; to that end, these
conceptual issues precede the moral, social, and political ones philosophers have been responding
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to. Put another way, if we cannot demonstrate that the microaggression concept itself is
meaningful, the rest of the philosophical work on microaggressions seems empty, or unimportant,
or unjustified. It is incumbent upon philosophers to do this work, as it is philosophers whose
training prepares and positions them to undertake such conceptual work.
In what follows, I will take steps in the direction of clarifying the concept of microaggression,
though far more work is needed in this domain. My very limited aim will be to show that the
concept of microaggression remains coherent, informative, and useful even if it lacks one hallmark
of conceptual clarity: a definition comprised of an exhaustive set of necessary and sufficient
conditions. Future work must continue to query the concept and sharpen its conceptual boundaries.
To move us in this direction, let me first illuminate the challenge of defining microaggression. To
illustrate this difficulty, I will offer several initially plausible attempts at definition, and show how
each is susceptible to an equally plausible counterexample.
Definition 1: A microaggression is a bit of speech which subtly conveys hostility or bias.
This first, initially plausible attempt to define microaggression is too narrow. We can see that it is
too narrow by revisiting the “Purse Clutching” example above. Though most microaggression
theorists would agree that a microaggression has occurred in that example, no bits of verbal speech
took place. Instead, the microaggression was conveyed via body language. Let’s try again.
Definition 2: A microaggression is a bit of speech or body language which subtly conveys hostility
or bias.
Though a valiant attempt, definition 2 also proves too broad: we must amend the definition again!
Why is this the case? Because this second definition leaves the concept far too open. As written,
this definition would include any subtle comments or body language which convey hostility or
bias against anyone, on any basis. But this doesn’t fit with ordinary use of the term, nor does it
map onto the phenomenon microaggression theorists want to single out. When thinking about the
concept of microaggression, we want to zero in on hostility and bias which target not just anyone
on any grounds, but rather which target specific people for specific reasons: members of
structurally marginalized groups (e.g., people who are marginalized on the basis of race, gender,
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sexual orientation, etc.) and on the grounds of some stereotype or bias about that group. This is the
case in all of the examples provided above, namely, they draw on biases and/or stereotypes
experienced by members of structurally marginalized groups.
Definition 3: A microaggression is a bit of speech or body language which subtly conveys hostility
or bias toward members of marginalized groups.
We might worry that the above definition is still too imprecise. For example, it might be overly
inclusive. Lots of speech and body language can subtly convey hostility toward or bias against
members of marginalized groups, and not fit with our common understanding of microaggression.
For example, the use of a slur might fit here. Or, the invoking of a stereotype. But microaggressions
are different from the use of a slur or the invoking of a stereotype, even if they are closely related.
We want to single out a distinct phenomenon. Let’s try again.
Definition 4: A microaggression is a bit of speech or body language which subtly and
unintentionally conveys hostility or bias toward members of marginalized groups.
Perhaps the above definition avoids the issue of being overly broad and inclusive. For example, it
might separate out intentional acts of discrimination, hate speech, or slurs by adding the
“unintentionality condition.” But wait! Many microaggression theorists believe that
microaggressions can be intentional or unintentional (Freeman and Stewart 2018; Friedlaender
and Ivy 2020). Consider the example of “Misgendering Professor” above. In that example, the
professor was fully aware of his student’s appropriate pronouns but opted not to use them in a
conversation about the student. This appears to be an intentional case of microaggression. We still
haven’t pinned it down!
We could continue on in this fashion, but I believe the result would continue to be the same:
regardless of what definition we try, we can think of plausible counterexamples that prove the
definition to be faulty. Moreover, there is disagreement from within microaggression theory
regarding some of the characteristics in play, such as whether microaggressions are necessarily
intentional (or, alternatively, necessarily unintentional). Pinpointing an exact definition of
microaggression (and figuring out what exactly falls into its extension) is incredibly difficult. But
what does this entail for the fate of the concept?
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You might think that running into these challenges shows that the concept itself is flawed; if it
were a meaningful and useful concept, after all, pinning down a precise definition wouldn’t be so
difficult, and there wouldn’t be so much internal dispute amongst theorists about that definition.
However, I believe that drawing such a conclusion is too quick – moving to toss out the concept
over such definitional challenges reflects a limited understanding of the available possibilities for
theorizing concepts. Specifically, it assumes that the only way (or, at the very least, the preferred
way) of making sense of concepts is by way of conceptual analysis aimed at identifying necessary
and sufficient conditions for the concept under consideration. One such a view, the way we define
a concept is by pinning down its clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions. (A necessary
condition is one which must be present in order for that use to be appropriate. A sufficient condition
(or set of sufficient conditions) produces the condition (e.g., all sufficient conditions must be met
or realized for an appropriate use of the term or concept)). With respect to microaggressions,
necessary and sufficient conditions would work in the following way:
[Nec.]: If a characteristic, C, is necessary for a microaggression, M, to
occur, you will only have an instance of M where characteristic C is
present.
[Suf.]: If characteristic, C, is sufficient for a microaggression, M, to occur,
then M has occurred just in case C is present.
[Def.]: On this approach, where C is the set of jointly necessary and
sufficient conditions, a definition of microaggression would take the
following form: An act, A, is an instance of microaggression, M, iff
characteristic, C is present.
Though this sounds rather straightforward, when applied to a wide-ranging concept such as
“microaggression,” which needs to account for a vast array of related but non-identical
phenomena, sorting out which characteristics are jointly sufficient to constitute microaggression
becomes incredibly messy. The four failed attempts at definition offered above go some way
toward demonstrating this sort of difficulty.

87

In order to further illustrate this difficulty, let’s return to two of the examples introduced in section
2.1 above. One example introduced above is the intentional misgendering of a trans person
(“Misgendering Professor”). Another example involved someone using the phrase “that’s so gay”
in front of their gay friend (“That’s So Gay!”). Both instances are, in both common (viz., nonacademic) and theoretical discourses, widely recognized as and referred to as instances of
microaggression. 51 Let’s start with characteristics they seem to share. Both of these examples
involve brief remarks. Both remarks are likely common, repeated, or routinely heard by the person
being microaggressed (e.g., the trans student might be misgendered regularly, and the gay person
likely hears casual remarks such as “that’s so gay” often as well). Both reflect bias against a
structurally marginalized identity (trans identity in the first instance; gay identity in the second).
We seem to be getting somewhere.
However, these two cases also depart from one another. In the first example, “Misgendering
Professor,” the microaggression was delivered intentionally (e.g., the professor consciously and
reflectively misgendered their student). In the second example, “That’s So Gay!,” we can assume
that the person would not intentionally hurt their gay friend. In other words, we can assume that
this microaggression was delivered unintentionally. This is one point of contrast, which illustrates
a conceptual difficulty with microaggressions: they can be intentional or unintentional (cf.
Friedlaender and Ivy 2020).
There is yet another difference between the two examples that I think is worth highlighting,
because I think it reflects a further challenge in pinning down the concept of microaggression. In
the first example, the microaggression was directed at the target specifically. By “directed at,” I
mean a comment that is either said to, or clearly stated about, a particular person (in this case, a
particular, identifiable trans person). The second example doesn’t quite function like that. In the
second example, the speaker makes a microaggresive comment that indirectly impacts the recipient
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I do not mean to suggest here that there is not active confusion, and debate, about where to draw the conceptual
lines regarding what should be included and excluded in the concept of microaggressions. In other words, I do not
mean to suggest that there might be some people, and perhaps some microaggressions theorist, who might disagree
with one or both of these examples. (Hence the conceptual ambiguity under discussion). But, I think these are two
relatively non-controversial examples, which have been discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature on
microaggressions, and I think that, at the very least, they illustrate the difficult I am trying to get at.
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(that is, the gay person who is present when the remark is made). Though the comment is general
and is not directed at the gay person, it can nevertheless be impactful. An interesting feature of
microaggressions is that they can impact people without being specifically directed at them (e.g.,
because people overhear microaggressions directed at someone else, or because some
microaggressions come in the form of general comments (e.g., “That’s so gay!”), or because some
microaggressions are built into our very environments (e.g., masculinist language that excludes
non-men but is supposed to read as “universal,” such as “All men are created equal”))
By looking at just these two examples of microaggressions, of the many, many possible examples
to consider, it is evident that microaggressions can come in very different forms, with differing –
even conflicting – characteristics. (The six examples included in the introduction above are
provided to offer some initial sense of this variability and complexity).
Upon reflection, most contenders for characteristics that might be necessary and jointly sufficient
for the concept of microaggression to apply are vulnerable to counterexamples. Microaggressions
can be intentional or unintentional; they can be rooted in implicit bias or explicitly held prejudicial
beliefs; they can come in the form of verbal comments, gestures or body language, or be embedded
within our physical environments; and they can target a wide array of marginalized identities (e.g.,
race, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic class, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation,
dis/ability status, body size). As a result of all of this complexity, particular instances of
microaggressions can, and do, look very different in practice. This makes the concept itself appear
incoherent and obscure – the concept of microaggression feels so nebulous and inclusive of so
many different things, without any obvious overarching unity to tie it all together (cf. Lilienfeld
2017a). Moreover, this makes the project of determining necessary and sufficient conditions for
the concept of microaggression appear doomed to fail.52 And yet, we still need a way of making
sense of the many diverse examples of things that we call ‘microaggression,’ such as the six
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One could object here that I have not shown that this project of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for
the concept of microaggressions is impossible, but rather that I have only shown that will be incredibly difficult.
Whether or not identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of ‘microaggression’ is theoretically possible, all I
have to show for my purposes here is that it is 1) difficult but 2) not essential to the project of legitimating the concept
of microaggression as meaningful and useful. This is because, as I will show, there are other perfectly reasonable ways
of making sense of concepts, including by appeal to family resemblance (though there are others).
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examples offered above and others, as well as a way of speaking meaningful about the concept
itself. This is one important contribution to microaggression theory that philosophers are wellpositioned to make – philosophers have resources for understanding concepts that do not readily
decompose into a clean set of necessary and sufficient conditions. We can appeal to other theories
of concepts to make sense of the coherency and usefulness of the microaggression concept, thereby
addressing the definitional concerns raised by microaggression critics (e.g., Lilienfeld 2017a). I
will demonstrate this possibility with one plausible approach for theorizing the microaggression
concept – namely, family resemblance theory – in what follows.

A Way Out of the Problem: Conceptualizing Microaggressions via
Family Resemblance
So far, I have set up the following problem: the microaggression concept is difficult to pin down,
especially using certain methods that philosophers tend to rely on (e.g., conceptual analysis aimed
at identifying necessary and sufficient conditions). This appears to threaten the usefulness of the
concept, leading certain microaggression critics to suggest that the concept ought to be abandoned
and microaggression theorizing and advocacy put on pause (cf. Lilienfeld 2017a). In what follows,
I aim to offer one possible route for rescuing the microaggression concept and demonstrating its
coherence. Specifically, my claim is that concepts do not need to be understood by appealing to
necessary and sufficient conditions; philosophers have other ways of theorizing concepts. In this
section, I will provide one such way, namely, I will offer a tentative family resemblance account
of microaggression. In so doing I do not intend to claim, definitively, that this is the only way (or
the best way) of theorizing the microaggression concept. Rather, I use an appeal to family
resemblance to demonstrate my main claim: that the microaggression concept can be meaningful,
useful, and coherent, even if it does not neatly parse into necessary and sufficient conditions. Let’s
now turn to the approach.
In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) aimed to offer a challenge to the
classical view of concepts, and instead offer an alternative way of thinking about and
understanding language and concepts. Instead of seeking out an underlying and universal essence
of a concept, he argued that we should instead look directly at our actual world and our practices
of language and see how the concept is actually used in order to try to grasp the general parameters
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of acceptable usage. What we do when we use concepts in language is set out conditions for the
concept’s permissible use. It turns out that we often use the same concept to refer to a wide range
of instances of a phenomenon, which are not identical, but are closely enough related to all of the
other uses to be a sensible instantiation of that concept. The instances to which the concept is
applied do not necessarily all relate to each other in the same way. Rather, they generally overlap,
at least enough that competent language users can recognize their unity (albeit imperfectly).
Understanding concepts in this way can be called “family resemblance.”
Wittgenstein illustrates this point by using the concept of ‘game.’ Specifically, he argued that there
is no singular essence which underlies all things that we apply the concept of ‘game’ to: some (but
not all) games are played for fun; some (but not all) games are played professionally; some (but
not all games) are played for gambling, or even as a result of an addiction; not all games have
scores or points; not all games have teams; some games can be played alone while others cannot;
not all games require equipment, and so on. Rather, we can identify instances of ‘game’ by their
having some of these features, though not necessarily all of them. Games can relate to other games
on some, but not all of these fronts. They are like a family in this way, in which different members
of the family share some features with some members, and different features with other members,
which together make them identifiable as a family unit.
Wittgenstein’s articulation of family resemblance theory offers a promising route for explaining
how it is the case that the concept ‘microaggression’ can be consistently and reasonably applied in
practice, despite the seeming impossibility of finding some shared essence that unifies every
discrete instance of it. In general, family resemblance theory offers a way of thinking about unity
and cohesion for concepts that seem inherently varied and diverse, by rejecting essentialist
tendencies and instead taking a more pragmatic route to understanding concepts. Scholars have
found Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ approach beneficial for understanding what unifies
various concepts, including “woman” (Munro 2006) and “genocide” (Snow 2015), and even as a
model for machine learning (Vadera et al. 2008). It has been viewed as a valuable approach for
understanding concepts that have meanings which shift, broaden, or otherwise change overtime,
and for which there is a genuine risk associated with defining the concepts too narrowly.
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When applied to the concept of ‘microaggression,’ family resemblance theory can help us to avoid
problems that arise from trying to provide a narrow and precise definition of a microaggression
via appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions. The potential problems include that: (i) if
construed too narrowly, a concise definition is likely to exclude things that common usage might
include, including instances of what people report experiencing as a microaggression; (ii) new
forms of microaggression that arise might not be captured by the definition (i.e., a static definition
cannot adequately account for an inherently dynamic concept)53; (iii) essentialist definitions are
often unable to account for context-dependency (i.e., people will experience and perceive
microaggressions differently as a result of their identity and other features of the social situation);
and finally, (iv) a static definition can contribute to people doubting the testimonies of already
oppressed people when they report that they have been microaggressed, if their experiences do not
conform to the singular definition.54 For all of these reasons (and likely others) the concept of
‘microaggression’ does not lend itself to a universalizing or totalizing definition, aimed at
capturing “the essence” of the concept and articulated as a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions. We ought to instead think about what unifies the varied and diverse instances of what
we experience as microaggressions and draw our understanding of the concept from there.
Importantly for my purposes, doing so shows that we can think meaningfully about the
microaggression concept without needing to pin down necessary and sufficient conditions.
Though I do not intend to offer a definitive accounting of the concept of microaggression here, I
will offer a tentative framework for a family resemblance account of the concept. Again, in so
doing, my claim is not that this is the only way to theorize the microaggression concept. Rather,

I say that the concept of ‘microaggression’ is a dynamic one because the concept is responsive to social facts (i.e.,
various forms of bias, stereotyping, etc.). These will naturally shift with the social and political landscape. For a
comparison, think of slurring terms that go in and out of being a slur (i.e., as a result of historical or social context,
terms that were previously considered a slur can cease to be so, through processes of appropriation or otherwise, or
can cease to be a slur for select ‘in-group’ users (see Anderson 2018)). I am suggesting that just as our social and
political landscape is dynamic, what is experienced as microaggression will be as well.
53
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For a parallel problem, consider people who bring forward claims of harassment, or even rape, and are disbelieved
or not taken seriously insofar as their experience does not conform to the given legal definition or the dominant social
myths and narratives around those particular acts (see Alcoff 2018 on rape myths and narratives; see Fricker 2007 on
the problem of the disbelieving testimony of marginalized people as a result of widely held social beliefs and
stereotypes).
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my aim is to show that this is one plausible way to make sense of the meaning of microaggression.
With that qualification in mind, let us now consider what features unify the many instances of what
we call microaggression, viz., let’s develop a family resemblance account of the concept.
I contend that the following set of features can be thought of as forming the basis of a family
resemblance account of the concept of ‘microaggression.’ Microaggressions are recognizable as
such because they generally share (albeit to different degrees) the following features:
microaggressions

are

contextually-defined,

subtle,

attributionally

ambiguous,

usually

unintentional, and often the result of implicit biases or otherwise non-conscious cognitive
processes. Their harm is also likely to fly under the radar, and their harms are cumulative in
nature. These seven features, I argue, form the basis of the concept; it is some combination of
these features that we appeal to when we are discussing microaggressions theoretically, and which
allow us to recognize when a microaggression has occurred in practice. To be clear, I do not
identify these as necessary or sufficient conditions.55 Rather, I identify them as sources of overlap,
commonality, and resemblance, which help tie microaggressions together into a recognizable
phenomenon.
Let us consider each in turn. First, microaggressions are contextually-defined. We are able to
theorize about, and recognize in practice, how certain comments, gestures, or actions are
inappropriate, offensive, or harmful vis-à-vis some particular social setting or political context.56
Particular comments or actions, for example, are harmful as a result of taking place within the
context of certain hierarchical power structures, where some groups experience oppression as a
result of their group membership. That some group is oppressed (and thus that some comments or
actions that are rooted in that oppression are harmful) is a contingent fact. It could be otherwise.
As such, microaggressions and their harmful consequences are the product of socially-contingent
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I am not foreclosing the possibility that one, or even several, of these conditions might be necessary. However, my
aim is not to decide this. Rather, my aim is to show that we can think and talk about the concept even if we cannot
locate necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept.
56

For example, ones like ours which are stratified by race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, dis/ability
status, body size, and so on.
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facts and power relations. These social features differ, at least in some respects, across different
social, cultural, and political contexts. Microaggressions pick up on and reflect dynamics of power
and oppression, which are the product of specific social conditions and political arrangements that
could (and can!) change.
Consider the “Real Mom” example above (that is, the example of the young Chinese girl playing
with a new friend at the park who is asked about her “real mom”). In that example, the
microaggression picks up on socially contingent facts about the unequal valuing of non-biological
parenthood (e.g., adoptive parents, step-parents, second-parents, guardians, or kin parents). This
devaluing of non-biological parenthood is a product of social relations and meanings and
reinforced by a lack of equal legal and institutional representation for non-biological families (see,
for example, the following report on the impacts of unequal parental leave on non-biological
parents, McLeod et al. 2019). That only biological parents are considered “real” is what gives this
comment its microaggresive force. But this assumption is socially and contextually defined; it is a
contingent fact that could change with more representation and recognition of non-biological
parenthood and child-rearing.
The context-specificity of microaggressions goes beyond broad scale social facts, however.
Sometimes microaggressions are contextually-fixed in an even narrower sense: for example, where
they only make sense or carry a certain force within the space of a particular community or
institution with its specific norms. Here, I think of examples from my own life as a first-generation
college student turned academic. As I have progressed through graduate school and have begun
making my way into the profession of academic philosophy, I have realized that there are many
norms and assumptions that are relatively unique to the academy, and in some cases to the
discipline of philosophy. For example, among graduate students, there is often an assumption that
one’s parents are also professors, or, at the very least, have some elite, white-collar profession. So,
for example, when upon entering my MA program I was asked by a fellow incoming grad student
“what my parents did?” this struck me as a class-based microaggression in that context (though it
likely wouldn’t register the same way in some other, less elite, context). Similarly, when my ability
to shut off my Southern accent betrays me, I get subtle microaggresive remarks about my accent
(and the unexpectedness of my accent) that reflect certain class norms and intellectual assumptions
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that pervade the academy. The assumption is that Southern accents equate to stupidity or ignorance
and attach to people who are not expected to be educated. I encounter this assumption, and the
microaggressions rooted in it, in academic spaces. I would not readily encounter them in some
other contexts such as, for example, the working-poor neighborhood in Kentucky that I grew up
in. So, microaggressions can be quite context-specific, even in a fairly narrow sense (e.g., not at
the broader social level, but rather within sub-cultures and/or specific institutional settings). Put
another way, some microaggressions get their meaning and force as a result of the narrow and
specific norms found in sub-communities or contexts that are narrower and more specific than
society writ large. This only adds to the difficulty of making sense of microaggression, especially
when one is not familiar with all of the relevant and specific norms in some particular context.
Second, microaggressions are characteristically subtle, especially when compared to other acts of
explicit discrimination or violence.57 While microaggressions are (like discrimination and many
other sorts of violence) properly thought of as manifestations of unjust background conditions and
their subsequent power differentials, they are a more elusive mode of oppressive action.
Consequently, microaggressions often pop up, and often pass by, in routine social interactions
across a variety of contexts. They may at times even go unnoticed by some, or all, people present
when the microaggressive comment or action was made. Consider again the “That’s ‘Dr.’ to You”
example offered above. It is plausible to think that the junior professor’s being called “Ms.” (while
her male colleagues are regularly referred to as “Dr.”) would go unnoticed by other students, and
perhaps even her colleagues. This reflects the subtlety of even the most frequently occurring
microaggressions.
Microaggressions might remain “invisible” to those present until they are brought to the surface
and made salient, often as a result of having the microaggression “called out” by the recipient of
the microaggression or a bystander. At times, we might only realize long after the fact that

See McClure (2019) for a discussion of how microaggressions fit on a “spectrum of aggression” that ranges from
overt and intentional assaults to unintentional microaggressions (though, as I have noted above, microaggressions, on
my view, need not be unintentional. For a discussion of intentional microaggressions, see Friedlaender and Ivy 2020).
57
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something we have said, or done, or heard constitutes an instance of microaggression. For
example, we might realize, in response to education or personal reflection, that certain terms or
phrases that we have used in the past are microaggresive. For example, many common phrases
reflect ableist language or entrenched sexism or homophobia. We might think here of commonly
used phrases, such as telling young boys that they are doing some activity, X, “like a girl” in the
presence of girls, where “X” is something we are socialized to believe women and girls cannot do
well. The “That’s So Gay!” example above of a friend casually using the phrase “That’s so gay”
to denote something negative or unwanted is also an example of this. Upon serious reflection, we
might come to find that much of the vocabulary and phraseology we use (or used to use in the past)
frequently reflects and reinforces problematic assumptions and biases. This sort of reflection is
encouraged in a variety of sensitivity trainings and workshops aimed at drawing attention to our
implicit biases and stereotyping perceptions. Unfortunately, however, such opportunities for
serious critical reflection are still too uncommon. Without serious reflection, the many subtle
manifestations of stereotypes, prejudice, and bias can remain difficult to recognize (and thus
difficult to prevent or resist).
As a result of this marked subtlety, microaggressions can cause a confusing sense of attributional
ambiguity for those who experience them and for others. Veronica Ivy (2014) describes
attributional ambiguity as the feeling we experience when it is unclear why someone behaves a
certain way toward us, such as when they provide a positive or negative evaluation of our actions.
Ivy provides the example of a young, attractive undergraduate student being given the high mark
of an A+ in a biology lab and being unsure whether the mark was given to her because she
genuinely earned it or because the graduate teaching assistant was attracted to her (Ivy 2014, 867).
The agent’s motivation for treating the undergraduate student in a particular manner is ambiguous,
most of all to the student herself.
This sort of ambiguity in motives, and the lack of clarity about how to appropriately interpret
another’s comments or actions, is often present in the case of microaggressions. This is to say that
microaggressions are often difficult to interpret by everyone – even those on the receiving end.
Targets of microaggressions might wonder whether what they experienced really was an instance
of microaggression, or whether for example, a particular comment or gesture was warranted in
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light of their level of knowledge, expertise, or whatever it may be. Microaggressions, as such, can
cause targets to doubt themselves and their ability to accurately interpret their own experiences.
(This is what Bartky 1979 describes as the internalization of oppression, or psychological
oppression.) They can also lead targets to wonder about the intentions of those who they feel have
microaggressed them. Not being sure how to interpret the words and actions (or the underlying
intentions of others) can compound an overall sense of confusion. (There is good evidence that it
is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the intentions of others; see for example Schwitzgebel
2008; Pronin 2009; Williams 2020). In this way, microaggressions align with other forms of
structural and systemic oppression (which, as I noted in the Introduction to this thesis, often
become “mystified” or obscured).
To the extent that people are able to understand their own intentions (although as agents we are
generally quite bad at this, too 58 ), we can give the benefit of the doubt that in most cases,
microaggressions are unintended on the part of those who commit them. Indeed, microaggressions
can be committed by people with good or even beneficent intentions (e.g., teachers, health care
providers) and even those closest to us (e.g., family members, partners, allies, co-workers,
neighbors, or friends). Given the frequency of microaggressions (see Rini 2020 on the
systematicity of microaggressions), and especially those that are committed by people who
generally do not desire to cause us harm, we can ascertain that microaggressions are often (albeit
not always) committed without the intention to do so, and certainly without the intention to cause
harm. It is a distinctive feature of microaggressions that they are a mechanism of oppression that
is not always (and perhaps not even often) mobilized with the explicit intention of reifying
oppression.59 They have this impact despite, and perhaps in spite of, the intentions of those who
commit them.
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The vast empirical literature on the phenomenon of implicit bias seems to indicate that we are not always fully
aware of the intentions behind our words or actions; we can act on implicit biases and beliefs which are not consciously
available to us, and which we do not explicitly endorse. For an analysis of this point, see Saul (2012). There is also
evidence to suggest that we are also quite bad at introspection. On this point, see Pronin (2009).
59

I have set out, in detail, how I am understanding oppression in the Introduction to this thesis. Put simply here, I take
oppression to be structural and systemic, embedded into the fabric of our social norms and institutions, and so
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We can explain the fact that microaggressions are often committed unintentionally once we
recognize that microaggressions are often the result of implicit biases or otherwise non-conscious
cognitive processes. That is, people can commit microaggressions without explicitly endorsing the
oppressive (e.g., racist, misogynistic, homophobic, transphobic) views that undergird them, and
indeed, while explicitly rejecting them and/or being committed to justice broadly speaking. For
example, a white person who is a committed anti-racist might not explicitly endorse racist beliefs,
but nevertheless might microaggress a Black friend or colleague. The microaggression likely
results from implicit biases, or internalized negative social stereotypes about Blackness, that
operate on us at a subconscious level.60 Or, for another example, we might misgender our trans
friend, despite our best intentions, as a result of deeply entrenched cis-normativity and a
widespread social commitment to the sex/gender binary. These social norms, beliefs, and attitudes
can act on us in ways that we do not fully realize, at times manifesting in microaggressions.
The final two features of microaggressions concern harm: the harms of microaggression are likely
to fly under the radar or be difficult to recognize,61 and this is, at least in part, because the harms
of microaggressions are cumulative in nature and compound over time.62 Microaggressions can
cause harm, even in instances where neither the perpetrator nor the target perceive that a harm has
been done, and these harms accumulate over time, slowly and often unrecognizably, until the

“normal” as to be invisible to everyone, potentially even to the oppressed themselves (Frye 1983; Young 1990; Bartky
1979).
60

See Fricker (2007) for a discussion of negative-prejudicial identity-based stereotypes that are contained within the
collective social imagination which can drive oppressive practices (on her account, epistemic injustices, and for our
purposes, microaggressions). On implicit bias, see Holroyd (2015) and Holroyd et al. (2017).
61

Note that this is a different point than the previous one (that is, that microaggresive actions are attributionally
ambiguous). While the former point about attributional ambiguity refers to the lack of clarity about how to attribute
intentions to the agent committing the act, or how to appropriately understand the act, the point here is about the
recognizability of the harms that result (e.g., whether the harms are detectable, to those committing microaggressions
or to those being harmed). Again, the ability for harm to be obscured is reflective of the mystification of oppression
(Bartky 1979). And, as I argued in the Introduction to this thesis, I contend that harm can (and often does) occur
without the awareness or recognition of the person being harmed.
62

See Evans and Mallon (2020) for a discussion of how small harms can result in bigger harms.
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molehill has become a mountain. The consequences of the cumulative harms of microaggressions
can be varied, but include, for example, the development of internalized oppression (cf. Bartky
1990), experiences of otherness and lack of belonging, and loss of social trust (for a discussion of
these long-term consequences of microaggressions, see chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis).
I contend that these seven features, taken together, constitute a preliminary articulation of what
makes microaggressions resemble one another enough to recognize them as diverse instances of
the same phenomenon. Being recognized as an instance of microaggression does not require that
each and every of these conditions be met in each discrete instance. For example, while some
microaggressions are more ambiguous (e.g., “That’s ‘Dr.’ to You” example above of the junior
woman professor being routinely addressed as “Ms.”), some are more overt and obvious (e.g.,
“Misgendering Professor” example above of the professor who intentionally misgenders a trans
student to another colleague). As such, some microaggressions are more likely to pass by
unnoticed, while others might stand out more readily. Or, there might be cases of microaggression
which are intentional (e.g., “Misgendering Professor”), or for which the experience of attributional
ambiguity is lacking for the person on the receiving end. In other cases, the person being
microaggressed might assume that the act was unintended (e.g., “That’s So Gay!”). On the view I
have outlined, instances of microaggression are related via overlapping resemblances of a variety
of these common features, even where one or more of the named features is absent. The relations
of the features to one another may shift – microaggressions can have various combinations of these
features and still be recognizable as instances of microaggression. Importantly, we can talk
meaningfully about the concept and the phenomenon of microaggression by understanding the
microaggression concept in this way. There is precedent for this way of understanding concepts,
which philosophers ought to engage with in order to offset worries about the definitional
challenges facing the microaggression concept.

Who Knows It When They See it? Standpoint Matters for
Microaggression Recognition
Before concluding, I want to address one additional, related concern about the microaggression
concept and the phenomenon it describes. This is the worry that microaggressions are so broad
and ambiguous that there aren’t reliable ways for figuring out when they have occurred in practice
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(Lilienfeld 2017a, 144). Furthermore, in some cases, microaggressions are only identified and
named as such retroactively (ibid.). The general concern is that because the concept of
microaggression and the phenomenon it describes is so elusive, knowing when we can identify
some instance as falling under the extension of the concept is tricky. I grant this difficulty:
microaggressions are indeed puzzling, and often difficult to identify and name in practice.
However, I do not think this difficulty is equally realized for all who encounter microaggression.
Rather, I think some people are better equipped, as result of their social and epistemic locations,
to recognize and name instances of microaggression as such. Put another way, I think standpoint
matters for recognizing and naming instances of microaggression in practice. Let me develop this
idea further.
Taking seriously a commitment to standpoint epistemology epistemology (Marx 1976; 1981; Marx
& Engels 1975a; 1975b; 1975c), and particularly feminist standpoint epistemology (see Alcoff and
Potter 1993; Hill Collins; 1990; 2004; hooks 1984; Harding 2004; 2008; Hartsock 1998; also see
chapter 1 of this thesis), I contend that those people who, in virtue of their social location, are most
likely to be on the receiving end of microaggressions are best suited to realize when a
microaggression has occurred. Given the family resemblance analysis offered above, you might
say that some people, as a result of being positioned so as to regularly encounter microaggressions,
are better positioned to recognize the various connections and overlaps between the various
features, and properly identify and name microaggressions when they encounter or experience
them.
Recent advocates of standpoint theory (see Rolin 2009; Toole 2019; Wylie 2004; 2012) argue that
people in oppressed social positions are generally epistemically advantaged with respect to
recognizing oppression, understanding the significance of oppression, and understanding the
connections between individual acts of oppression and larger oppressive systems and structures. I
contend that this is the case here, namely, that those who are on the frequent receiving end of
microaggressions are generally better suited to recognize microaggressions when they occur, and
also to understand their significance, including the harms they cause and how those harms connect
to larger, interlocking systems of power and oppression (for a longer version of this argument, see
chapter 1 of this thesis).
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As Wittgenstein called on us to look at how language-users actually use a particular concept in the
real world, I think it is similarly relevant for our present purpose to look at how marginalized
people talk about their own experiences with oppression, viz., to examine how marginalized people
use the concept of ‘microaggression’ and what sorts of actions they describe as ‘microaggression.’
I contend that marginalized people are best able to recognize microaggressions (and understand
their moral gravity and broader social significance), because it is marginalized people who are
subjected to routine microaggressions and experience their harms first-hand. Microaggressions are
likely far more difficult for people who have never been on the receiving end of them to recognize
and grasp their significance.
Most generally, the point is about perspective, and how one’s identity and experience shape their
perspective. Our identities and experiences inform what we are likely to perceive (or to fail to
perceive) in our social world; they also shape how we understand and relate to what we perceive.
Consider an innocuous example. My partner is a well-trained mycologist. Her training and broad
set of experiences with finding, identifying, and studying mushrooms has shaped her perception
in significant ways. Consequently, when we go on a hike in the forest, she is far more likely than
I am to notice mushrooms, to be able to name them, to understand why they are growing in the
places they are, and how they interact with the broader ecological context. The way she and I
experience the context of the forest is very different; she notices fungi hidden away that I would
not have noticed and would have simply breezed past without her ability to call them to my
attention. Though we are, in such cases, occupying the very same environment (the forest), and
the objects in question are really there (the mushrooms), the likelihood that either of us will
recognize them or understand them in context is markedly different on account of our past
experiences and how those experiences have shaped our perspectives, attuning our eyes to readily
notice (or in my case, fail to notice) certain things in our environments.
My claim is that recognizing oppression and oppressive phenomena in our broader social context
is like this, namely, our relative experiences with oppression shape our capacities to recognize and
name oppression in practice. Those who live with the constant experience and awareness of
oppression and oppressive structures are better able to recognize and identify instances of that
oppression – no matter how hidden or subtle they may be. The experiences of the oppressed have
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shaped their perception to make them more aware of oppression and its various mechanisms.
Oppression and oppressive phenomena are not features of their environment that they can simply
ignore or not notice – oppression structures the way they move about and engage with their
environments.
Like fungi in the forest, microaggressions are often hidden in plain sight. For those whose
experiences have not attuned their perception to notice subtle instances of oppression, they might
go overlooked. At the same time, they might be readily apparent to those whose perspectives and
perception are shaped by oppression. They are “really there,” even if they are more or less easy to
see for differently situated people.
To bring the focus back to microaggressions, and to make my claim regarding standpoint more
concrete, let’s consider a real example. At a recent divisional meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, a white male attendee approached another conference participant (a
woman of colour) and asked where a particular conference room was located. She replied that she
did not know, only to have the man respond: “Oh, sorry, you look like you work here.”63 I won’t
speculate about this man’s intentions, and indeed, we can give him the benefit of the doubt that he
did not intend anyone any harm by his questioning. However, it is likely the case that, in making
this offhand remark to a young woman of colour philosopher, he was entirely oblivious of the
impact that his words might (and ultimately did) have on her, or the broader context in which such
a speech act is situated. That said, the racist and misogynist undertones were not lost on the young
woman of colour. Moreover, a second attendee in the room (another woman of colour), witnessed
the exchange and immediately recognized it as an all-too-familiar act of microaggression.
Speaking to me after the fact, she noted that comments like this “make her feel like she doesn’t
belong.” That’s a pretty crummy feeling before one is slated to give a conference talk. (Can you
say, “stereotype threat?”).64 The main point here is the following: both women, in virtue of being
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True story – this actually happened.

Stereotype threat refers to a psychological threat that is elicited by a negative stereotype and the resulting feeling
that one can be judged or treated on the basis of the stereotype. This awareness – and fear of being judged – causes
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women of color in a context that is structured by power imbalances and in which people like them
are vastly underrepresented, they were able to recognize this comment as an instance of
microaggression, and also contextualize it within a broader pattern of context-specific facts (e.g.,
that women of color are not expected to be professional philosophers, and are more readily
understood as hotel staff). They are epistemically better positioned to perceive these features of
the man’s comments than he is. They live with certain identities and experiences that make the
significance of such comments more readily apparent. They have a clear sense of how they connect
up with broader patterns and bits of racism that they experience in this context and others.
I believe that this is generally true with microaggressions and other similarly subtle mechanisms
of oppression, namely, that our identities and experience shape our relationship to them, making
us more or less able to recognize them and understand their significance in real time.
In making the claim that those with lived experience of oppression are more likely to perceive
microaggressions, I want to be clear about two things that I am not suggesting. First, I am not
suggesting that the perception of oppressed people is infallible. My claim is weaker than that. The
claim is that our perspectives are shaped in important ways by our lived experiences, which
influence what we can see and what we thereby come to know about the world. As Briana Toole
(2019) characterizes the significance of standpoint, it is about how our identities inform and
influence our knowledge acquisition. The claim is not that our identities make us perfect knowers,
though, they may make us more reliable knowers in a particular context, e.g., regarding
oppression. So, I am not suggesting that oppressed people will get it right one hundred percent of
the time, or that they will have a perception that is perfectly attuned to all subtle instances of
oppression and all microaggressions. The claim is that their experiences make them better able to
see microaggressions, not that they will see or understand them all with perfect accuracy.
To relate this back to the example offered earlier, you might think that while my mycologist partner
is generally far better positioned than I am to recognize and identify mushrooms in the forest, her

the person to perform worse than they otherwise would, were they not made acutely aware of the stereotype (see
discussion in Freeman 2017). Also see Spencer et al. (2016).
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perception will not be perfect or infallible. Though it is rare, she might occasionally miss a batch
of mushrooms that were right in her path. That she occasionally fails to perceive mushrooms that
are in her environment does not detract from the fact that she is, in general, far better positioned
than I (and, realistically, than most!) to perceive, name, and understand mushrooms when they are
present in some environment. Her training and past experiences make this the case. She need not
be a perfect or infallible mycologist (though she is pretty close) to still be better positioned,
epistemically speaking, to know things about fungi and to identify them when she encounters them.
Infallibility does not invalidate the claim of epistemic advantage.
Secondly, intersectionality is relevant here. I do not want to claim, or even to suggest, that all
oppressed people will be equally attuned to all microaggressions. As I have argued, our identities
and experiences make us more apt to notice certain things, and, in light of experiences, to
understand them and their significance in context. But of course, not all oppressed people
experience oppression in the same ways (e.g., I take seriously Young’s 1990 pluralistic picture of
the many ways oppression manifests, or what she calls the different “faces” of oppression). It is
possible (and indeed, likely) that differently oppressed people will be more or less able to notice
different microaggressions, or more or less able to understand the full moral and social significance
of a particular microaggression. For example, a white queer woman might be well-positioned to
recognize gender or sexual orientation based microaggressions in practice (and understand their
connections to systems of misogyny and heteronormativity) but might not as readily perceive the
myriad microaggressions that Black people experience, or the full scope of their significance (e.g.,
their historical significance or the extent of their connection to or roots in anti-Blackness), as a
Black person might. Intersectional differences in experiences of oppression will have impacts on
the ability of differently positioned individuals to recognize microaggressions and grasp their
moral and social significance in practice. Again, our direct experiences with oppression make a
difference, so differently oppressed people will be more and less able to perceive and understand
different types of microaggressions.
In sum, the point is that our experience acts as a guide when it comes to recognizing
microaggressions in practice, and in understanding their connections to broader systems of
structural and systemic oppression. Although it is the case that microaggressions can be elusive,
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and tricky to pin down in practice, those who occupy positions of marginalization and experience
oppression directly are better equipped to recognize them – specifically, to pick up on the
overlapping features of microaggression. First-hand experiences with oppression, including
microaggressions, “train the eye” to better recognize instances of microaggression when they occur
again… and again… and again. Oppressed people generally have an epistemic advantage in this
domain (a point which is developed in chapter 1 of this thesis).

Objections and Replies
Before concluding I would like to briefly consider some objections to the claims I have offered
above.
First, I have claimed that the microaggression concept is coherent even if it does not break down
cleanly into necessary and sufficient conditions, and I have illustrated this by appealing to family
resemblance theory as an example of one way in which we can make sense of the concept without
appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions. One might object to this approach, arguing instead
that there are better or more fitting ways of understanding the concept of microaggression. For
example, one might argue that microaggression is best explained as an “essentially contested
concept” (Gallie 2019) or is better explained by something like a prototype theory of concepts
(Hampton 2006). To answer to this concern, it is worth reiterating what I have set out to do and
what I haven’t. Specifically, my aim in this paper is to address concerns about the challenges
involved in defining microaggression, and related concerns about the coherence and usefulness of
the concept. To this end, I have used an appeal to family resemblance to demonstrate that there
are, within philosophy, ways of making sense of concepts without appeal to necessary and
sufficient conditions. In presenting the family resemblance approach, I have been careful in my
framing: I am not taking a definitive stance on what is the best theory for the concept, but rather
am presenting one possibility for making sense of the concept that gets us around certain concerns
about the concept. I am here using family resemblance as an example of a way around such
concerns, but I am not making a claim that it this the only (or the best) way to understand the
microaggression concept.
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The other possible objections that I want to consider concern my appeal to standpoint
epistemology, and my claim that members of structurally oppressed groups are generally better
positioned to identify and name microaggressions in practice, as well as to have a better sense of
their moral and social significance in context.65 One objection that might be raised against this line
of thinking is the following: but what if oppressed people disagree about whether some instance is
a microaggression. 66 This objection could take two forms: first, what if members of the same
marginalized group disagree about a microaggression purportedly targeting a member of that
group (e.g., two white women disagreeing about a gender based microaggression), and second,
what if two people from differently marginalized groups disagree about a microaggression (e.g., a
white woman and a woman of color disagree about whether some instance is a microaggression).
A few things are worth noting in response to these concerns. First, I have noted above that the
standpoint claim that I am making is not a claim to infallibility or perfect knowledge, but rather is
a claim about a tendency toward reliable perceptions and greater access to knowledge. In the case
of disagreement, it is possible that someone is simply wrong about what they take to be the case.
They could be failing to appreciate, for example, how some comment is rooted in or reinforcing
some harmful group-based stereotype or bias. They might not have all of the relevant historical
background or information about the specific context in which the comment or action is situated,
both of which have bearing on the microaggressive force of a particular comment or action.
For example, consider the “Real Mom” example described at the outset of this paper. Two people
watching that interaction might react differently and come to different conclusions about whether
the instance was a microaggression or not. But those differences could be rooted in differences in
what one knows about preferences for biological parenthood and the marginalization of different
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Insofar as the forthcoming discussion raises objections and replies about my appeal to standpoint epistemology,
they are also relevant to my appeal to standpoint epistemology in the previous chapter. What I say in defense of
standpoint epistemology here can be taken as relevant to what I say about standpoint in chapter 1 as well.
Lilienfeld (2017a) raises a version of this concern. He asks: “If Minority Group Member A interprets an ambiguous
statement directed toward her—such as “I realize that you didn’t have the same educational opportunities as most
Whites, so I can understand why the first year of college has been challenging for you”—as patronizing or indirectly
hostile, whereas Minority Group Member B interprets it as supportive or helpful, should it be classified as a
microaggression? The MRP literature offers scant guidance in this regard” (144).
66
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forms of parenting. They might not know, for example, how loaded the qualifier of “real” is when
attached to the identity of “parent.” Though both witnesses to the interaction might be members
of structurally oppressed groups, they might nevertheless lack some relevant knowledge or
experience which informs the microaggressive impact of that particular comment. In that case,
then, the person who fails to perceive this comment as a microaggression could simply be wrong
about that, in light of missing relevant social information and context. Furthermore, this reinforces
my previous claim that intersectionality is relevant to standpoint: even people who can all be said
to be oppressed will have varied experiences of oppression and, as a result, might not all understand
all types of oppression and marginalization equally. Intersectional differences shape the ability to
accurately recognize different microaggressions in practice, and this is consistent with the
standpoint claim that I have made above.
Another related point is that harm, as I understand it can be objective (for a review of how I am
thinking about harm, see the discussion of harm in the introduction to this thesis). In other words,
some comment or action can be objectively harmful, just in case it reinforces one’s oppression.
This harm occurs regardless of one’s subjective perception of that harm. Microaggressions
reinforce structural and systemic oppression, and as such, constitute a harm (see introduction to
this thesis as well as chapter 3 of this thesis). So, one can be harmed by microaggressions, even
when they do not perceive them, or even when they misperceive them as not microaggressions.
(And, because oppression is, as I have noted, often internalized and mystified (cf. Bartky 1979;
1990), this can, at times, be the case). In a case where an oppressed person fails to perceive an
instance of microaggression as such, or in which two people disagree about whether some instance
is a microaggression, we can look at the comment or act in its context to help settle the dispute or
clarify what has taken place. If the comment or action is one that reinforces stereotypes, biases,
marginalization, or oppression, then it is likely a microaggression in that context, even if one is
unable or unwilling (e.g., as a result of internalized oppression) to perceive it as such. Again –
even those who are generally better positioned to recognize microaggressions are fallible. In such
cases, looking to structural and systemic features of the social and political context can help us go
some way toward sorting it out.
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Conclusion
Microaggressions are difficult to pin down, both conceptually and as they manifest in practice.
Many diverse features of microaggressions (and ongoing debate about what counts as
microaggression) make achieving a precise definition (e.g., in the form of necessary and sufficient
conditions) fraught. Though this has led some to worry about the clarity and usefulness of the
concept (cf. Lilienfeld 2017a), philosophers can help us get around these worries. Specifically,
philosophers have tools for making sense of the meaning of concepts in ways that do not depend
on isolating some essence of a concept or being able to define it with reference to necessary and
sufficient conditions. I have illustrated this prospect by developing one possible route for
conceptualizing microaggression, namely, via an appeal to a family resemblance understanding of
the concept. I have suggested some common features of microaggression which might be thought
to unify varied instances of microaggression into a coherent and recognizable concept. I have also
argued that even though microaggressions can be ambiguous in practice, some people, in virtue of
their social and epistemic positionality, are generally better positioned to recognize them and to
speak to their broader significance as they occur in real time.
This paper has as its motivation a desire to resist concerns about and challenges to the
microaggression concept, and related calls to abandon it altogether. I have suggested that even in
the absence of a fixed definition of microaggression, there is still good reason not to abandon our
attempts to better understand the microaggression concept, in all of its multidimensionality, and
the morally and socially significant phenomenon it tracks. We can, I believe, draw on the
epistemically advantaged perspectives of those on the frequent receiving end of microaggressions
to guide our exploration and theorizing of the concept. With such perspectives as our guide, we
can continue to get a better picture of microaggression and continue to refine our conception and
understanding of it. In the meantime, by appealing to conceptual approaches such as family
resemblance theory, we can go some way toward grasping the unity and coherence of the
microaggression concept. Moreover, we can continue to communicate sensibly about
microaggressions, we can recognize them when they occur in practice, we can describe them and
their consequences to others, and we can continue to theorize about them and advocate for their
reduction in our social lives and linguistic practices.
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Chapter 3
3. Microaggressions in Clinical Medicine

Abstract:
This chapter proposes a recipient-centered, harm-based account of
microaggressions within the context of clinical medicine. In so doing, it
argues

that

microaggressions

can

undermine

physician–patient

relationships, preclude relationships of trust, and therefore compromise the
kind and quality of care that patients deserve. Ultimately, by focusing on
the experiences of those on the receiving end of microaggressions, the
paper demonstrates how harmful microaggressions in clinical medical
contexts can be, and thus provides strong reasons why healthcare providers
ought to know about them and actively work to avoid committing them.
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Introduction67
Damon Tweedy is a psychiatrist, lawyer, and writer. He’s also Black. While in his first year as a
medical student at Duke University, one of his professors saw him in the classroom and asked why
the burned-out light bulb in the room hadn’t been changed, as requested. Tweedy realized that his
professor assumed he was a maintenance worker. Tweedy never took up this incident with the
professor, nor did the professor ever apologize. Tweedy recounts that his best “revenge” would be
to excel in the class, which he ultimately did. At the end of the semester, upon learning that Tweedy
received the second highest grade of over one hundred students, this professor invited him to work
as a research assistant in his lab, still never apologizing for what he’d said earlier in the semester.
Tweedy declined the professor’s invitation. Despite excelling in this class and in medical school,
in Black Man in a White Coat (2015), Tweedy discusses how he internalized this incident and how,
compiled with countless similar occurrences throughout his education and training, the experience
stayed with him. He continually had to battle impostor syndrome 68 and tried to overturn and
disprove stereotypes. This caused him significant stress and anxiety (2015, 24ff.).
Though Tweedy doesn’t analyze his experience using the language of microaggressions, this
occurrence is a clear example of one. Microaggressions can be defined as verbal, nonverbal, and/or
environmental slights, snubs, or indignities that are either intentional or (most often) unintentional;
they convey hostile, derogatory, or otherwise negative messages to target persons based upon their
membership in a structurally oppressed social group (Sue 2010). Over the last decade, and
particularly in the last several years, microaggressions have received a great deal of attention, both
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This chapter is a revised version of a previously published paper, published in The Kennedy Institute of Ethics
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Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association (2017).
“Impostor syndrome,” describes high-achieving individuals who are unable to internalize their accomplishments or
to believe that they are in fact successful and who live with a persistent fear of being exposed as a "fraud."
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popular and scholarly, from supporters and critics alike.69 The most substantial scholarly work on
microaggressions analyzes the concept specifically within the context of clinical psychology. One
area in which microaggressions haven’t been considered in any depth is within the context of
clinical medicine.70 Our paper aims to rectify this oversight.
Section 3.2 outlines how microaggressions have been understood within the psychology literature,
namely, as microassaults, microinsults, and microinvalidations. This taxonomy distinguishes
microaggressions according to the type of act committed by the aggressor. Contrary to this
approach, we imagine and propose an alternative way of understanding microaggressions. Instead
of taking as the point of departure the act committed by the aggressor, we consider what an account
of microaggressions would look like that instead understands them on the basis of the harm(s)
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For instance, in the scholarly literature Sue (2010), Nadal et al. (2011), Nadal (2013), have introduced and developed
the phenomenon. Lilienfeld (2017a) has questioned the science behind how microaggressions have been studied and,
quite radically, has called for a moratorium on any workshops that attempt to help prevent the occurrences of
microaggressions until the research program has been validated. In both scholarly and popular venues, Haidt (2016,
2017) has questioned the seriousness of microaggressions and, following Campbell and Manning 2014, has argued
that microaggressions promote a culture of victimhood (thereby dismissing the extent to which they in fact cause real
harm). Ong et al. (2017) and Sue (2017) have defended microaggressions against charges leveled against them in
Lilienfeld 2017a, including Haidt’s. Other defenders of microaggressions include Decuir-Gunby & Gunby (2016),
Friedlaender (2018); Huynh (2012), Isom (2016), Joshi Wynn et al. (2015), Kaskan & Ho (2014), and Pitcher (2017).
For accounts of microaggressions that are specifically focused on clinical counseling and other clinical psychology
contexts, see Constantine (2007), DeLapp & Williams (2014), Hook et al. (2016), Nadal et al. (2012), Owen & Rodolfa
(2010), Shelton & Delgado-Romero (2013), Sue et al. (2007), Sue et al. (2008). Also see Rini (2019) for a sustained
discussion of microaggressions by a philosopher.
Within popular media, a large part of the microaggression debate has focused on microaggressions on college
campuses (see, for example, McWhorter 2014; Vega 2014; Friedersdorf 2015) with many suggesting that claims of
microaggressions are vastly overblown (i.e., Lilienfeld 2017b; Lilienfeld 2017). Lukianoff and Haidt (2015) have
suggested that talk of microaggressions corrodes public discourse and encourages accusations and counter-accusations
rather than critical thinking. Many have responded to such attacks on microaggressions, including Joseph (2015),
Riedel (2016), Rini (2015), Runyowa (2015), and Weiss (2016).
Since there’s been very little substantive work on microaggressions within clinical medicine, we see this paper as
making an important contribution. Some basic treatments of the topic can be found in Bleich (2015), Montenegro
(2016), and May (2017). These articles focus on microaggressions within the profession of medicine, specifically,
between higher and lower ranks of physicians, physicians and medical students, and between physicians and nurse
practitioners. None of them discusses microaggressions that occur between physicians and their patients. Hall and
Fields (2012) discuss racial microaggressions between nurses and patients, though they focus on counseling
relationships. We’re adding to the literature by broadening discussions of microaggressions in medical settings to
include microaggressions that focus on harms to patients. Walls et al. (2015) is an exception insofar as it considers
microaggressions experienced by patients; however, it focuses on the narrow patient group of American Indians with
type 2 diabetes. Another exception is Smith-Oka (2015), which examines the effects of microaggressions in another
narrowly defined population group of obstetric patients in public hospitals in Mexico.
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experienced by the recipients. We propose this alternative, recipient-centered, harm-based
framework for understanding microaggressions in section 3.3. Our proposed account distinguishes
between three different types of microaggressions on the basis of the kind of harm that results for
the recipient: epistemic microaggressions result in epistemic harms, emotional microaggressions
result in emotional harms, and self-identity microaggressions result in harms to one’s sense of self,
or existential harms.71 In developing our account, we provide examples of each kind of harm that
frequently occurs in medical encounters. While our focus in section 3.3 is on the harms to patients
that can result directly from the microaggressive actions of health care workers, section 3.4
considers how repeated, long-term experiences of clinical microaggressions can have further
damaging consequences: they undermine physician-patient relationships, preclude relationships of
trust, and therefore, compromise the kind and quality of care that’s received. On the basis of these
consequences, we argue that microaggressions shouldn’t be ignored in clinical medicine. In order
to further motivate and substantiate our proposal to rethink the taxonomy of microaggressions,
section 3.5 briefly revisits Sue’s account of microaggressions. In light of two cases considered in
section 3.3, we show how and why Sue’s account can’t derive the precise conclusions about the
kinds of harms that result from microaggressions, conclusions that can be reached on our proposed
recipient-centered, harm-based approach. On the basis of this conclusion, we suggest that the
dominant microaggressions taxonomy ought to be re-conceptualized.

Microaggressions
The term “microaggression” was first coined by Chester Pierce (1970) and then developed to refer
to the phenomenon of “subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are ‘put
downs’” (Pierce et al. 1978, p. 66). In the last decade, there’s been renewed and sustained attention
to and development of this phenomenon, initially in the work of Derald Wing Sue (2008; 2010;
Sue et al. 2007) and more recently by his former student, Kevin Nadal (2013; 2018; Nadal et al.

We use “existential harms” to refer, broadly, to the various harms to self-identity and one’s sense of self that result
from self-identity microaggressions.
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2011) and others (see Lilienfeld 2017a for a special issue dedicated to the topic of
microaggressions). It’s widely accepted that “microaggressions” refer to brief and commonplace
verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities – either intentional or unintentional – that are
rooted in (implicit or explicit) prejudice and/or racial, ethnic, gender, sexuality, religious,
disability, or other stereotypes and that are directed at and subsequently harm members of
marginalized groups (see, for example, Sue et al. 2007; Sue, 2010; Torres et al. 2010; Nadal et al.
2011; McWhorter 2014).72
One common example of a microaggression is the following: a person of color is asked “Where
are you from?” They respond with, “Louisville, KY, just like you.” If, instead of stopping there,
the questioner continues, “But where are you really from?,” this is a microaggression since it
emphasizes that there’s an important difference between a white person and a person of color who
are both from the United States. Even if unintentional, this line of questioning sends the message
that the person of color isn’t a “true” American, or that they are (or are considered to be)
perpetually a foreigner or “Other” in their own country. Similar messages are sent when people of
color, people of lower socioeconomic standing (SES), or people with unfamiliar accents are told,
“You speak well” or “You’re so articulate!” Though the speaker might think they’re
complimenting their interlocutor, such comments suggest that members of these groups aren’t
expected to be articulate and that their being articulate comes across as surprising and anomalous.73
When members of these groups routinely hear such comments and questions, microaggressions
can compound to create a sense that they don’t belong, even in their birth country.
Sue divides microaggressions into three different kinds: microinsults, microassaults, and
microinvalidations. His taxonomy is act-based: microaggressions are understood and delineated
according to the kind of act perpetuated by the aggressor. Not only has this taxonomy largely been

It is worth noting here that the prefix “micro” need not mean that the act itself is small, relative to some other act.
As Rini (2019, 29-31) argued, the prefix “micro” can refer to a part of whole system (e.g., in the way
“microeconomics” explains actors within the larger economic system, whereas macroeconomics refers to the study of
the system itself. In this sense, the prefix micro means to refer to a part/whole relation and not to comparisons of scale.
I note this in the introduction to the thesis as well.
72
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For additional examples of microaggressions, see introduction and chapter 2 of this thesis.
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taken for granted in the growing literature on microaggressions, but it seems to have become
sacrosanct. Though Sue has made an undeniably important contribution to the literature on
microaggressions, in this paper we’d like to imagine a different point of departure for
conceptualizing them. Instead of defining and understanding microaggressions based on the kind
of act committed by the aggressor, we focus instead on the kind of harms experienced by the
recipients. Specifically, we propose and begin to consider what such a recipient-centered, harmbased approach to microaggressions might look like.74 Such an approach accomplishes at least
three things that an act-based approach (like Sue’s) fails to. It: (1) takes seriously, validates, and
puts at the forefront the experiences of those on the receiving end of microaggressions, rather than
those who commit them; (2) ensures that the harms experienced by those on the receiving end of
microaggressions (viz., members of marginalized groups) aren’t obscured; and (3) makes sure that
the various different types of harm aren’t missed, erased, or collapsed into a single category.75
In choosing to understand microaggressions based on the types of resulting harms, we intend for
our proposed categorization both to reflect and to be guided by the experiences of the oppressed.76
Insofar as we’re taking as our point of departure the experiences of those on the receiving end of
microaggressions, one might immediately object that the prefix “micro” isn’t appropriate since it
seems to undermine the seriousness of harms that result (a problem we address below), and to
minimize the agency and responsibility of those committing these harmful acts. For example, from
the perspective of the microaggressor, to misgender a transgender man or woman might seem like
nothing, or, at the very most, like an “honest mistake,” something “micro”; however, when
considered from the perspective of the recipient, such an act is anything but micro ‒ especially
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For a discussion of how harm is being understood here and throughout the thesis, see the introduction chapter to
this thesis. There, I note that I am understanding harm in such a way that harms are not necessarily wrongs (and thus
are not necessarily blameworthy, though one might still be responsible for them). As discussed in this chapter, harm
should be understood in this way.
Since the publication of this paper, we have developed a longer articulation of what we think is wrong with Sue’s
approach, and how, precisely, his approach does each of these things. Our longer critique of Sue’s account is
forthcoming in Perspectives on Psychological Science, in press, 2021.
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This move is motivated by a commitment to feminist standpoint epistemology, as detailed in chapter 1 (and
further discussed in chapter 2) of this thesis.
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when it’s an instance of a patterned experience of being repeatedly misgendered. 77 The term
“microaggression,” then, reflects the understanding of these incredibly harmful actions as small or
insignificant, and thus does little to prompt those who commit them to take seriously the severity
of harms that result, and also provides little motivation to stop committing them. This
understanding also lends fuel to the fire of the microaggression skeptic (for a discussion of the
skeptical position, see chapter 1 of this thesis).
Given this problem, one might object further that it would be best to do away with the term
altogether and instead to simply call these acts aggressions, since from the perspective of the
person on the receiving end, there’s nothing ‘micro’ about them, especially when compiled over
time. There are four reasons why we refrain from abandoning the term. First, as it’s presently used,
the term captures the unique nature and dynamic harm that such aggressions cause: they’re at the
same time both innocuous (from the perspective of the one committing them) and deeply harmful
and enduring (from the position of the recipient). It’s worth holding onto a term that manages to
convey, at the same time, both the apparent smallness of the act and the significance and severity
of the harm. Second, it’s important to call attention to these kinds of acts precisely because they
are, in many cases, unintended. This is a feature that the term “microaggression” seems to capture,
yet which the terms ‘insult,’ ‘invalidation,’ and certainly ‘assault’ (without the ‘micro’ prefix) do
not.78 Third, it’s important to separate these types of actions from those that are explicit, overt,
deliberate, and intentionally racist, sexist, transphobic, etc. In so doing, we allow for the possibility
that microaggressions can be enacted by those who have our best interest at heart and do not mean
us harm (e.g., our family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, or physicians). In this way,
microaggressions are meaningfully different than the sorts of acts that are committed with the
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See Kapusta (2016) and Freeman (2018) on the harms of misgendering.

Lilienfeld (2017a) problematizes the conceptualization of microaggressions and the associated research program,
arguing that the concept of microaggressions is incoherent, insofar as “aggression” implies intentionality (147).
Though not written as a response to this article, Brennan (2016) provides a compelling argument to the contrary.
Contra Lilienfeld, and in line with Brennan, we contend that microaggressions are problematic and harmful,
irrespective of the intentions of the aggressor since targets can be harmed even if doing so was not the intention of the
perpetrator. Also see Friedlaender (2018).
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express intention to cause serious harm, usually by people who do not mean well. Our final reason
for retaining the term is that we’d like our discussion to be considered within the growing literature
on microaggressions and to potentially have an impact on the rapidly unfolding conversation
happening there. Were we to use another term (or to simply call them ‘aggressions,’ etc.), this
wouldn’t be possible.
With a basic understanding of how microaggressions have been understood in psychology, as well
as how we intend to rethink them, we ask readers to join us in considering what such a proposed
alternative understanding of the phenomenon would look like, specifically within a medical
context. Before doing so, an important methodological qualification is in order. In what follows,
we discuss a number of different cases. In most of these cases, the authors themselves don’t use
the term “microaggression.” (Many of the accounts we draw on were published before this concept
gained much traction (after the publication of Sue’s 2010 book gained scholarly attention).
Nevertheless, we include these cases since they are clear examples of microaggressions as we
understand them, and importantly, they demonstrate how harmful microaggressions can be for
those on the receiving end.

Microaggressions in Medicine and Their Resulting Harms
In this section, we consider a possible alternative recipient-centered, harm-based taxonomy for
understanding and conceptualizing microaggressions. In lieu of an action-centered classification
of microaggressions, the three kinds of harm-based microaggressions that we propose are
epistemic microaggressions, emotional microaggressions, and self-identity microaggressions,
which result, respectively, in epistemic harms, emotional harms, and existential harms. Before
discussing each one, three clarificatory points are in order.
First, we are focusing on microaggressions within a clinical medical context. We acknowledge
that illness itself tends to be accompanied by emotional and self-identity impairing consequences.
The point that we’d like to emphasize, however, is that experiences of illness and its impairing
consequences are often compounded by harms resulting from the microaggressions of healthcare
providers and others. That is, whatever harms arise from illness are exacerbated by harms that arise
from microaggressions and the resulting failure of healthcare providers and others to take seriously
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patients’ non-physical harms. Thus, harms resulting from microaggressions are significant over
and above the consequences brought on by illness.
Second, the three harms (i.e., epistemic, emotional, and existential) resulting from the three
different kinds of microaggressions that we propose aren’t necessarily clear-cut or analytically
distinct. There are often messy overlaps between them; epistemic harms come with existential and
emotional side effects and harms to self-identity certainly manifest themselves emotionally and
existentially. Though for the purposes of analysis we separate the harms into three different kinds,
for the one experiencing them, such tidy analytic distinctions are rarely possible.
Third, while microaggressions are typically understood to target and affect members of
marginalized groups (Sue 2010, 23, 39) – viz., groups that have been historically and
systematically oppressed – we understand “marginalization” (i.e., seriously restricted power, or
experiences of powerlessness) to have a slightly broader scope in this specific context. Following
Kidd & Carel (2014; 2017a; 2017b), we contend that within clinical medical contexts, many
patients occupy a marginalized position qua patients, relative to physicians, as a result of
(temporary or permanent) vulnerabilities with respect to their injuries or illnesses; their general
reliance upon physicians’ recommendations or demands; their overall lack of (institutional) power
and (epistemic) authority; or their (assumed or actual) lack of education and medical expertise
relative to physicians within the space of the clinic.79 The extent to which this is the case varies on
the basis of the condition for which one is being seen in a medical clinic. For example, an otherwise
socially privileged person experiencing terminal illness, or a mental health crisis, can experience
a robust sense of powerlessness with respect to their health condition and reliance upon their health
care provider (that they might not feel if their condition were not terminal or severe). Other things
will come into play as well, including educational attainment, fluency in understanding and
communicating with medical terminology, and relative comfort in a clinical space. It is in these
respects that even people who are socially dominant in [most] other contexts can still be
marginalized—lack power, authority, or status—within the domain of clinical medicine, albeit to

Our account differs from Carel and Kidd’s insofar as our account takes an intersectional approach to distinguish
different levels of marginalization within the group “patient,” whereas theirs does not.
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varying degrees. It follows from this that many patients can, at least theoretically, experience
microaggressions in this specific context.80 For example, on our account, within a medical context,
even an upper-middle class, white, cis-gender, heterosexual man could be subjected to
microaggressions based on his status as a patient (e.g., with reduced epistemic power, with relative
vulnerability). For example, a man with all of those dominant social markers (upper-class, white,
cis-gender, heterosexual) might feel powerless in the space of the clinic upon receiving a cancer
diagnosis. And, moreover, in this context, he might in fact lack power, privilege, or epistemic
authority, relative to his physician, and might experience the clinic through that lens. It must be
underscored, however, that the microaggressions he might experience in a medical context would
have less serious overall consequences than those experienced by members of structurally
marginalized groups (that is, groups which are marginalized in broader society) because part of
the harm of microaggressions rests on their repeat nature in a variety of different contexts that
accumulate over time. Someone who is structurally oppressed is likely to experience
microaggressions in various domains beyond the medical, making the cumulative impact more
severe.

3.3.1.
Epistemic

Epistemic Microaggressions and Epistemic Harm
microaggressions

in

clinical

encounters

are

defined

as

intentional

or

unintentional/unconscious slights conveyed in speech or gesture by health care providers that
dismiss, ignore, ridicule, or otherwise fail to give uptake to claims made by patients. Epistemic
microaggressions result in epistemic harms to patients, which can result in epistemic injustices,
specifically, testimonial injustices. Testimonial injustices are injustices suffered in one’s capacity
as a knower, which occur when a speaker’s claims aren’t given uptake by the listener, due to
prejudicial stereotypes held by the listener (either consciously or unconsciously) about some facet
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of the speaker’s identity. Epistemic microaggressions are related to ‒ but are not co-extensive with
‒ this phenomenon.81, 82
In medical contexts, epistemic microaggressions involve the tendency of physicians and other
health care providers to view themselves as experts over patients’ bodies in problematic ways. It
is true that physicians have a kind of (non-problematic) medical authority over patients; indeed,
they’re medically trained and technical experts and the reason we visit them in the first place is
because they can provide such expertise. This generally isn’t a problem. Rather, the problem is
when their expertise prevents them from recognizing, taking seriously, or giving uptake to their
patients’ claims and to the first personal perspective that their patients have over their bodies.
Though a patient’s perspective isn’t expert in the sense that most patients aren’t trained medical
practitioners, their first-person perspectives on their bodies and symptoms that are unavailable to
physicians are often crucial in order to help physicians make proper diagnoses.83
Thus, it’s problematic for physicians to automatically privilege their own third-personal, objective
knowledge of what a patient experiences to the exclusion of the patients’ first-personal, subjective,
embodied knowledge and resulting testimony. This is not to say that patients are infallible; patients
can be, and sometimes are, mistaken, for example, about their diagnosis or what they need
medically as a result. However, to assume automatically and outright that the physician knows
better is epistemically limiting – it precludes the possibility that patients have some relevant
knowledge (e.g., phenomenological knowledge about their symptoms or their pain). This tendency
for health care providers to assume an automatic and totalizing epistemic privilege over their
patients’ bodies, experiences, and testimonies can result in microaggressions toward patients, such
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Fricker (2007) provides a general account of epistemic injustices and resulting harms. She articulates two types of
epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Since the publication of her book, there’s been
a growing philosophical literature on the topic. Dotson (2011; 2012) and Medina (2013) challenge and expand
Fricker’s account within the context of race. Carel and Kidd (2014) discuss epistemic injustices within medical
contexts. Carel and Györffy (2014) consider how children are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustices in
healthcare settings. Freeman (2014) discusses epistemic injustice in pregnancy. Sanati & Michalis Kyratsous (2015)
discuss epistemic injustices in psychiatry. Also see Kidd, Medina, Pohlhaus Jr. (eds. 2017).
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See, for example, Solomon (2016).
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as implicit or explicit deflation of their patient’s credibility or failure to give uptake to their
patients’ claims. Such microaggressions tend to occur without health care providers being aware
that they’re committing them. We see an important example of what we are calling epistemic
microaggressions in Arthur Kleinman’s work, though he doesn’t use the term “epistemic
microaggressions.” Kleinman describes microaggressions in his account of healthcare
practitioners discrediting patients’ first-personal accounts of their embodied experiences,
specifically of patients with chronic pain.
If there is a single experience shared by virtually all chronic pain patients
it is that at some point those around them – chiefly practitioners, but also
at times family members – come to question the authenticity of the patient's
experience of pain. This response contributes powerfully to patients'
dissatisfaction with the professional treatment system and to their search
for alternatives (Kleinman 1988, 57).
Such failures to give uptake to, to empathize with, or to respect patients as knowers in their own
right – often motivated by stereotypes about race, gender, class, sexuality, gender identity, age, or
ability – are examples of epistemic microaggressions. Testimonial injustices that result from such
microaggressions are harmful to patients in a variety of ways.
As Miranda Fricker (2007) notes, one of the most serious consequences of testimonial injustices
is the moral harm committed against speakers (here, patients). The primary moral harm is that
speakers are harmed in their capacity as knowers. Being regarded as a knower is a central
component of human dignity and value; thus, to be harmed in this capacity results in a violation
of the speaker’s humanity (Fricker 2007, 43-4). According to Fricker, this primary moral harm
leads to a variety of secondary harms, which are either practical or epistemic.
Practical secondary harms that result from patients being harmed in their capacity as knowers
include misdiagnoses that could have been avoided had the patients’ testimonies been taken
seriously in the first place. Epistemic secondary harms occur when listeners’ doubting of the
speaker’s testimony (and the microaggressions that occur as a result) are internalized by the
speaker, which can result in speakers coming to question their own capacity for knowledge. In the
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case of patients who experience repeated epistemic microaggressions, they might begin to doubt
their own testimonies and experiences, which can exacerbate emotional and existential harms of
the sort we describe below.84
One example of epistemic microaggressions can be seen in the case of the sociologist, Tressie
McMillan Cottom, as she elaborates in her book, Thick (2018, ch. 3).85 Even though Cottom is
highly educated – she won a MacArthur “genius” grant – and has high socioeconomic standing,
as a fat, Black woman, she knew that in any medical context she would face an array of
discriminations. For this reason, she chose her physicians carefully. Or so she thought.
When she was four months pregnant, bleeding and in terrible pain, Cottom knew that something
was wrong. When she arrived at her doctor’s office, instead of being seen immediately for her
urgent and likely dangerous situation, she was told to wait patiently in the waiting area. After
insisting that she get some privacy since she was bleeding all over the chair, she was brought to an
examination room. When her doctor arrived, he looked at her and said that she was probably “just
too fat” and that for women “like her,” spotting was normal. She was sent home and told not to
worry.
That night, her pain escalated. When she called a nurse and described her situation, she was told
that because the pain was in her bowel, not in her lower back, it was probably constipation and
that she should just try to use the bathroom. She did this for the next 36 hours, with no luck. After
three days of pain and almost no sleep, she went to the hospital. There, her health care providers
implied that she’d probably just eaten something that was “bad” for her. Finally, and begrudgingly,
they agreed to do an ultrasound, which showed not one, but three entities growing in her uterus.
In addition to the fetus, there were two large tumors. Upon learning this, the nurse scolded Cottom:
“You should have said something.” Ultimately, Cottom went into early labor and gave birth to her
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This discussion of Cottom’s experience is a revised version of a discussion offered in a forthcoming chapter
contributed by myself and Lauren Freeman to the Routledge Handbook on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics,
forthcoming 2021.
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daughter, who died shortly after birth. After making plans for how to handle her daughter’s
remains, another nurse said, “Just so you know, there was nothing we could have done since you
never told us that you were in labor.”
There are so many things wrong with the way that Cottom was mistreated, but here we will focus
on the epistemic microaggressions. Before doing so, we must emphasize that the ultimate, tragic
result of the death of her premature daughter was not micro. At every stage, Cottom knew that
there was something wrong, tried to convey this knowledge to her health care providers, and was
systematically marked as not being credible with respect to her knowledge of and claims about her
body. As a result of widespread and enduring biases and stereotypes about Black women (see
Collins 1986 for a discussion of stereotypical and biased “controlling images” of Black women,
and Dotson 2011 on how these “controlling images” contribute to epistemic silencing of Black
women) she experienced epistemic microaggressions. As a pregnant woman who was bleeding
and in pain, her bleeding was attributed to her fatness. Later, her pain in her bowel was dismissed
as being on account of something “bad” that she’d eaten (where “bad” has racial undertones about
what Black people eat (see Hobbes 2018)). Finally, after the death of her daughter, she was blamed
for not having spoken up sooner, where the implication was that the death was in part her fault and
could have been prevented had she said something.
In each instance, Cottom was relatively powerless vis-à-vis her health care providers. Not only
was she blamed for her condition, but her knowledge of her body was ignored. Over and again,
her health care providers assumed they knew better. Cottom thus suffered the epistemic harm of
not being recognized as a credible knower, the practical harms of severe physical pain (much of
which could have been avoided had she been taken seriously at the outset) and ultimately, the
death of her daughter. Cottom lost her daughter and likely could have lost her own life. These
consequences are macro and tragic. But we are concerned with the epistemic microaggressions
that led up to them; her credibility as a knower being denied due to her race, gender, and body size,
and as a result, her claims being ignored or dismissed. Reflecting on her experience, Cottom
describes the following:
“In the US, a typical pregnancy for a Black woman is more potentially
fraught with emotional and physical negative outcomes than it is for white
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women… And I thought I was an exception, if you want to know the truth.
And one of the things I learned is that I couldn’t be an exception. It didn’t
matter how educated I was, it didn’t matter that I tried to make all of the
right choices. At the moment when the health care system needed me to be
whatever they assumed a typical Black woman should be, in my position,
they treated me that way until I was as incompetent as they assumed I was.
And that looked like not believing me when I said that I was having labor
pains… But that’s fairly typical, and that’s the devastating part of it.”
(Cottom Interview for NPR’s “On Point” (2019))
The epistemic microaggressions that Cottom experienced are reflections of imbalances in
epistemic and other sorts of social power that are themselves reflections of broader patterns at
work both in health care and in society. Health care providers are members of an elite professional
class and are assumed to have epistemic authority within that context and also more broadly. They
often exert a sort of epistemic power over their patients – they block their patients from making
meaningful epistemic contributions to the clinical exchange. This epistemic situation both reflects
and reifies assumptions about power in the epistemic domain (e.g., who creates, controls, and
deploys knowledge and who doesn’t; who is “rational” or “objective” and who isn’t (cf. Code
1991)). Such microaggressions result in epistemic harms to patients: crucially, they are denied the
full status of knower, which is central to human dignity and value (Fricker 2007; also see Pohlhaus
Jr. 2017; Dotson 2011). Because the epistemic contributions of patients who are members of
marginalized groups are routinely blocked, over time this can result in patients coming to doubt
their own epistemic capacities, especially as microaggressions add up and their harms accumulate
(see Evans and Mallon 2020). Microaggressions can also, as we saw in the case of Cottom, lead
to harmful health and other consequences.
Another example of practical secondary harm resulting from epistemic microaggressions is evident
in case of a 19-year-old female patient, Bronte Doyne, who died in part as a result of her
physicians’ failures to give uptake to her testimony. After expressing concerns to her medical team
at Nottingham University Hospitals Trust that her rare form of liver cancer had returned, Bronte’s
physicians instructed her to “stop Googling” her symptoms. They also failed to diagnose the

129

recurrence of her cancer in a timely enough manner to have enabled her to receive adequate pain
management and cancer care (Cara 2015; Srivastava 2015). Doyne ultimately died as a result of
her undiagnosed cancer recurrence, 16 months after having her concerns dismissed and being told
she’d survive.
Though on first glace it might appear as though this case is simply one of gross medical
malpractice, or even of lack of epistemic credibility of the patient, we argue that it’s a case of
epistemic failure on the part of the physicians resulting specifically from the microaggressions
they committed. The health care providers committed an epistemic microaggression by failing to
give uptake to Doyne’s claims about her body and symptoms, and in particular her concern that
her cancer had returned. In order for us to claim, convincingly, that Doyne suffered a
microaggression, we must first show that she’s a member of a marginalized group. Doyne meets
this criterion in two ways. First, she’s a patient. As mentioned above, following Carel and Kidd
(2014; 2017a; 2017b), within a clinical medical context, patients can be considered marginalized
relative to physicians, insofar as they lack power in the physician-patient relationship. Doyne is
also marginalized in a second way, namely, insofar as she’s a female patient. It’s a known
phenomenon that due to pernicious gender-based stereotypes, within clinical medical contexts,
women’s claims – in particular, claims of pain – are generally not taken seriously, are considered
to be over-reactions, and are systematically ignored and/or dismissed.86 As a result, women have
diminished status as credible givers of knowledge regarding their bodies (see, for example, Kukla
2005; Foreman 2014a; Code 1991; Dusenbery 2018).
On account of these two different (yet related) ways in which Doyne occupies a marginalized
position, it becomes clear that what she experienced were microaggressions. Based on her
marginalized status as patient in general and as a female patient in particular, her case isn’t just
one of medical malpractice or of a failure of attributing epistemic credibility. Rather, the ways that
Doyne was treated constitutes microaggressions given the nature of the interactions, namely the
seemingly small off-hand remarks and slights, such as questioning whether she’d been “Googling
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her symptoms again,” when really, she’d been experiencing physical changes and pain and was
trying to make sense of them both to herself, and in a way that would receive uptake by her medical
team. These sorts of seemingly small comments are examples of microaggressions, and we’re
suggesting that they’re directly tied to Doyne’s marginalized status qua female and female patient.
The epistemic microaggressions experienced by Doyne contributed both to serious physical harm
(and ultimately, to her death), as well as to significant epistemic harm (and related emotional
trauma) for Doyne and her family. The latter can be viewed as a result of her and her mother not
being listened to, and to their claims pertaining to her medical condition not having received
uptake. All of these could have been avoided had Doyne’s physicians taken her and her family’s
claims seriously at the outset.
In this section, we’ve demonstrated how in addition to the significant physical harms that resulted
(at least in part) from these two cases of epistemic microaggressions, both show how epistemic
microaggressions can lead to other significant non-physical harms, which are inherently
problematic morally and epistemically, and also instrumentally problematic insofar as they lead to
further physical harms. Thus, on account of these consequences, epistemic microaggressions that
result in epistemic harms are a serious moral and medical concern. They ought to be on the radar
of health care providers, who should work to avoid committing them.

3.3.2.

Emotional Microaggressions and Emotional harm

Illness is often accompanied by a wide range of emotions, many of which arise both before and
during clinical encounters and continue to develop in complicated, fluctuating, multi-layered ways
with the progression of illness. For instance, patients might react to their diagnosis with disbelief,
numbness, sadness, anger, rage, denial, or fear. Emotional microaggressions occur when
physicians and other health care providers fail to take patients’ emotional reactions to and
emotional experiences of their diagnoses and illnesses seriously. Emotional microaggressions
consist of indignities directed at patients, frequently motivated by assumptions about what
constitutes appropriate emotional responses to medical symptoms and diagnoses and often
compounded by stereotypes about emotions as they relate to race, sexuality, and especially to
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gender. Emotional microaggressions, like all microaggressions, can impose additional and serious
harms on patients that we discuss in what follows.87
In a 2015 article in The Atlantic, Joe Fassler describes his wife Rachel’s emergency room
experience, during which both her claims of intense pain as well as her emotional response to that
pain were ignored and discredited by health care providers. This led to Rachel being misdiagnosed
with kidney stones when in fact she had ovarian torsion, which can lead to ovarian loss, sepsis,
and even to death. The failures to hear her, to consider her emotional responses to her pain, and
the resulting misdiagnosis, lead to enduring emotional problems for Rachel, which followed from
what she aptly called “the trauma of not being seen” (Fassler 2015).
Despite Joe and Rachel repeatedly describing the severity of Rachel’s pain to the attending
physicians and nurses (she rated it an 11 out of 10), each time they were told, “she was fine.” Two
kinds of microaggressions are occurring in this case. The first is an epistemic microaggression,
where the speaker’s claims to knowledge about their body aren’t given uptake, resulting in an
epistemic injustice (not our immediate focus here88). The second is an example of an emotional
microaggression, where the speaker’s emotional response to their pain isn’t taken seriously,
resulting in emotional harm.
For the healthcare team to have discredited Rachel’s emotional response to her pain is an example
of an emotional microaggression. Fassler reports that in response to Rachel’s writhing in pain so
severe she couldn’t speak, nurses barked: “Sit still, or we’ll have to start [the exam] over.” They
also corrected her that what she was really experiencing was “just a little pain.” These responses
are examples of failures to give uptake to Rachel’s (claims to pain and additionally to her)
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emotional response to her pain. They are based on stereotypes about women not only being more
emotional than men (Code 1991), but also being overly emotional. This tendency to misjudge the
seriousness of women’s claims about their physical symptoms, especially their pain, is welldocumented (see Ellin 2015; Dusenbery 2018; Foreman 2014a; Foreman 2014b; Hoffman and
Tarzian 2001; Kukla 2005; National Pain Report 2014; Walters 2016; Watt 2006). It’s rooted in
histories and stereotypes that women are hysterical, weaker than men, and unable to deal with
pain; that they’re making it up; that they’re seeking attention; or that they’re just trying to get their
hands on drugs. Women’s pain is also disproportionality assumed to be psychiatric in origin
(Foreman 2014a, 68).
Tara Culp-Ressler details the long history of women’s physical symptoms being ascribed to mental
pathology, based in stereotypes of women as dramatic, irrational, and crazy (2015a; 2015b). These
stereotypes can lead to women being told that their physical symptoms are “all in their head,”
which can (and often does) lead physicians to miss potentially life-threatening physical conditions,
in addition to compounding the emotional distress they are already experiencing. Considered from
the perspective of physicians, one cardiologist confessed that “[i]n training, we were taught to be
on the lookout for hysterical females who come to the emergency room” (reported in Dador 2011).
This is precisely what happened in Rachel’s case. As we show, not only does this tendency to
reduce women to “hysterical females” and subsequently to dismiss their claims to pain or other
physical symptoms have the potential to do substantial physical harm (especially when it
contributes to misdiagnoses), it can also cause lasting emotional harm.
Returning to Rachel’s case, it’s worth noting that not only did her healthcare team take their own
assumptions about her condition to be true (and superior to Rachel’s account), thereby failing to
consider that Rachel might actually know better than they do about the severity of her symptoms
(e.g., epistemic microaggression); but they also undermined the severity of her emotional
responses to her pain. This made Rachel subsequently question whether she was responding
“properly” to her pain (as if there is such a thing) and whether she was perhaps being overly
dramatic, also contributing to existential harm of diminished self-trust (a consequence we explore
below). Presently, we want to show that emotional microaggressions can result in serious and
enduring emotional harms to the recipients, as they did for Rachel. Fassler recounts some of the
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emotional harms that Rachel experienced, which far outlasted the physical harms of her illness.
He writes:
Rachel’s physical scars are healing, and she can go on the long runs she
loves, but she’s still grappling with the psychic toll ‒ what she calls ‘the
trauma of not being seen.’ She has nightmares, some nights. I wake her up
when her limbs start twitching (2015).
The “trauma of not being seen” is what Rachel believes to be the consequence of repeated
dismissals of the emotional turmoil brought on by her illness and her emotional responses to her
pain. While we want to highlight this emotional harm, we must also be clear that the
microaggressions directed at Rachel also resulted in a permanent, practical secondary harm. The
medical team’s failure to take her claims seriously at the outset (epistemic microaggression)
resulted in delayed treatment (more than 14 hours after they arrived at the ER). Though her life
was ultimately saved, her ovaries were not. Thus, in addition to the epistemic and emotional harms
we’ve outlined, Rachel also suffered the (practical secondary) bodily harm of losing her ovaries.
These combined consequences of emotional and epistemic microaggressions are examples of
epistemic secondary harms, which result when the cumulative effect and internalization of
epistemic injustices over time function to harm one’s view of one’s self as a competent knower.
The reality of many members of marginalized groups is determined by understanding and
conceptualizing events through the prism of repeated experiences with racism, sexism,
homophobia, etc. (Sue 2010, p. 73). When such experiences are compiled over time, the results
accumulate to be more serious and disadvantageous than one might initially assume, what Ron
Mallon has called an “accumulation mechanism” (2017; 2021). Mallon develops this concept in
order to explain how the seemingly small harms experienced in the past can accumulate over time,
amplifying the resulting disadvantage suffered by marginalized individuals or groups (ibid.). Thus,
we see that emotional microaggressions that manifest as disregard for patients’ complex subjective
experiences of pain and illness can be harmful and enduring in a variety of ways. As with epistemic
microaggressions, the harmful consequences of emotional microaggressions are serious and
therefore ought to be recognized and avoided by health care providers.
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As we’ve acknowledged, the distinctions between the types of microaggressions we’re considering
and their resulting harms are messy. Emotional microaggressions lead to both emotional and
existential harms. Robin Stern, author of The Gaslight Effect, describes the phenomenon of
“gaslighting,” wherein women aren’t only shamed for their emotional responses, but their feelings
are routinely invalidated through attaching stigmatizing labels such as “crazy” (2007). 89 Stern
describes the invalidating experience of being “gaslit” as “soul destroying” and argues that women
whose feelings are frequently invalidated in this way often start to second guess their ability to
make decisions for themselves or conclude that their concerns aren’t worth articulating at all
(ibid.). In this way, emotional microaggressions that invalidate women’s emotional responses to
their illnesses and dismiss their physical symptoms as being the result of mental pathology can
result in harms that are emotional, existential, and enduring.
Before turning to the final type of microaggressions, it is worth reiterating a point raised above.
Though we’re arguing that patients’ claims about their pain and their emotional responses to their
physical conditions ought to be given uptake, we don’t mean to suggest that all patients should
always be the final or absolute authorities about their own diagnoses, or that patients’ first-personal
knowledge of their bodies, illnesses, or experiences of pain should always or automatically be
taken as primary over the medical/technical expertise of health care providers. We want to retain
important differences between these two distinct types of knowledge: that of patients and that of
health care providers. Instead of giving priority to one over the other, we suggest the need to take
both sources of knowledge seriously when dealing with patients. In her article “Confronting
Diminished Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Injustice in Pregnancy by Challenging a ‘Panoptics
of the Womb,’ (2014)” Lauren Freeman argues that within the context of pregnancy, health care
providers and pregnant people ought to have a relationship of epistemic peers. Epistemic agents
are epistemic peers if “they can both make legitimate claims to knowledge about S, and if their
respective claims are taken seriously by each of them” (5). Such a relationship is “based on mutual
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respect, open responsiveness, and strong communication between women and physicians.”
Physicians who are able to successfully create epistemic peer relationships with their patients
create supportive and open communicative environments in which they take time to listen carefully
to patients’ accounts and concerns, and trust that they’re credible in their testimony (ibid.).
Patients, in such contexts, can rely on this openness to their own perspective, and become more
active participants in the dialogue. It’s this idea of epistemic peers that we have in mind when
considering the kind of relationship that should exist between health care providers and patients.90
An epistemic peer relationship lies in sharp contrast to what we see happening in the cases
examined above, in which patients’ first-hand, embodied knowledges and emotional responses to
their illnesses or symptoms are systematically dismissed in favor of health care providers’
technical knowledge ‒ often with detrimental consequences for the patients.
Relatedly, one might be concerned that with the increased availability and use of online resources
such as Web MD, patients might attempt to attach incorrect diagnostic labels to themselves,
another reason why their perspectives should be treated with suspicion. We aren’t arguing in
support of these sorts of self-diagnoses; we believe that the ability to diagnose and treat illnesses
most often lies within the purview of physicians. The sort of knowledge that we think patients do
have isn’t about specific medical diagnoses or treatments; rather, it pertains to the types and
degrees of pain or other symptoms they’re experiencing first hand ‒ things that can’t be known, at
least directly, by health care providers. In cases such as Rachel’s, she knew that something was
very wrong, and she knew that both her claims to pain and her emotional responses to that pain
weren’t given uptake. It’s not, as one might argue, simply a matter of epistemic luck that she just
happened to be right about the severity of her pain and her physical symptoms. Rather, Rachel was
better positioned to know something about her body than her health care team; she had better
knowledge of the degree of pain that she was experiencing and that it was unlike other sorts of
pain she’d experienced. This doesn’t mean that Rachel was in a position to self-diagnose her
ovarian torsion, or to know what treatments were necessary to respond to her pain. The particular
sort of expertise possessed by the health care providers is crucial to diagnosing and treating
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patients, and we don’t wish to undermine that. Rather, we’re suggesting that the ideal scenario
would have been for Rachel’s health care team to have treated her as an epistemic peer. With
Rachel’s knowledge, combined with their medical/technical expertise, the epistemic, emotional,
and physical/embodied harms she experienced could have been avoided.

3.3.3.

Self-Identity Microaggressions and Existential Harms

The final kind of microaggression we’re considering are self-identity microaggressions.91 News of
illness, individual experiences of such news, and illness itself can change how people view and
understand themselves and how they relate to others and to the world (Carel 2014). Within medical
contexts, self-identity microaggressions occur when health care providers (or others, including
family members) either intentionally or unintentionally undermine or don’t give uptake to the
existential consequences that often accompany experiences of illness. Self-identity
microaggressions result in enduring, non-physical, existential harms. For example, if physicians
and health care providers focus only on the physical aspects of illnesses, they might fail to
recognize the significance of how experiences of illness can impact the broader ways that patients
experience themselves and the world around them, thereby failing to do justice to how important
these experiences can be to patients as individuals. It’s important to note that while we’re
highlighting this third category of microaggressions as a distinct source of harm, the other types
of microaggressions we’ve identified in medical contexts can also result in enduring harms to a
person’s self-identity and self-worth.
An example of an existential harm caused by a self-identity microaggression is illustrated in
Anatole Broyard’s book, Intoxicated By My Illness (1992). Broyard was a mixed-race man of
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Since the 2018 publication of this paper, Lauren Freeman and I have developed our account of self-identity
microaggressions. Specifically, we parse them into two types. The first is medical self-identity microaggressions,
which are limited to the medical context, and which capture the sort of experience Broyard (1992) describes – not
having his illness experience recognized or given uptake, which he equated to an invalidation of his humanity. The
second is marginalization-based self-identity microaggressions, which are those which result in a failure to give
uptake to some important part of one’s marginalized identity or their embodiment (e.g., their trans identity, their queer
identity, or their fat body). The latter is not limited to medical contexts, but rather track people with marginalized
identities or embodiment through their lives and arise in various contexts. These two types are related in that they
have to do with a failure to recognize a person as the person they are, leading to harms that are existential – pertaining
to one’s very humanity.
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Louisiana-Creole decent. His memoir documents how his identity was radically altered as a result
of his cancer diagnosis and how he desired a doctor who could appreciate that central aspect of his
illness experience. Reflecting upon his recently received diagnosis, Broyard writes:
I had dawdled through life up to that point, and when the doctor told me I
was ill it was like an immense electric shock. I felt galvanized. I was a new
person. All of my old trivial selves fell away, and I was reduced to an
essence. I began to look around me with new eyes, and the first thing I
looked at was my doctor (37-8).
With literary and philosophical elegance, Broyard illustrates how he felt deeply affected by his
diagnosis. His physician was the first person to whom he looked for acknowledgement and
understanding, but Broyard soon realized that his physician wasn’t equipped to deal with the
existential impacts of his illness. Rather, his physician’s role was narrowly focused on the technical
aspects of diagnosing and curing an illness, as opposed to seeing and treating a person, a sentiment
echoed in numerous patient testimonies that we reviewed in researching this paper. Broyard
reflects on not being seen as a human being by his physician, and how this left him feeling
abandoned and alone to deal with his diagnosis.
Other doctors give you a generic, unfocused gaze. They look at you
panoramically. They don’t see you in focus. They look all around you, and
you are a figure in the ground. You are like one of those lonely figures in
early landscape painting, a figure in the distance only to give scale. If he
could gaze directly at the patient, the doctor’s work would be more
gratifying. Why bother with sick people, why try to save them, if they’re
not worth acknowledging? When a doctor refuses to acknowledge a
patient, he is, in effect, abandoning him to his illness (50).
Though Broyard doesn’t describe the actions of his physicians and their resulting harms to his
personhood using the language of microaggressions, we’re calling their actions self-identity
microaggressions since they failed to see or engage with Broyard as a human being (rather, they
only considered his body as something to be cured) and on an on-going basis, failed to
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acknowledge or respond to the nature of Broyard’s existential difficulties pertaining to his illness
that resulted from his vulnerable position qua patient. Though this lack of attention to the more
human side of illness might be considered micro from the perspective of the physician – after all,
from their perspective, their job is to cure or treat injury, illness, or disease – from the perspective
of patients, as we see with Broyard’s account, these oversights are anything but micro. The selfidentity microaggressions that Broyard faced had serious harmful existential consequences for his
well-being and sense of self, as well as for his view of doctor-patient relationships more generally.
Broyard recognizes the difference between how he perceives the existential crisis he’s facing as a
result of his illness, and how his physicians understood it. He writes: “To the typical physician,
my illness is a routine incident in his rounds, while for me it’s the crisis of my life. I would feel
better if I had a doctor who at least perceived this incongruity” (43).
In her article, “Loss of Self: A Fundamental Form of Suffering in the Chronically Ill” (1983),
Kathy Charmaz recounts that experiences like Broyard’s aren’t uncommon. Based on 57
interviews conducted with people living with a variety of chronic illnesses, Charmaz suggests that
many chronically ill patients go through significant existential crises as a result of their experiences
of illness and the accompanying vulnerability that it brings, combined with failures of their
physicians and families to acknowledge the complex existential and psychological consequences
of their illness. Though Charmaz doesn’t use the language of microaggressions, we take her to be
articulating the harmful existential consequences that arise from, among other things, self-identity
microaggressions. Charmaz rejects a narrow view of suffering that restricts medical
understandings of suffering exclusively to physical forms at the expense of considering how
experiences of illness affect one’s very selfhood and way of being in the world.
One of the women Charmaz interviews discusses several examples of how harmful self-identity
microaggressions can be, especially when they come from someone with whom one has already
developed an intimate relationship (like that between a physician and a patient). In describing an
incident that happened to her, the interviewee notes the importance of a physician who’s more than
simply a good technician. She expresses how necessary it is for the well-being of a patient to have
a physician who understands their patients as more than mere bodies to be cured.
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Dr. Lang took care of me – he’s okay as a surgeon but as a doctor, he upset
me more than words. You keep going in with the same problem and they
stop listening. One time he sat there opening his mail while I was in the
office. I said, “Go ahead and open your mail, I’ll wait.” He felt silly, then
he listened (Chamaz 1983, 180).
Later in the interview, the same woman expands upon the importance of a physician recognizing
the personhood of a patient:
What I like about Dr. Brenton and Dr. Kaye is that they treat you like a
person…that is so important when you are ill, to be taken seriously as a
person…The thing I found in Dr. Kaye and Dr. Brenton is a
humanitarianism…In a person with chronic disease who has so many
things to handle, not only the sickness, but just living problems – to be
treated like a number is the last thing you need (Ibid.).
The physician’s act of opening his mail as his patient expresses her concerns about her illness is a
self-identity microaggression since this action fails to recognize the human being before him and
it had consequences for her self-worth. Throughout her account, we see how harmful it can be to
one’s sense of self to have their very being ignored by a physician.
Another common example of a self-identity microaggression within a medical context (and more
generally) is to deadname, mispronoun, and/or misgender a transgender or gender non-conforming
patient. 92 Deadnaming refers to using the birth or legal name of a transgender or gender nonconforming person (that may still be on their legal identification due to legal, practical and
financial difficulties in legally changing one’s name, but that they no longer use). Xeph Kalma, a
transgender woman who lives with depression, calls deadnaming “that other dysphoria-spewing
beast” (Kalma quoted in Sharman 2017; 204) and notes that each time it happens she feels like
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she’s “being hit with a hammer” (ibid., 206). She describes her painful experiences of being
deadnamed and misgendered in the ER:
Deadnames can be a painful reminder of a terrible time in a person’s life.
They are tenacious and require resources to fix legally, which many trans
folx do not have. Because of this, mine still exists in the legal sense. In an
attempt to counter this during the intake process, I tried to make it
abundantly clear that even though my deadname might show up on some
files, it is not in fact my name and is certainly not how I want to be
addressed, especially in a suicidal state of mind. This tactic has worked in
the past, but today, the message either isn’t passed along to the staff
treating me or is simply ignored. I’m repeatedly deadnamed, leaving me
worse than when I arrived at the hospital… Maybe some years of working
in a hospital will have taught them that as a patient, I’m looking to be
treated like a human being who is worthy of respect (Kalma quoted in
Sharman 2017, 204-205).
It’s clear from Kalma’s testimony that having her identity undermined was incredibly painful:
worse, in fact, than the illness for which she’d originally sought treatment. From the perspective
of health care providers, deadnaming might seem “micro”; in deadnaming patients, they might not
intend to cause harm. However, as Kalma’s testimony attests, when considered from the
perspective of the patient, deadnaming is not at all micro. Rather, it’s an act of disrespect,
constitutes a failure to listen to or acknowledge patients, and is profoundly harmful, in particular
when it occurs to a patient already in such a vulnerable state of illness.
When physicians fail to give proper uptake to the existential consequences of illness, let alone act
in ways that fail recognize the basic personhood of patients (as in deadnaming, mispronouning,
and misgendering), they commit self-identity microaggressions; they fail to see and respond to the
many significant ways that illness affects individual people, their senses of self, and the ways in
which failing to recognize one’s selfhood in an already vulnerable state can be exponentially
harmful. Insofar as it’s common in the face of illness for patients to experience significant
existential crises and at times to begin to lose their sense of self, physicians risk harming patients
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further by not responding appropriately and humanely to these experiences. As the testimonies of
Broyard, the chronically ill woman interviewed by Charmaz, and Xeph Kalma show, this can have
significant impacts for patients’ sense of self and also for how they relate to their physicians. Such
a harm ought to be avoided by health care providers.

Long-Term Harms of Microaggressions in Clinical Medicine
In this section we elaborate upon some of the long-term consequences that microaggressions in
clinical medicine can have: they can undermine physician-patient relationships, preclude
relationships of trust, and therefore compromise the kind and quality of care that is received.
Recall the case of Bronte Doyne, a 19-year-old woman who died as a result of her undiagnosed
liver cancer recurrence. She suffered more pain and received less care than she otherwise would
have, as a result of her physicians’ failures to take seriously her testimony about her symptoms
(epistemic microaggression). Consequently, her mother lost trust in health care providers. In
reference to their repeated attempts to secure adequate cancer care for Bronte, Doyne’s mother
stated: “I can’t begin to tell you how it feels to have to tell an oncologist they are wrong, [but] it’s
a young person’s cancer. I had to. I’m fed up trusting them” (Cara 2015). When microaggressions
are repeated, the long-term distrust that can result can have serious and dangerous physical and
psychological consequences. Xeph Kalma explains:
In this moment, in my already suicidal state, the doctor has made it a
million times worse. I put my coat on and walked out…Instead of having
those whom I trust take care of me, those whose job it is to take care of
me, I am now at a brand new low – hopeless, hungry, and cold…The way
I was treated in the ER – the misgendering, deadnaming, ignorance, and
the lack of discretion I experienced – is incredibly dangerous. When I say
it was ‘my last visit,’ I mean it. I will not voluntarily return to an ER the
next time I’m feeling suicidal. Anything would be a better option than
experiencing

that

level

of

embarrassment

and

shame

again.

Embarrassment and shame, from those who were meant to take care of
me” (Kalma quoted in Sharman 2017, 206; our emphasis)
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The distrust that results from experiences of microaggressions, as evidenced by the testimonies
we’ve discussed, contributes to patients’ doubts about the efficacy of health care, often resulting
in delayed medical treatment, foregoing medical treatment altogether, and prolonged illness. These
factors can deepen the physical, emotional, and existential harms that accompany illness. Although
as we’ve argued above, all patients could be recipients of microaggressions in clinical contexts,
members of marginalized, structurally oppressed groups are more likely to experience this injustice
and to greater consequence.93 One serious and pervasive example of this phenomenon is that many
women tend to delay seeking medical treatment when exhibiting symptoms of heart attacks, often
because they’ve an internalized a fear of seeming “too emotional,” of being dismissed as a
“hypochondriac,” or as seeming “crazy.” A recent Yale study reported that such fears of not being
taken seriously led to women having “limited and sporadic connections” with primary care
practitioners for routine check-ups and preventative heart care (Lichtman et al. 2015).
Microaggressions are indeed a large part of this structural problem insofar as there’s a long history
of the sorts of gendered epistemic and emotional dismissals we considered above. But this isn’t
only an issue for cis-gender women. As we saw with Xeph Kalma, a phenomenon that’s common
for many trans and gender non-conforming folks, fear of being deadnamed and misgendered, is
enough to preclude them from even setting foot in a hospital or clinic.94 All of these reactions are
related to the problem of microaggressions. Though actions performed may be micro from the
perspective of the health care providers, the harms suffered are not micro at all and can lead to
people avoiding health care settings to the detriment of their health.
In one of the two studies of which we’re aware that specifically focuses on microaggressions
toward patients within medical contexts (Walls et al. 2015), the investigators conducted in-person
interviews with 218 adult American Indians diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. They found that
greater than one third self-reported having experienced microaggressions in interactions with
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See Williams et al. (2009); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2013).
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See Freeman and Ayala (2018) and Freeman (2018) for discussions of this problem.
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health care providers, which correlated with self-reported history of heart attack, worse depressive
symptoms, and prior-year hospitalization. Moreover, the researchers claim that microaggressions,
in addition to other kinds of discrimination faced by members of marginalized groups within
medical contexts, can ultimately contribute to worse behavior; poorer physical, and mental health;
decreased service utilization; and reduced treatment compliance (ibid. 233, 237). Decreased
service use and treatment compliance can in turn result in further disease complications and
comorbidities.
Our point is this: when one’s health, well-being, and in many cases, one’s very life is at stake, it’s
imperative to trust and to have a positive relationship with those in charge of your treatment and
care. Experiencing microaggressions within medical contexts, however, can undermine this trust
in health care professionals, leading to a variety of roadblocks for successful treatment, as well as
serious psychological and existential pain for the recipients, as evidenced by the testimonies
detailed above. We must bring attention to the kinds of microaggressions that arise in medical
contexts in order to try to eliminate them (or, perhaps more realistically, to diminish them as much
as possible). Working to decrease microaggressions in medicine is especially important in light of
the resurgent popularity of the concept of patient centered care.95 If we truly believe that medicine
should be centered around and guided by quality care of patients, then this is all the more reason
to promote understanding of health and illness “through the eyes of patients” (Saha et al. 2008).
Doing so would involve a commitment to understanding what microagressions are; recognizing
that they occur; understanding the severity of the harms that result from them; and finally, taking
steps to be mindful so as not to commit them. As we’ve shown, non-physical harms within the
context of illness can be just as serious as (and sometimes, as in the case of Rachel, even more
enduring than) physical harms. As such, medical practitioners need to take heed and work to reduce
microaggressions.
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Patient-centered care is a model built upon the active collaboration and shared decision-making between patients,
families, and providers. In patient-centered care, one’s specific health needs and desired health outcomes are the
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patients holistically from a clinical, emotional, mental, spiritual, social, and financial perspective (NEJM Catalyst
2017).
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Microaggressions Revisited
In the preceding sections, we’ve proposed and begun to develop a recipient-centered, harm-based
alternative to Sue’s action-based account of microaggressions. We now return to several cases
discussed above to show how and why, when compared to Sue’s act-based account, our account
yields a better understanding of the specific harms of microaggressions. In so doing, we hope to
demonstrate the theoretical and practical value of a recipient-centered, harm-based account of
microaggressions and to motivate further discussion on this topic.
Though Sue’s account of microaggressions is useful for delineating actions committed by those
with relative power compared to members of marginalized groups, it’s less helpful in determining
the precise nature of the harm experienced as a result of those actions. A recipient-centered, harmbased account is better suited to this task. In order to demonstrate this point, we return to the cases
of Tressie McMillan Cottom (epistemic microaggression) and Xeph Kalma (self-identity
microaggression).
Recall that Cottom’s claims about her body and her pain were repeatedly ignored by her health
care providers, which led to a series of harmful consequences, including, ultimately, the loss of
her child and her being blamed for that loss. Again, these outcomes are macro and tragic, but it is
significant to zero in on the subtle, microaggresive interactions that occurred in the lead up to those
tragic events. In being told that what she was experiencing was normal for women “like her,” and
repeatedly, subtly dismissed when she tried to assert the seriousness of her pain, Cottom
experienced subtle (though significant) epistemic microaggressions. When we try to categorize
these microaggressions on Sue’s view, the specific nature of the interaction becomes harder to
pinpoint. On Sue’s account, Cottom would likely have experienced a racial microinvalidation,
defined by Sue et al. as “communications that exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological
thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of a person of color” (2010, 274). Cottom’s claims were
ignored (due to gendered and racial stereotypes held by health care providers, as well as
assumptions about normative body size), thereby invalidating her as a person (and specifically, as
a fat Black woman). Though calling this harm a microinvalidation captures very generally the
basic harm suffered by Cottom – nobody likes to be ignored – labeling it a microinvalidation fails
to capture the precise and important epistemic dimension of the harm, which is a crucial component
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both of the case itself and of the enduring epistemic consequences of such microaggressions. If we
take seriously the sorts of harms that Miranda Fricker (2007) and others have convincingly argued
can arise from testimonial injustices and other epistemic oppressions (Dotson 2011), it becomes
clear how harmful it was for Cottom as a knower to have her claims about her body repeatedly
brushed off, dismissed, and ignored – to tragic ends. One can be invalidated in many senses, but
calling what happened an epistemic microaggression, pinpoints the distinctly epistemic dimension
of the interaction, and underscores the specificity of the epistemic harms that resulted. Cottom’s
very capacity and position as a knower was undermined. Being a knower is crucial to one’s agency
and personhood (cf. Fricker 2007). It’s in this sense that microaggressions caused serious epistemic
(among other types of) harm, rather than just invalidating her more generally, as Sue’s account
holds. We aren’t questioning whether it’s harmful to have one’s thoughts, feelings, and
experiential reality negated. Rather, our point is that our proposed account is better able than Sue’s
to highlight the precise epistemic dimension of the harm. Identifying and naming the specific
nature of the harm is important for understanding it in a full, robust moral sense.
A second case that helps to show how our account is better able than Sue’s to provide a precise
analysis of the kind of harm experienced as a result of microaggressions is Xeph Kalma’s. Recall,
she was deadnamed in the ER. Her birth name (that still appeared on her identification) was no
longer a part of her identity, as she expressed numerous times to her medical team. Being
repeatedly called by that name and simultaneously misgendered during her visit threatened her
sense of self. As with Cottom’s case, if we stick to Sue’s taxonomy of microaggressions, it’s
difficult to pinpoint the precise nature of the harm suffered by Kalma. On Sue’s account,
deadnaming could either count as a microinvalidation insofar as the recipient’s personhood is
invalidated by failing to recognize who she is, or possibly as a microassault, defined as an explicit
“derogation characterized primarily by a verbal or nonverbal attack meant to hurt the intended
victim through name-calling, avoidant behavior, or purposeful discriminatory actions” (Sue et al.
2010, 274). To be deadnamed and misgendered was extremely harmful to Kalma’s general wellbeing, as conveyed in her testimony above. However, neither of Sue’s categories of
microaggressions manages to capture the precise and enduring harm to Kalma that a self-identity
microaggression and the resulting existential harm does; both of them seem to collapse all types
of harm under one general category. Kalma describes being deadnamed as a constant reminder of
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terrible times in a person’s life. The fact that her health care team continued to deadname her even
though she explicitly told them the name that she uses, is harmful to the core of her being and
violates her sense of self. What Kalma described wanting (and what she felt her health care team
failed to do) was to treat her “like a human being who is worthy of respect” (Kalma quoted in
Sharman 2017, 204). Using the language of self-identity microaggression and the resulting
existential harm highlights that what occurred to Kalma had implications for her identity and sense
of self in an enduring way. We’re suggesting that an account that labels microaggressions on the
basis of their harms is better able to capture what’s morally wrong in the case ‒ a conclusion that
isn’t as easily or readily reached when her experience is described using Sue’s more general
language of microassault or microinvalidation, which lumps all harms into a single category.
The language we use to describe microaggressions has consequences for the way we think about
them: how severe they are, how much harm they inflict upon those on the receiving end, the precise
nature of this harm, and thus, how important they are for us to confront. For this reason, it’s
preferable to describe microaggressions in ways that are most accurately able to capture what is
morally salient: the particular, severe, and enduring harms that result from microaggressive acts.
While Sue’s taxonomy conveys the idea that harms are caused to targets of microaggressions, it
doesn’t specify the specific kinds of harm. However, when we start from the position of the harms
experienced by those on the receiving end of microaggressions, as opposed to the actions of the
microaggressors, we can better understand the significance of microaggressions and why they’re
therefore important for health care providers and others to avoid.
Presently, we aren’t launching a full argument in favor of our taxonomy of microaggressions, nor
are we completely rejecting Sue’s account. Rather, as a preliminary foray into this issue, we hope
that by showing how our account is better suited to capture the precise kinds of harm that result
from various types of microaggressions, we might motivate readers to think anew about the starting
point that’s traditionally been taken, and continues to be taken, to discuss and understand the
phenomenon, and to consider how microaggressions might be re-conceptualized if we take on a
different standpoint, namely, that of those on the receiving end of microaggressions and the
enduring harms they experience. Doing so (in addition to doing more service to the perspective of
those harmed by microaggressions) might also foster a change in how society thinks and talks
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about microaggressions, insofar as it illuminates how genuinely harmful they are for those on the
receiving end – a question which still receives plenty of debate and skepticism.96 Intervening in
microaggressions through awareness, education, and training, might be more likely and less
contentious once we make such a shift in the cultural mindset towards a recognition of the ways
in which they really do impact people’s lives in enduring, harmful ways.
Before concluding, we’d like to acknowledge a possible objection to our proposal. One might
argue that Sue’s account of microaggressions is sufficiently recipient-centered, insofar as his
primary aim in theorizing microaggressions is to bring to light a phenomenon that affects
structurally oppressed people. However, we see Sue’s account as treating the harms experienced
as secondary, insofar as his account doesn’t center on those experiences, but rather focuses on and
is guided by what the actor/microaggressor is doing to that oppressed person. That is, his account
takes as its point of departure the agency of the microaggressor, as opposed to theorizing from the
position of those harmed. In so doing, Sue’s account is unable to make much headway on
differentiating the unique harms that may result from the types of acts he identities, something
that’s required of any account of microaggressions. He spends significant time making the case
for the different categories of microaggressive acts but gives little attention to the diversity of
harms that might follow from them.
This is evident in much of the literature that utilizes Sue’s taxonomy to research the negative
impact of microaggressions. This empirical research uses Sue’s three categories to examine at how
microaggressions generally cause harm, mostly without distinguishing between distinct harms that
result from the different types of microaggressions. The conclusions are thus of the form:
microaggressions contribute to x, y, and z harms, without attention to whether or not the distinct
types of microaggressions cause harm differently or cause different harms altogether. For example,
Hunn et al. (2015), Berk (2017), and Munro (2017) rely upon Sue’s tripartite distinction of
microaggressions, but when they move to discussions of harms, all harms caused by
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See note 2. Also see chapter 1 of this thesis for a response to this skeptical position and the Introduction of this
thesis for a discussion of the working conception of harm.
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microaggressions are lumped together into a single category. We believe that an account that calls
for a more nuanced distinction between different types of harms caused by different types of
microaggressions is superior insofar as it better describes the phenomena under consideration. In
other words, significant nuance is lost when we fail to consider the unique harms of particular
types of microaggressions. Thus, as research and discussion on microaggressions continues, it’s
beneficial to consider adopting an account which can illuminate some of this nuance.

Conclusion
In this chapter we’ve discussed the dangerous consequences of microaggressions within the
context of clinical medicine. We’ve proposed a possible, even if only tentative, alternative
classification of microaggressions within this context that takes the harms experienced by patients
as its point of departure. In doing so, we’ve articulated three types of microaggressions ‒ epistemic,
emotional, and self-identity microaggressions ‒ which result in harms that are epistemic,
emotional, and existential respectively. We’ve illustrated each within a medical context by
providing examples drawn from patients’ firsthand experiences. By centering the experiences of
those on the receiving end of microaggressions themselves, we hope to have shown how harmful
microaggressions in medical contexts can be, and thus to have provided compelling reasons why
health care providers ought to know about them and actively work to avoid committing them. Our
hope is that future extensions of this work can (1) develop the new classification of
microaggressions that we’ve offered here, thus shifting the terms of the debate to focus on the
perspectives of those who experience microaggressions as opposed to the types of actions
committed by microaggressing agents (2) use this revised classification and the related harms to
begin developing practical tools which can be used to aid health care providers in recognizing and
avoiding the microaggressive acts that result in these types of harms in their clinical practice.
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Chapter 4
4. Hearing Queer Voices in the Clinic: On the Prevention of Clinical
Microaggressions for Better Communication and Care

Abstract:
‘Microaggressions,’ are brief and commonplace verbal, gestural, or
environmental indignities that, whether intentionally or not, convey
hostility or derogation toward members of marginalized groups (Sue
2010). Given the power differentials inherent in the doctor/patient
relationship, clinical encounters are often rife with microaggressions,
which can be a detriment to effectively communicating patients’
symptoms and needs, and can thus stand in the way of patients receiving
quality care (see Freeman and Stewart 2018). This is the case regardless of
physicians’ intentions. The difficult reality of microaggressions is that they
often occur – and cause harm – without the perpetrator even realizing what
they have done or said, or why it is problematic. In this chapter, I discuss
the harmful implications of microaggressions in clinical contexts,
particularly those leveled against members of the LGTBQ+ community. I
argue that routine experiences of microaggressions committed by health
care providers can, over time, degrade queer peoples’ trust in health care
professionals, produce anxiety about ‘coming out’ to providers, cause
queer people to withhold information that is pertinent to their health, or, in
the worst-case scenario, avoid health care contexts all together. When
queer people are unable to effectively and openly communicate with their
health care providers – or, avoid them altogether – the many health
disparities that LGBTQ+ communities already face can worsen. As such,
I argue that as a matter of health justice, health care providers need to
become more aware of microaggressions, particularly those leveled at
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LGBTQ+ people, and work to stop committing them. Furthermore, I offer
positive proposals for how health care providers can better collaborate with
their queer patients and become more effective hearers of their queer
patients’ testimonies. Drawing on the work of Lauren Freeman (2015) and
others, I argue for an “epistemic peers” model of communication with
queer patients in the clinic, which should help to reduce the frequency of
microaggressive comments and to ultimately improve the quality of
communication and knowledge exchange between queer patients and those
tasked with providing quality health care to them.
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Introduction
So, I went to see a provider, hoping to find some
good provider for gender stuff. And this place, it was
a trans clinic, but they didn't really know what to do
with me, because... well they don't really have words
for non-binary people. So, they didn't have that on
the sign-up form. When it asked gender, I couldn't
click anything. I saw trans, but I knew that the intake
form wasn't gonna have what I wanted on there, like,
a gender box for me. But I was hoping. I ended up
just leaving. (23-year-old gender-fluid patient
quoted in Lykens et al. 2018).
The rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of medical humanities has shown us time and again
how integral personal expression and effective communication are to medical communication.97
Communicating effectively in medical contexts is, of course, invaluable for achieving accurate
diagnoses and successful treatment. In what follows, I consider one phenomenon that can cause
clinical communication to go array, thereby preventing the sorts of expression and productive
interactions that are so vital for quality care. Specifically, I focus on the phenomenon of what has
been called “microaggressions,” and I examine how the frequency of such microaggressions
leveled at LGBTQ+ people in clinical spaces serves as a barrier for effective communication, and
thus quality care.
The chapter will proceed as follows: in section 4.2, I will provide an overview of what
microaggressions are and the sorts of harms they cause for their targets; in section 4.3, I will
develop an account of how microaggressions in medical contexts can degrade trust, and ultimately
effective communication, thereby negatively impacting the kind and quality of care that is
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received; in section 4.4, I will apply the conceptual understanding of microaggressions and their
short and long term harms specifically to LGBTQ+ patients, arguing that for this group, there is a
particular need to minimize microaggressions in clinical settings; in section 4.5, I provide a brief
overview of some ways health care providers can minimize microaggressions and begin to
neutralize their harmful effects. Specifically, I focus on effective listening and communication that
helps to counteract the harmful influence of microaggressions in clinical interactions.

Microaggressions and their Harmful Effects
The term ‘microaggression’ was first introduced by a Black psychiatrist by the name of Chester
Pierce in the 1970s, with a specific focus on racial microaggressions (or, those microaggressions
which target a person on the basis of their marginalized racial identity). Pierce understood
microaggressions to be a subtler mechanism for enforcing racial hierarchy and racial oppression,
which, much like other types of racial animus and aggression, is meant to “brutalize, degrade,
abuse, and humiliate” others on the basis of their marginalized racial identity (Pierce 1970). The
concept was then further developed to refer to the phenomenon of “subtle, stunning, often
automatic… exchanges which are ‘put downs’” (Pierce et al. 1978). More recently, and especially
within the past decade, the phenomenon has experienced a resurgence of interest, primarily
following the publication of the book Microaggressions in Everyday Life by psychologist Derald
Wing Sue (2010) and a series of articles by him and his colleagues (Sue et al. 2007; 2008a; 2008b;
Nadal 2013; 2018; Nadal et al. 2011; Nadal et al. 2014).
A classic and often-cited example of a microaggression is the following. A person of colour is
asked by a white interlocutor “Where are you from?” The person of colour replies, “I am from
here – a Kentuckian, just like you!” If instead of accepting the answer and ceasing questions, the
interlocutor continues – “No, but where are you really from? – the interlocutor has committed an
instance of microaggression. Specifically, the interlocutor has microaggressed the person of colour
in a way that sends multiple messages, including that the person of colour does not belong, that
they appear foreign even in their home state and country, and that there is some meaningful
difference between a white person and a person of colour uttering the locution that they are from
Kentucky. What makes this sort of act characteristic of ‘microaggression’ is that it is subtle,
coming off as “benign” and “harmless,” yet sending a message steeped in historical and ongoing
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racism and xenophobia. It is important to note that microaggressions do not turn on the
microaggressor’s intention – microaggressions can harm their targets irrespective of their
interlocutor’s intention to do so or not. In this example, the microaggressor might not have meant
anything malicious by his follow-up question, and yet, for the person of colour, it was likely one
more instance of never-ending reminders that they are seen as different, as “Other,” in the place
they call home.
The dominant conception of microaggressions is that which largely follows in the tradition of Sue
and his colleagues, who developed microaggression theory in such a way as to focus primarily on
the type of act committed by the microaggressing agent. This yields the well-known tripartite
taxonomy of microaggressions, which divides microaggressions into the following: microinsults,
microassaults, and microinvalidations (see, for example, Sue 2010). This taxonomy has been
largely taken for granted in both the growing empirical psychological literature on
microaggressions (see, for example, Balsam et al. 2011; Cruz et al. 2019; Resnick & Galupo 2019)
and also the nascent philosophical literature on microaggressions (see for example, Friedlaender
2018; O’Dowd 2018; Rini 2020).
However, despite its popularity, in a 2018 paper, I argue with Lauren Freeman that such a
conceptualization of microaggressions is fundamentally misguided (see chapter 3 of this thesis).
Microaggression theory – insofar as it aims to understand how the phenomenon of
microaggressions affects marginalized people (i.e., the targets of microaggressions) and ideally to
rectify the harms microaggressions cause to them – ought to start from the perspectives of those
who are most likely to be on the receiving end, that is, those who fall within structurally
marginalized social identity groups. As such, Freeman and Stewart (2018) introduces a new
taxonomy for microaggressions, which categorizes them on the basis of three distinct types of
harm that targets are likely to experience as a result of microaggressions, yielding the following
taxonomy: epistemic microaggressions are those which result in epistemic harm; emotional
microaggressions are those which result in emotional harms; self-identity microaggressions are
those which result in existential harms to one’s sense of self or identity. This new way of thinking
about microaggressions from the perspective of those on the receiving end helps to keep the focus
on the more vulnerable parties within given relations of power (i.e., structurally marginalized
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people, or those with less social, political, or institutional power vis-à-vis some other agent). Doing
so helps to underscore not only that microaggressions can indeed be harmful, but it also helps to
isolate and highlight the precise nature of the harms that result (on our view, fundamentally
epistemic, emotional, or existential harms). Though I will not overview the full argument given in
Freeman and Stewart (2018) here, our primary contention is worth recapping: we argue that insofar
as they are deeply harmful for members of already marginalized groups, microaggressions warrant
our moral attention and our best attempts at intervention.

Microaggressions in Medical Settings and the Degradation of
Trust, Communication, Access, and Care
Part of the harmful nature of microaggressions rests on their repeat nature. 98 Insofar as
microaggressions are routine, brief, and commonplace interactions, they tend to occur readily, in
virtually all dimensions of marginalized people’s lives. In other words, those who experience
microaggressions tend to experience them frequently, in a wide range of social settings: at work,
at school, at the grocery store, and, importantly for our purposes, within the space of the medical
clinic.
The medical clinic is an important site for considering the harmful nature of microaggressions for
at least three reasons. First, illness experiences can already lend themselves to feelings of
confusion, alienation, and a variety of other emotional and self-identity impairing consequences
(see Freeman & Stewart 2018; Broyard 1992; Carel & Kidd 2014; Frank 2002). The many
emotionally and existentially (not to mention, physically) taxing dimensions of illness are
compounded by other things that can go wrong within the space of the clinic – including
microaggressions (our focus here). Second, the medical clinic is infused with inherent power
differentials – those between doctors and nurses, nurses and patients, and so on. For our purposes,
we are interested in the inherent power differential between health care providers (particularly
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For an articulation of the ways in which small actions can accumulate to amount to large disparities (or, large
discrimination or other inequalities), see Mallon (2021). Mallon also discusses his view of “accumulation
mechanisms” in a 2017 NPR interview (Lombrozo 2017).
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physicians99) and patients. Patients tend to occupy marginalized positions (of status or power) with
respect to health care providers, as a result of vulnerabilities associated with (acute or chronic)
illness or injury, the tendency to take orders from health care providers and comply with their
demands, and their different (and often understood to be lesser) epistemic position (resulting from
their actual or assumed lack of formal medical training).100,101 Third, in order for health care to
function properly, effective communication is essential. The proper practice of health care
(involving, primarily, diagnosing, treating, and preventing illness) requires the successful
transmission of information between patients and health care providers, and vice versa. Effective
communication, in turn, relies on there being adequate trust. Specifically, patients need to trust
that their physicians have their best interests in mind, that their physicians will listen to them and
take them seriously when they describe their symptoms or otherwise, and will diagnose and
prescribe appropriate treatment, to the best of their ability. These are the preconditions upon which
patients decide to disclose often sensitive and deeply personal information, experiences, and
worries to their providers. When trust is damaged, patients have a significant interest set back,
which constitutes a serious harm (McLeod 2020, 65).
On account of these three salient features of the medical clinic (namely, the complexities of illness,
the inherent power dynamics, and the importance of effective communication to the salient trustrelationships), the medical clinic becomes a space not only where microaggressions can be
pervasive (e.g., because of the inherent vulnerabilities and imbalances in power), but, perhaps
more importantly, where routine microaggressions can do serious damage (e.g., to trust
relationships). The power differentials inherent between patients and health care providers,
particularly between patients from structurally marginalized groups and their providers, makes

As such, while I will use the more inclusive phrase of “health care providers” throughout, I primarily have
physicians in mind, insofar as they generally wield the most power in medical contexts.
99

100
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See Carel (2014), Carel & Kidd (2014).

See McLeod (2020) for a discussion of this power dynamic. McLeod sees the physician-patient relationship as a
fiduciary relationship, which is inherently infused with power (power to exercise one’s judgement in a particular
domain; power in the form of possessing a certain sort of authority; power to make determinations regarding another’s
significant practical interests; McLeod 2020, 121).
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microaggressions not only possible, but likely. And, as I will describe below, frequent experiences
of microaggressions degrade the trust that is the foundation of open and effective communication,
and that is in turn essential for quality care. This makes microaggressions important to pay
attention to in medical contexts, insofar as they can be one roadblock that stands in the way of
patients receiving the care that they need – and particularly, patients who already occupy
structurally marginalized social positions. This need to better attend to microaggressions is made
difficult, however, by the nature of microaggressions as subtle acts (see chapter 2 of this
dissertation), which can make them easier to ignore, dismiss, or simply not to notice, for both the
microaggressor, and the microaggressed.102
So, what do microaggressions look like in medical settings? As noted above, microaggressions can
represent different sorts of actions, events, or circumstances. For example, microaggressions can
be verbal, that is, they can result from something that is said by a health care provider to a patient.
Consider an example involving a young, female patient comes into medical clinic. Having
previously had a confirmed ovarian cyst rupture, she reports to the health care provider that she
thinks she has had another ovarian cyst rupture. Note, that the patient is making a claim that is the
result of both her embodied awareness of her current level of pain, but also an understanding of
her past experiences and how they compare to her current symptoms. Upon the patient’s
suggestion, the health care provider replies, rather rudely, that the patient should “stay off of Web
MD.” 103 This constitutes a microaggression 104 because, while appearing to be a small, benign
comment, and despite the health care provider’s [good] intentions, this remark sends the message
that the female patient does not (or cannot) know her own body, and is not in a position to make

For a discussion of why this is the case, see discussion of oppression being “mystified” in the introduction to this
thesis.
102
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This is a modified, fictional example based on the true story of Bronte Doyne, who, upon telling her health care
providers that she thought her rare form of cancer had returned, was told to “Stop Googling symptoms.” It turned out,
her rare cancer had in fact come back (see Cara 2015). See chapter 3, this thesis, for a further elaboration of this case.
104

Specifically, on the account given in Freeman & Stewart (2018), it would be an epistemic microaggression, that is,
an “intentional or unintentional/unconscious slights conveyed in speech or gesture by health care providers that
dismiss, ignore, ridicule, or otherwise fail to give uptake to claims made by patients.” See also Freeman and Stewart
(2019a; 2019b; 2019c).
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claims about her own physical state. It amounts to a dismissal of her claims to knowledge about
her own embodied experience.
Microaggressions are not always verbal comments or remarks, however; they can also be gestural
or environmental. Consider the following gestural microaggression. A young, female patient is
reporting a difficult experience she had with a sexual encounter. It was hard for her to work up the
courage to speak about this with her health care provider, and she is experiencing feelings of
confusion and shame. In the middle of her story, the health care provider’s phone (which is not on
silent) rings, and he pulls the phone out of his white coat pocket and answers, beginning a
conversation about what his wife should prepare for dinner. He then concludes his call, hangs up,
and returns to the patient: “So, what were we talking about again?” 105 This action (again,
irrespective of the intentions of the health care provider) sends the message that what the patient
has to say is not important – or, is at least less important than the physician’s dinner plans. It
amounts to a failure to acknowledge that the patient is disclosing something personal, significant,
and difficult. It amounts to a failure of respect for the patient in the room.
Finally, consider an example of a microaggression that is not committed by an individual agent (in
the way that a verbal comment or gestural move is), but rather has to do with the physical space
of the clinic itself, as well as its aesthetics. Consider the following. A fat patient is in an
examination room having their vitals measured. The registered nurse goes to take the patient’s
blood pressure, only to discover that the cuff will not fit around the patient’s arm. There is no
larger cuff available. The registered nurse then asks the patient to step on the scale, however, the
scale is not capable of measuring weights high enough. This continues, with the fat patient unable
to be properly treated, insofar as the clinic lacks the equipment necessary to accommodate the
larger body size.106 This is an example of an environmental microaggression. It is not the result of
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This, too, is a modified fictional example of a real case, in which a patient describes her physician beginning to
open his mail while she was in the examination room, seeking help for chronic pain (see Charmaz 1983, 180).
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This happens all the time in practice. A 2017 article from CBC News reported that when a 470-pound patient was
in a hospital in Edmonton, Alberta (Canada), the patient was told they could not use the washroom, because they
might “break the toilet.” They ultimately brought a commode into his (shared) hospital room and put fabric walls
around it and told him he must use that, instead. The patient describes it as “the most degrading experience of his life.”
A health care provider reported to CBC that despite the growing number of fat patients seeking health services, the
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something any single agent is doing or saying, but rather, the environment itself; the material
conditions of it function to send the message to the fat patient that they do not belong and are not
valued in that space – that, ultimately, their health is less important than those patients with
“average” sized bodies.
While these are just a few examples of microaggressions that can occur in medical contexts, in
these settings, microaggressions are diverse and pervasive. Again, this is because patients are in a
position of vulnerability, vis-à-vis their health care providers, and often demonstrate deference to
them and their judgment. As a result, health care providers have disproportionate authority, which
creates and reinforces the sort of power differentials that lend themselves to microaggressive
comments and actions. And again, the material conditions of the clinic, insofar as the clinic is
designed for a certain sort of normative body, can also send messages of exclusivity and nonbelonging to patients with non-normative bodies. All of this can result without anyone intending
to cause harm.
Freeman and Stewart (2018) have argued that it is crucial for health care providers to become
aware of, pay attention to, and try to avoid microaggressions in medical settings because
widespread microaggressions in these settings can lead to an array of negative outcomes for
patients, in both the short- and long-terms. The short-term harms are varied and depend on the
nature of the microaggression in question. For example, a microaggression of the sort above, in
which a patient notifies her health care provider that she thinks she has a cyst and is subsequently
told to “stay off of Web MD,” might cause short term epistemic harm; that is, the patient may feel
as if she wasn’t taken seriously as an epistemic agent, who knows her body and her symptoms.
This can register as a sort of epistemic put down, or as being put in one’s epistemic place, or
otherwise being shut down as a knower. Relatedly, when a physician answers his phone while a
patient is disclosing a painful or confusing experiencing, the patient might feel ignored, rebuffed,
or even as if her humanity and vulnerability are not being recognized or responded to appropriately.
This can register as a sort of disrespect, for the seriousness of the patient’s experiences, or for the

system isn’t responding fast enough; health care providers are not properly trained and lack adequate equipment to
respond to the needs of fat patients (Roussy, 2017).

169

patient herself, as a person. Finally, when a fat patient is unable to be properly treated because the
standard equipment in the clinic cannot accommodate their body, they might feel a combination
of shame, embarrassment, or unworthiness. They might feel as if they are not welcome, or do not
belong in the space – like they won’t be, or can’t be, appropriately cared for in a way that meets
their needs. All of these short-term consequences, whether epistemic, emotional, or related to the
patients’ self-identity, can be seriously uncomfortable, and moreover, seriously damaging, to
patients. As such, they are worth attending to in their own right. However, what we know about
the microaggressions that marginalized people face is that they are not one-offs, but rather, they
occur systematically. A person who experiences microaggression once is likely to experience
microaggressions again, and again, and again. When this repetition of slights causes the harms of
microaggression to compound, more seriously grave long-term consequences can occur.
The long-term consequences of microaggressions (within the context of medical practice) include
at least the following: repeated microaggressions can i) damage or preclude the possibility of trust
between patients and health care providers, ii) damage the possibility for effective communication
and knowledge transmission, and thus iii) undermine physician-patient relationships which are
essential for quality care.107 In order to trust their health care providers and communicate their
needs to them, patients need to feel as if they will be listened to and taken seriously when they
give testimony to their health care providers. Microaggressions, however, can undermine both.
Recall a case described in chapter 3 in which a young, female patient and her mother were
repeatedly met with microaggressions when trying to convey information about the young
woman’s symptoms, the mother recalls losing trust in her daughter’s providers as a result. She
states: “I can’t begin to tell you how it feels to have to tell an oncologist they are wrong, [but] it’s
a young person’s cancer. I had to. I’m fed up trusting them” (Cara 2015.) This case demonstrates
that part of what is at stake in trusting someone is developing a normative expectation that the
trustee (i.e., the one being trusted) will do whatever it is we are trusting them to do – in this case,
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For a longer discussion of the long-term consequences of microaggressions in medical contexts, see Freeman &
Stewart (2018) (included as chapter 3, this thesis).
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to be responsive to their patient and recognize that their cancer has returned.108 Trust, then involves
some degree of vulnerability (because the trustee can fail to do the thing we have entrusted them
to do, cf. Baier 1986). When the trustee (in this case, the physician) fails to live up to our normative
expectations, trust is damaged.
Relatedly, trust can involve the expectation of competence and goodwill on the part of the trustee
(see McLeod 2020, 68-78; also see Baier 1986). Microaggressions can degrade these dimensions
of trust as well, by reflecting incompetence and/or a lack of effort to demonstrate goodwill or
concern. Consider the words of a patient who reported experiencing routine microaggressions from
the very people she entrusted with her care at a vulnerable time. In the testimony below, the patient
reports that, as a result of this trust being broken down, she will not return to seek medical attention
or care next time she finds herself in a similar [suicidal] state. She says,
“When I say it was ‘my last visit,’ I mean it. I will not voluntarily return
to an ER the next time I’m feeling suicidal. Anything would be a better
option than experiencing that level of embarrassment and shame again.
Embarrassment and shame, from those who were meant to take care of
me” (Patient quoted in Sharman 2017, 206; emphasis added).
These patient testimonies – and so many others like them – make it clear that when patients are
doubted, dismissed, mocked, ridiculed, or otherwise slighted by those responsible for their care,
they lose trust in the providers and the larger system (e.g., trust in providers to be competent or
able to meet their needs). As a consequence, they may (and often do) opt to delay care, or even
forego care altogether. 109 This, of course, has detrimental impacts on mental and physical
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See discussion in the third chapter, “Damages to Trust” of Margaret Urban Walker’s 2012 book, Moral Repair.

This isn’t mere conjecture. In one of the only empirical studies that examines the effects of microaggressions
specifically in medical settings, the researchers (Walls et al. 2015) found that of the 218 patients interviewed (all selfidentified as Indigenous Americans), over one-third reported having experienced microaggressions from providers,
and that this correlated with self-reported history of heart attack, worse depressive symptoms, and prior-year
hospitalization. Moreover, the researchers claim that microaggressions, in addition to other kinds of discrimination
faced by members of marginalized groups within medical contexts, can ultimately contribute to worse behavior; poorer
physical, and mental health; decreased service utilization; and reduced treatment compliance (ibid. 233, 237).
109

171

wellbeing, especially if people are hesitant to seek medical care when in crisis states, such as the
patient quoted above. We thus have reason to worry about the impact microaggressions will have
on those patient populations who already experience significant health disparities. One such
patient group, namely, those who are members of the LGBTQ+ community, will be our focus for
the remainder of this paper.110

Microaggressions and Queer Folks in Medicine
Now that we have a sense of what microaggressions in medical contexts can look like in a general
sense, and how they can be problematic in both the short and long terms, we can now apply that
understanding directly to our primary focus, namely, the wellbeing of LGBTQ+ patients.
Before getting ahead of ourselves, some basic familiarity with relevant terminology is in order.
“LGBTQ+” is an acronym which refers to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer.” The addition of
the “+” is an effort to be maximally inclusive – to represent all other non-normative sexualities,
orientations, and identities that fall under the “rainbow umbrella.”111 LGBTQ+ people all, in some
way or another, fall outside of dominant constructions of normative gender identity, experience,
or presentation, and/or sexual orientation or preference. Queer people and their experiences are
incredibly diverse; it is important to keep in mind that gender identity and sexual orientation are
separate dimensions of one’s identity and experience. One can be, for example, a cis-gender
lesbian; in this sense, one might conform to cis-normative gender, while deviating from

Decreased service use and treatment compliance can in turn result in further disease complications and comorbidities.
This research is discussed in Freeman & Stewart 2018 (included as chapter 3, this thesis).
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There are several documented health disparities facing the LGBTQ+ community, including but not limited to a
higher risk for substance use, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), cancers, cardiovascular diseases, obesity, bullying,
isolation, rejection, anxiety, depression, and suicide as compared to the general population (see Gounder 2016; Hafeez
et al. 2017; Krehely 2009; Praderio 2019). An intersectional lens also suggests that we should pay attention to how
disparities worsen for LGBTQ+ groups that are also structurally marginalized on the basis of some other structurally
oppressed identity, such as race. For example, an estimated 50 percent of black transgender women are suffering
greatly from HIV – a statistic that requires attentiveness to both trans health disparities and racial health disparities
(see Powell 2018).
For a helpful overview of relevant terms, see the Human Rights Campaign’s “Glossary of Terms” found at
https://www.hrc.org/resources/glossary-of-terms.
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heteronormative romantic and sexual expectations. Or, someone might be trans and identify as
heterosexual. Or, someone might be queer in all dimensions! There are infinitely many ways to be
queer – all are unique, beautiful, and valid. However, LGBTQ+ are often on the margins of
mainstream [read: dominant] society and experience a variety of discriminations and mistreatment
as a result.
As noted above, microaggressions target members of systemically marginalized social groups, that
is, those who are oppressed on the basis of their race, ethnicity, sex, gender identity, sexual
orientation, body size, dis/ability status, and so on. Because LGBTQ+ people remain oppressed
structurally, they are likely to be targets of microaggressions that draw on a number of social
biases, myths, or stereotypes about LGBTQ+ people and communities, and which reflect deep
social homophobia, biphobia, transphobia, or other sources of resentment against queer people.112
While microaggressions tend to track socially marginalized people in all dimensions of their social
lives, as I have argued above, it is particularly important to pay attention to them in medical
settings, given the adverse consequences they can have for medical treatment delivery, and thus,
for the overall health and wellbeing of queer people.
Despite the large number of people who identify as members of the LGBTQ+ community,113
health care providers and health care clinics are still generally ill equipped to accommodate their
needs properly. Part of the problem involves medical training, which not only fails to correct for
negative identity-based stereotypes (i.e., racial or gender stereotypes), but which can actually
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It is worth noting that while I am now focusing on microaggressions that queer people are likely to face qua
members of the LGBTQ+ community, I do not intend to erase or ignore intersectional identities that queer people
have, and how those might affect their experiences of microaggressions and other manifestations of structural
oppression (see, for example, footnote 10). For example, queer people of colour are likely to experience
microaggressions on the basis of race and their sexual orientation or gender identifications and experience the
intersection of both racism and homophobia or transphobia. Queer women might experience microaggressions that
simultaneously target their being women and their being queer, which are rooted in misogyny and homophobia
respectively.
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A 2011 study from the UCLA School of Law reported that, as of that time, there were approximately 9 million
LGBT Americans, a figure roughly equivalent to the population of New Jersey (Gates 2011). In the United States, we
do not have exact numbers, since the U.S Census Bureau does not track LGBTQ+ statistics (Wang 2017).
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reinforce them.114 Relatedly, there is a general lack of attention to LGBTQ+ specific dimensions
of health and health care in medical training. In a report for NPR, a third-year student at New York
Medical College described the extent of her LGBTQ+ focused medical training as having
“watched a BuzzFeed video” about what it is like to be transgender or intersex. She recalls
recognizing that this was insufficient, noting that: “It was a good video, but it felt inadequate for
the education of a class of medical students, soon to be doctors” (Cohen 2019). The video, paired
with a 30-minute lecture on sexual orientation, was the only queer-focused training she received
across her medical education. I point to this anecdote, but the problem is widespread – medical
curriculum does not yet include, in any robust way, meaningful training in queer and trans health
and health care.
As a result of this lack of focus on queer health content in medical training, practicing health care
professionals often feel incompetent to deal with LGBTQ+ identified patients (see Beagan et al.
2015; Fallin-Bennett 2015). In a 2018 study of 658 New England area medical students, around
80% of the respondents reported feeling “not competent” or only “somewhat competent” to treat
gender and sexual minority patients (Zelin et al. 2018). This is problematic, especially since this
competence can be increased by providing the content in the curriculum: studies show, for
example, that when medical students learn about transgender health issues, they feel better
equipped to treat transgender patients. For instance, when Boston University School of Medicine
added transgender health content to a second-year endocrinology course, students reported a
nearly 70 percent decrease in discomfort with providing transgender care (Safer and Pearce 2013).
I don’t mean to suggest that an appropriate medical education and training that centers queer and
trans lives, experiences, and health needs will wholly solve the problems (discriminations, biases)
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Two clear examples of the failure of medical training to reduce biases or misconceptions about marginalized patient
groups involve biases about body size faced by fat patients, and myths about pain tolerance and Blackness. Regarding
the first, recent studies have documented that over one-third of medical students have anti-fat biases, and medical
school curricula are doing little to correct for it (see Geller & Watkins 2018; Miller et al. 2014). Medical students also
have documented false beliefs about supposed biological difference between white people and Black people (i.e.,
including false beliefs about Black people have biologically higher pain thresholds and tolerances, that Black skin is
thicker than white skin, and that Black blood coagulates more quickly) that often remain consistent through medical
training (i.e., from first year through residency) (see Hoffman et al. 2016; Robb 2017).
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that queer and trans patients face in the clinic. Health care providers are still humans who, outside
of their training, are socialized and exist within a deeply homophobic and transphobic society.
They will, then, still be impacted by the influence of widespread stereotypes and biases. But,
without any baseline knowledge and awareness of queer lives and needs, these stereotypes and
biases are even more difficult to recognize, challenge, and try to combat.
Not only does a lack of education about or understanding of LGBTQ+ identities and experiences
make social stereotypes and biases more difficult to detect and challenge, it can lead to health care
providers reproducing these biases, and relying on stereotypes, myths, and misinformation, within
the space of the clinic. If they are not trained in accurate information about queer and trans people,
there will be a default to reliance on the prejudiced assumptions they are already hold – those
which are socialized into us all as a result of living in a cis-heteronormative society which
privileges cis-gender people and heterosexuality. In acting on one’s unchallenged biases and
assumptions, social stigmas can be reinforced and manifest in deeply problematic ways.
Moreover, this is precisely what happens, and queer patients know it. A 2017 study for the Center
for American Progress measured the extent to which LGBTQ+ patients perceived experiencing
discriminatory treatment when seeking medical care. The results were astounding: of the 1,864
patients surveyed, of which 857 identified as LGBTQ+, 8 percent of LGBQ identified patients
reported that a doctor or other health care provider refused to see them because of their actual or
perceived sexual orientation; 6 percent said that a doctor or other health care provider refused to
give them health care related to their actual or perceived sexual orientation; 7 percent said that a
doctor or other health care provider refused to recognize their family, including a child or a samesex spouse or partner; 9 percent said that a doctor or other health care provider used harsh or
abusive language when treating them; and 7 percent said that they experienced unwanted physical
contact from a doctor or other health care provider (such as fondling, sexual assault, or rape).
Among the transgender respondents to the survey, the results were even more alarming: 29 percent
said a doctor or other health care provider refused to see them because of their actual or perceived
gender identity; 12 percent said a doctor or other health care provider refused to give them health
care related to gender transition; 23 percent said a doctor or other health care provider intentionally
misgendered them or used the wrong name; 21 percent said a doctor or other health care provider
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used harsh or abusive language when treating them; and 29 percent said that they experienced
unwanted physical contact from a doctor or other health care provider (such as fondling, sexual
assault, or rape) (Mirza 2018). These results are astounding. Upon looking at them, there’s no
wonder that queer and trans patients experience such burdens in trying to receive appropriate health
care and maintain good physical and mental health.
We need to understand these discriminations, and the ways they are experienced for those on the
receiving end. And this is where the focus on microaggressions comes into play. While not all
instances of discriminatory treatment are properly understood as instances of microaggression –
some exceed that threshold and are clearly ‘macro’ instances of discrimination, assault, or
otherwise overt maltreatment – many of them do.115 Many instances of what queer patients face in
clinical settings amount to small, routine, seemingly subtle remarks and comments, often
motivated by a lack of awareness, insight, or understanding, often at the hands of well-intended
people (e.g., those tasked with delivering care). This is the core of what microaggressions are, and,
when they are frequently occurring, they can lead to detrimental, or even disastrous, outcomes for
queer patients.
Let’s consider what microaggressions look like for LGBTQ+ patients in medical settings. Within
medical contexts, queer patients encounter a variety of microaggressions, which reflect a failure
to understand, respect, or appreciate some (or many) dimension(s) of their identities as queer.
While it would be impossible to canvass all of the possibilities here, let’s consider a few examples
of the sorts of microaggressions LGBTQ+ people might experience when seeking medical care.
As noted above, microaggressions can be verbal, gestural, or environmental. Let’s consider each
in turn.
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In calling attention to subtle mechanisms of discriminatory treatment (e.g., microaggressions), I do not mean to
undermine the seriousness of the many overt forms of discrimination that LGBTQ+ people still face when trying to
access healthcare, including outright denials of care. One extreme example of this is a recently passed (2021) state bill
in Arkansas, which bans doctors from providing some types of trans healthcare to trans youth (see Reuters 2021). For
a discussion of how such policy impacts trans youth (see Levin 2021). Such instances of overt discrimination and
denial of care is unconscionable, and something we need to challenge, resist, and overturn, for the sake of queer and
trans youth.
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A verbal microaggression occurs in a medical context when a health care provider makes a
comment or remark that functions to invalidate the knowledge claims, emotional experiences, or
very identity of their patients. One commonly reported verbal microaggression experienced by
trans and nonbinary patients is being referred to by the wrong gender pronoun or gender marker,
or by a name they no longer use (a phenomenon referred to as ‘deadnaming’).116 While health care
providers, in many cases, do not intend to cause harm to patients by misgendering them or using
a name they no longer identify with, these practices can in fact be incredibly damaging for trans
patients. Consider the testimony of one trans patient, who in a state of vulnerability sought medical
care, only to be repeatedly microaggressed by the health care providers tasked with her care: She
explains:
In this moment, in my already suicidal state, the doctor has made it a
million times worse. I put my coat on and walked out…Instead of having
those whom I trust take care of me, those whose job it is to take care of
me, I am now at a brand new low – hopeless, hungry, and cold…The way
I was treated in the ER – the misgendering, deadnaming, ignorance, and
the lack of discretion I experienced – is incredibly dangerous (Trans
patient quoted in Sharman 2017, 206).
Or, consider another example, this one reported by a 30-year-old, American Indian, genderqueer,
two-spirit femme:
I told her about my identity when she asked me. And I remember she asked
me if I was a transgender woman. I felt a little taken aback at that but it
was understandable, most people like me may be perceived as transgender
women. But the problem was after I told her that, it didn't convince her.

For an excellent article on the harms inflicted on trans people when they are ‘misgendered’ (and the moral
contestability of those harms) see Kapusta 2016. Robin Dembroff & Daniel Wodak (2018) also discuss the harms of
mispronouning trans and nonbinary folks, arguing that doing so reinforces ideologies that disrespect transgender and
genderqueer individuals, and deprives them of opportunities for equal respect. Also see Freeman 2018 for a discussion
of the implications of misgendering in medical contexts.
116
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She asked me if I had ever thought about transitioning, and I told her I
couldn't, because I was already male and female. She kept asking me if I
had ever considered breasts, or how did I feel about my penis. She was
very adamant about it (patient quoted in Lykens et al. 2018).
While this example borders on “macro-aggressive,” in light of the intense and unilateral focus on
genitals and physical transition, even after the patient was clear that this was not something they
desired, we can assume that the health care provider had good intentions (that is, she was trying to
help in the only way her limited understanding allowed her to). And yet, when she had a person in
front of her trying to help her understand, she could not hear them, and continued on with her
singular focus on genitalia – a focus driven by cis-normative and binaristic notions of gendered
embodiment (for a discussion of the obsession with trans people’s genitalia in reductive and
violating ways, see Bettcher 2007).
Not unlike trans and nonbinary folks, bisexual patients are also frequently subjected to
microaggressions in medical settings, many of which are rooted in heteronormative assumptions
about sex and sexuality (see Stewart 2019). Consider the following example, 117 which as
constructed is hypothetical, but in reality, is all too common:
Physician to cis-gender, bisexual woman patient: Have you had any new
sexual partners?
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This example is slightly modified from Stewart (2019). For a similar first-person account of this, see Hastings
(2018), who describes going to the doctor as a feminine-presenting queer woman, and having her doctor assume she
has a boyfriend and question her about her contraception use (which she uses to improve her complexion) upon finding
out she doesn’t have a male partner. She describes the onset of microaggressive questioning: “Puzzled questions
inevitably follow: why are you taking a contraceptive if you can’t get pregnant? Are you absolutely sure you’re not
pregnant? Do you have any other partners?” She also describes the impact they have: “More often than not, the
inattentive and disapproving body language from healthcare professionals is enough to make me feel unwelcome.
Whether it’s a raised eyebrow or a terse remark, these microaggressions chip away at my willingness to return.” A
similar story is given by Ariana, a femme-presenting queer, and Kassie, a lesbian (see Praderio 2019). This scenario
is all too common, as health care providers generally assume patients are heterosexual, and automatically interact with
them as such. This could be alleviated by simply asking, instead of assuming.
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Patient: Yes, I have. Only one, and we have been monogamous for six
months.
Physician: What are you doing to prevent pregnancy?
Patient: I cannot possibly get pregnant.
Physician: Well young lady, no method is 100%… Are you using any
contraception? Condoms? Birth control pills?… You need to be using
some method, unless you want to wind up pregnant.
While there is a lot going on in this brief example, I want to highlight a few things. First, it is clear
that the physician has not listened to the patient or asked the right questions of her (see footnote
21 below), but instead, has allowed his own assumptions about heteronormativity, about his own
epistemic authority, and about his assumed knowledge of what is best for her, to carry the day.
This subtle failure to listen appropriately and give uptake to what she has said constitutes a
microaggression. Secondly, the physician belittles the patient on gendered lines by calling her
“young lady,” a way of, again, diminishing her agency (epistemic and otherwise) in that moment,
and reasserting his (epistemic and other) authority. These microaggressions, and the harms they
generate, occur regardless of the physician’s intent. While all of these microaggressive dimensions
of the exchange are important, and certainly worth attending to, I want to highlight the
microaggression at play that specifically targets the patient’s identity as a bisexual, and her firsthand knowledge about her own sexuality.
In this case, if the patient was not (yet) out as bisexual to her physician, he has closed off that
possibility by assuming that when a cis-woman reports they are sexually active, it is safe to
automatically assume that she is referring to heterosexual sex in general, and vaginal intercourse
in particular. There are many, many heteronormative and pro-natalist assumptions packed into that
assumption, as well as a general lack of awareness of the existence and possibility of bisexuality,
or the vast array of sex acts that are non-procreative, or generally are not vaginally-penetrative. On
the other hand, if the patient had already been open with her physician about her bisexuality, then
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the physician’s remarks make it clear that he hadn’t listened to her when she came out to him, or
that he didn’t believe her or take her seriously, or that he assumed that even if she identified as
“bi,” she was likely still engaging in heterosexual relations of the sort that could result in pregnancy
(e.g., heterosexual vaginal penetrative intercourse). He certainly did not leave open the possibility
that her interactions could be with another woman, or otherwise of the sort that renders pregnancy
impossible, as she had already expressed. The physician’s remarks constitute a failure to ask the
right questions and to appropriately listen, and also amounts to a sort of epistemic arrogance.118 In
either case, whether the physician had previously been made aware of the patient’s bisexual
identity or not, the physician has committed a microaggression, and specifically, one that calls into
question the patient’s very identity as bi. And just to reiterate, this is the case whether or not the
physician meant to question his patient’s identity, and subsequently to cause her any harm.
Microaggressions are sneaky that way: they can (and do) occur regardless of our intentions, or
even our awareness (see discussions in the introduction and chapter 2 of this thesis).
Not all microaggressions come in the form of words spoken, however. Some microaggressions are
the product of gestures or bodily signals (i.e., facial expressions, body language) that can also send
harmful messages to targets. Consider the following possible instance of a microaggression that
occurs via body language. An HIV-positive gay man is in the clinic for a routine check-up. When
taking his vitals, the nurse maintains a visible distance, and clearly tries not to make physical
contact. When she does, she noticeably jumps back, as if to touch his body was disgusting or
repulsive. Again, while the nurse likely means no harm – she might not even be consciously aware
that she is acting this way – her body language sends the message that he is untouchable, unclean,
monstrous even.119

On the vice of “epistemic arrogance,” see Medina (2012). Also see Frye (1983) on the related problem of viewing
others with an “arrogant perception.”
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Physician and poet, Rafael Campo, writes about the centrality of physical touch to the art of healing in his 1998
book, The Desire to Heal: A Doctor’s Education in Empathy, Identity, and Poetry. To withhold contact can be
detrimental to trust, comfort, and ultimately care.
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In addition to verbal or behavioral, as noted above, microaggressions can also be environmental.
Environmental microaggressions are unlike those which are expressed with words or physical
actions and gestures, because they are not necessarily brought on by a particular agent. Rather,
there can be features of the environment, that is, the physical space, which function to send
messages to target groups that they are regarded as being of low worth or importance in that space,
or that they otherwise do not belong there. Consider the following possible (and, indeed all too
common) environmental microaggression. A polyamorous, lesbian teenager is browsing through
the information pamphlets about sex and sexuality while she awaits the physician to enter the
examining room. She quickly realizes that all of the information available presupposes both
heterosexuality and monogamy.120 In other words, the pamphlets (in both the language used and
the images depicted throughout) make references and provide information that systematically
exclude people with sexual identities like hers. Immediately, she begins to second guess coming
to the doctor, or, at least this doctor, again. She wonders if the doctor assumes heterosexuality and
monogamy to be normatively best, or, indeed, the only reasonable possibility for sexual or
romantic interaction. She wonders if he is aware of – and competent to speak to her about – the
sexual identities she holds and the sexual experiences she is currently having.121 In a moment of
self-doubt, bridging on utter panic, the young patient grabs her jacket and runs out of the clinic.
She does not return. In this example, the patient experienced a microaggression that isn’t clearly
traceable to any one particular agent’s comments or actions, and yet, it still had the effect of making
her question whether this space was for her: whether there were people in the space that could
understand her and support her, or whether she was simply too different, too “Other,” to exist
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On problematic assumptions of monogamy and the erasure of polyamory, see the interview with Carrie Jenkins in
Illing (2018).
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A parallel example involves trans and nonbinary people arriving at medical clinics and being asked to fill out intake
forms which only provide two sex/gender options, which correspond to the gender binary. For an argument against
binaristic sex categorization in medical contexts, see Freeman & Ayala (2018). For an excellent analysis of the
overwhelming heteronormativity of the space of the clinic, see Meer & Muller (2017).
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there. Insofar as this isn’t the first time she has been fundamentally misunderstood, the buildup of
doubt pushes her toward the latter.
Microaggressions such as those described above – and so many others – can have lasting
implications for those queer people who experience them. Within the context of medicine, this can
include the more general long-term consequences of medical microaggressions described above in
section 4.2: an undermining of trust, damaged channels of communication, and thus the
undermining of physician-patient relationships (including, in the worst case, the avoidance of
medical care altogether).
Discrimination of all sorts, including microaggressions, endangers LGBTQ+ people’s lives and
wellbeing through delays or denials of medically necessary care. The Center for American
Progress study cited above (Mirza 2018) notes that discrimination ‒ and indeed, even the potential
for discrimination ‒ can deter LGBTQ+ people from seeking care in the first place. In the year
prior to the survey cited above, 8 percent of all LGBTQ+ people ‒ and 14 percent of those who
had experienced discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity in the
past year ‒ avoided or postponed needed medical care because of disrespect or discrimination from
health care staff. Among transgender people, 22 percent reported such avoidance. With regard to
preventative screenings, 7 percent of LGBTQ+ respondents reported avoiding or postponing care
in the year prior to the survey, while 17 percent of LGBTQ+ respondents who had experienced
discrimination that year and 19 percent of transgender people reporting avoidance during that
period.122 Of LGBTQ+ people who reported having experienced discrimination in the past year;
18.4 percent reported avoiding doctor’s offices to avoid discrimination, nearly seven times the rate
of LGBTQ+ people who had not experienced discrimination in the past year, at 2.7 percent (Mirza
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A 2011 study, the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, found that 27% of binary (mtf or ftm) trans people
and 36% of nonbinary trans people reported postponing medical care due to fears of insensitive or incompetent
treatment (see Harrison et al. 2012).
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2018). 123 This data makes it clear that experiencing discrimination – in whatever form that
discrimination takes, usually multiple forms – makes LGBTQ+ people more resistant to seek care
at all.
In the following testimony, borrowed from Lykens et al. (2018), a two-spirit patient describes
ceasing medical care after their health care provider routinely assumed that they desired genital
surgery and refused to acknowledge or accept their identity as two-spirit, despite routinely trying
to explain it. They recall:
I remember that she [the provider] thought I hated my penis. This was so
bizarre to me, you know, because I used it, I was fine with it. But she was
seriously like convinced by all this shit that [because] I said I was nonbinary that I hated my penis. She told me on—well, she told me like three
separate times […] to consider removing it, to consider bottom surgery.
Like to transition, whatever that means. She didn't even really believe that
I liked using it for sex. I left after the third time, I couldn't take it anymore.
This example represents clear epistemic arrogance on the part of the health care provider, who,
despite not having the same first-person experience of being two-spirit, and also likely lacking
theoretical knowledge about non-binary identity and experience, still assumes she knows what the
patient wants and needs better than they do. When the patient makes claims about their own
experience (i.e., enjoying using their penis for sexual encounters), the provider still privileges her
own understanding and refuses to believe them. Her failure to take their knowledge claims
seriously, paired with her microaggressive erasure of their identity as two-spirit, leads the patient
to leave, with no plans to return. As a result of her repeated microaggressive remarks, this provider
has lost this patient, perhaps for good.
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As Mirza (2018) notes, this data from the Center for American Progress is consistent with other research. The 2015
U.S. Transgender Survey, for example, found that nearly 1 in 4 transgender people (23 percent) had avoided seeking
needed health care in the past year due to fear of discrimination or mistreatment due to their gender identity.
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While there are many first-person reports of queer patients giving up on health care providers as a
result of frequent experiences of microaggression and other discriminatory slights, many queer
patients still (at times reluctantly) seek care. When LGBTQ+ people do seek care, past experiences
of microaggressions can make them less likely to open up to their providers (i.e., about their
sexuality or gender identity) than they otherwise would be. The Human Rights Campaign 2019
reports that 10% of lesbians, 13% of gay men, 33% of bisexual women, and 39% of bisexual men
report not disclosing their sexual orientation to their health care provider. Of course, this is often
relevant information for health care providers to know (assuming they know how to provide
LGBTQ+ informed care in the first place) in order to give them tailored medical advice and
treatment.124
In addition to the problem of not disclosing one’s sexual or gender identity at all, there is also the
problem of providing false information in an effort to receive the care one needs. More precisely,
LGBTQ+ people might alter their own story to conform to more dominant narratives, ones they
anticipate providers being more likely to understand. For example, a nonbinary or genderqueer
person might use the language of mtf or ftm transgender, if they anticipate that they’re actual
identity won’t be understood or responded to appropriately. A genderqueer patient describes this
very experience:
But you know, you gotta lie when you go into a clinic, you gotta say you're
trans and you gotta say you want hormones and surgery. They're not gonna
understand genderqueer, but they're gonna understand trans. […] So I said
I was trans a lot, when I wasn't. But I wanted my hormones more than
anything else… So for a long time I was just telling doctors that I was

Studies have shown that “coming out” is better for the health of LGBTQ+ people. For example, a study by the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention shows that gay and bi men who had disclosed their sexual orientation and
behavior to their physician are more than twice as likely to receive the leading health institute's recommended testing
and vaccines (Reynolds 2018). For a study on the importance of visibility for queer, lesbian, and bisexual women, see
Fredericks et al. (2017). Also see Rossman et al. (2017).
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trans, but that was really tiring because I had to make sure I was saying the
right things. And all I really wanted was to explain to someone that I was
non-binary, that I wanted to be seen that way. So, for a long time I had to
put myself on the back burner, because doctors probably wouldn't
acknowledge my existence (patient quoted in Lykens et al. 2018).
Notably, the patient describes having to describe themself as something they are not and use
language to describe themself that does not fit with their lived experiences. They note that this was
difficult and exhausting to maintain, as it involves a sort of self-deception and an act that needs to
be kept up and maintained. And while keeping up a guise is difficult in itself, and perhaps even
results in feelings of confusion and shame, the patient determines that, in this case, it is worth it in
order to try to get the care that they need in a system that is difficult to navigate, and which
generally fails to understand identities and experiences like theirs.125
The possibility of these grave consequences – delaying or avoiding care, feeling unable to open up
to health care providers, having to alter their own narratives in an effort to be understood, and so
on – are crucial to pay attention to. As noted above, LGBTQ+ people already have worse outcomes
on a variety of mental and physical health indicators. Avoiding or delaying medical treatment can
only make those disparities worse. Insofar as health care providers are committed to bridging those
gaps, diminishing unjust health disparities, and providing quality care to all patients, they need to
be aware of the effect routine microaggressions can have in medical settings, and work to become
more aware of them when they occur. In what follows, I will suggest some ways to combat the
harmful effects of medical microaggressions faced by queer people, in hopes of improving clinical
experiences for LGBTQ+ communities.

For more on this problem, see Ivy (2013). Ivy highlights the problem of the “gatekeeper model” of health care
delivery, and the impact it has on trans patients seeking medical resources to aid in their transitions. As Ivy describes,
it is often the case that in order to access the means to medically transition, trans patients have to convince health care
providers that they are “really trans” or that they are “trans enough.” As such, trans people often conform their
narrative to fit the expectations of their providers, at least long enough to “convince them” that they are “trans enough”
to get through the gate and access necessary medical resources.
125
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Improving Communication and Care for Queer Patients
So far, I have argued that as a matter of health justice, providers need to become aware of
microaggressions and work to avoid them. Failure to do so has the potential to worsen (or, at least
maintain) the health disparities faced by LGBTQ+ people, as they continue to avoid or delay care,
or feel unable to communicate openly with their providers. I want to suggest some ways for health
care providers to improve with respect to communication and care for LGBTQ+ patients,
particularly with respect to avoiding microaggressions, or trying to neutralize their harmful
impacts when they do occur.
First, it is imperative to recognize that while health care providers often assume that they are the
authority within clinical encounters, both parties (queer patients and health care providers) have
relevant types of knowledge or expertise to bring to bear on the encounter (cf. Kukla 2007; also
see chapter 3 of this thesis). While health care providers have an important sort of technical,
medical expertise, which is essential for diagnosing and treating illness, what they lack in many
cases is a first-person awareness of the phenomenological experience of being queer – the “what
it’s like” to be LGBTQ+, and how that shapes queer patients experiences of themselves, their
illnesses, and/or their health needs.126
Moreover, Talia Bettcher has argued that trans people (and I have argued, other queer people as
well) 127 have “first-person authority” over their [gender or sexual] identities. Respecting this
authority, Bettcher argues (and I agree) is morally and epistemically important. This is because
when one makes an avowal of their gender they are, on Bettcher’s account, making what amounts
to a confession, insofar as they are sharing information which is generally kept private or
concealed. In publicly avowing one’s gender identity (or, I would add, their sexual orientation),

This lack of access to the phenomenological “what it is like” of being queer is in addition to the widespread lack
of knowledge about queerness in general. As I have indicated, medical training tends to be deficient in this domain.
This is all the more reason for providers to recognize the limitations of their knowledge and, where necessary defer to
their patients’ knowledge and collaborate with them to come up with the best possible course of action.
126

127

I develop this argument in a not yet published paper, which was presented at the 2021 meeting of the Canadian
Philosophical Association.
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they are staking a social claim – they are authorizing how they want to be seen and treated in the
social domain (or in a particular context, such as a medical clinic). This, Bettcher contends, is
closely related to their autonomy; to decide if, and when, and how, to disclose one’s gender identity
or sexual orientation, is solely one’s own choice. For someone else to determine or disclose this
for them would constitute a serious violation of their ability to self-define and control information
about their identity.128
Insofar as health care providers do not (and cannot) have direct access to the first-personal,
subjective, phenomenological, embodied, and authoritative knowledge and experience that queer
patients possess first-hand, it is necessary that health care providers begin to listen and respond to
queer patients in a way that takes this first-personal knowledge and authority seriously, and
integrates it into the process of understanding, diagnosing, and treating illness, or otherwise
supporting health and wellness needs. To fail to do so is not only an ethical violation (insofar as it
overrides one’s right to self-determination and self-definition), it can also hinder one’s ability to
derive more complete knowledge of one’s situation and needs.
Hence, there is a real need for the different types of knowledge that clinicians and their queer
patients possess to come together in clinical discussion and deliberation. Lauren Freeman (2015)
has provided one model that I think can help us here, namely, a model for what she calls “epistemic
peers” (see discussion of this model in chapter 3 of this thesis). An epistemic peers relationship is
one in which both parties are in a position to make legitimate claims to knowledge about some
subject, S, and if their respective claims are taken seriously by either of them, the resulting
knowledge will be more robust.129 Freeman describes how the disproportionate epistemic power

See Kapusta (2016) on the importance of authority over one’s gender to one’s autonomy, and how the failure of
others to recognize and respect this authority is morally contestable.
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While Freeman is focused on pregnant persons and their embodied knowledge, the model applies here. The main
point is the call for collaboration across these different sorts of knowledge, and the unification of the
embodied/subjective with the technical/“objective” to provide the best possible care. It is also worth noting that Serife
Tekin is developing a similar argument within the context of psychiatry. She argues that psychiatric patients’ firsthand experiences of mental illness and their subsequent testimonies are indispensable for objectivity in psychiatry
(2020). Her general argument also applies here. Also see Davis-Floyd & Davis (1996) on the way assumptions of
“authoritative knowledge” need to be brought into better balance with other forms of patient knowledge, such as
“intuitive knowledge” (e.g., in childbirth).
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(and sense of epistemic authority) health care providers have functions to undermine the epistemic
privilege that patients have over their bodies, which can place them in a position of epistemic
powerlessness (3). To counteract the problematic power/knowledge dynamics, she calls for the
cultivation of epistemic peer relations, which are founded on mutual respect, open responsiveness,
and strong communication. She writes:
Physicians create a dialogic space in a supportive environment in which
women feel comfortable talking about how their bodies feel to them and
about what they are experiencing (physiologically, psychologically,
emotionally), asking questions, and engaging in related discussion.
Moreover, in this space, physicians take the time to listen carefully to
women’s accounts and concerns and to respond, speak to, and treat them
as credible in offering testimony based on their first-personal experiences
of their bodies (5).
I contend that the cultivation of such a relationship, one in which clinicians establish an epistemic
peers relationship with their queer patients, is essential for creating the sorts of communicative
contexts that are necessary to provide proper care for LGBTQ+ patients. Health care providers
should recognize – and respect – the unique sorts of knowledge that queer patients have in virtue
of their first-person experiences as queer and bring those into conversation with their own relevant
knowledge and experiences.130
As noted in the quote from Freeman (2015) above, for a health care provider to be a good epistemic
peer to their queer patients requires listening and responding appropriately to the testimonies of
those patients. In other work (Stewart 2017) I have begun to develop normative guidelines for
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It is important to note that while we take for granted that in most cases, health care providers do possess this sort
of medical, technical expertise, in the case of treating LGBTQ+ patients, they often lack the queer-specific training
and experiences that would give them epistemic authority in this domain. Testimonies from queer patients reflect that
in many cases, they find themselves in a position of having to teach, explain, or educate their health care providers
about queer identities and experiences, or having to interact with health care providers who are not queer competent
(Praderio 2019). In such a case, an effective epistemic peers relationship would require even more deference to the
knowledge and experience of the patient, which demands epistemic humility on the part of the health care providers,
who are used to being in the position of greater epistemic power.
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effective listening and ethical responses to testimony. Listening appropriately involves, first and
foremost, bracketing one’s own assumptions and the limitations of their prior knowledge, and
being open to having their perspectives and ideas challenged and changed by others who might be
in a position to know better (Stewart 2017, 40; see also Frye 1983 on “loving attention” and
Lugones 1987 on “playful world-travelling”). Insofar as there are some things that can only be
fully and robustly understood with first-hand experience, those who lack that experience owe an
openness to those who do have it, which requires a willingness to have one’s preconceived notions
unsettled and genuinely challenged (cf. Lugones 1987). Where one truly cannot understand a
certain experience (e.g., an experience of oppression), they owe what Laurence Thomas (1992)
calls “moral deference” to the testimonies of those who have lived experiences of oppression.
These are all tactics of listening better – trying to let go of one’s arrogance (cf. Frye 1983),
observing deference to the testimonies of others when we have experiential gaps (cf. Thomas
1992), and cultivating openness to having one’s perception of what things are like challenged and
changed, when viewing the situation from another’s perspective (cf. Lugones 1987).
Another dimension of effective listening involves demonstrating compassion, particularly for
experiences of suffering. This compassion might require a recognition of and grappling with one’s
relative power, safety, or institutional authority, and a willingness to feel and express concern for
others who might lack it. Treating one’s patients compassionately, across difference, is essential
to hearing, and treating, them well.131
Once providers have cultivated the ability to listen and hear their patients well, they must also
learn how to respond with empathy, and in a way that takes into account the patient’s stated needs
or interests. This requires not automatically assuming that the provider is automatically in a better
position to know what the patient really wants or needs (see, for example, the case of the two-spirit
patient above), but instead tailoring their recommendations and guidance to the stated needs and
interests of their patients and collaborating on a course of action that fits with the patients’ stated
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For a truly beautiful and insightful account of how health care providers can establish compassionate, empathy,
and loving connection with their patients, see Campo (1998). Michael Cohen (1995) has also offered a defense of
compassionate bioethics, and an argument for how we might make medical practice more robustly compassionate
(also see de Zulueta 2015).
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goals and values. Responding empathetically requires giving meaningful attention to those needs,
desires, goals, and values.
All of the above – becoming epistemic peers, cultivating better and more ethical listening practices,
and engaging in empathetic response to patients’ needs – function together to help reduce the risk
of microaggressing patients. It does so by establishing a more level epistemic playing field – one
which does not assume that providers have the epistemic upper hand by default. In cultivating
more ethical listening practices – ones that decenter one’s own perspective, remain open to having
one’s mind changed, and reflect moral deference – one is less likely to diminish or demean, even
in subtle ways, patients’ perspectives, identities, or values. All of these tactics are important for
trying to balance out the power dynamics that occur in clinical encounter, and which drive the
frequency of microaggressions. The more we close the presumed and actual gap in power, the
more we can reign in microaggressions, and their detrimental impacts on patients.132
Though the strategies I have just outlined have as their aim reducing the circumstances in which
microaggressions are likely to occur (e.g., by balancing out epistemic power relationships,
avoiding speaking over and for patients, and knowing when to defer to their lived experience), I
want to briefly suggest some additional, tangible ways that microaggressions can be reduced in
clinical settings. These suggestions, however, are less about what individual health care providers
can do when interacting with their patients, and instead focus on structural changes that need to
occur within the space of the clinical environment itself (e.g., the aesthetics of the physical space
of the clinic).
To get us started, let’s revisit the example given above, in which a patient is browsing the medical
literature in the clinic, and realizes that there is none available which matches her sexual orientation
and preferences. Such cases are all too familiar for LGBTQ+ patients and can send the message
that they will not be understood or respected in that space, or that they are deviant or abnormal
insofar as they are not reflected in the available literature. These sorts of environmental
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For a longer discussion of the way microaggressions reflect and reinforce unequal relations of power, see Stewart
and Freeman’s contribution to the Routledge Handbook of Feminist Bioethics (forthcoming 2021).
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microaggressions are easily prevented, or counteracted, by the presence of “microcues,” that is,
small markers of inclusivity and acceptance that imply an awareness of, and respect for, diverse
sexual and gender identities (see Sue et al. 2020 on these and other microaggressions intervention
strategies). Some easy to incorporate examples would be having literature and pamphlets that are
representative of diverse sexual preferences and gender identifications, having posters that reflect
various sorts of families or sexual partners, having gender neutral and accessible washrooms, and
removing gendered language from sexual health resources (for e.g., baskets containing free
condoms should not have heteronormative language on them!) Another important thing that
providers can do is indicate their pronouns when introducing themselves to a patient (“Hi, I am
Dr. Smith and I use he/him pronouns”). Pronouns could also be displayed on the name badges of
providers and staff. This normalizes asking for and providing pronouns in all clinical exchanges,
thereby reducing the risks or mispronouning or misgendering.
Another change that is easy to implement, but which can seriously reduce the harmful
consequences of environmental microaggressions (and other interpersonal microaggressions as
well!), involves designing and utilizing inclusive intake forms. As noted above, intake forms are
one of the first parts of a clinical encounter which suggest to a patient whether their experiences
are recognizable and understood in that space. Having a range of gender identity and sexual
orientation options can help make LGBTQ+ people feel welcome from the outset. It can also help
open the door for more open conversations later. Though providers often are reluctant to ask
patients questions about sexual preference for fear of embarrassing them, recent survey data
indicates that an overwhelming majority (approximating 90 percent) of patients don’t share that
fear (Powell 2018). A simple open question on registration forms ‒ “Do you have sex with men,
women, or both?” ‒ can give a physician information and help establish communication that might
prove important in understanding and treating health needs. It also takes the onus of asking this
question for the first time off the provider in real time, and allows the patient to indicate it in
writing, in a more discrete way.
Queering the clinical space in these ways helps to reduce the sorts of environmental
microaggressions that can make LGBTQ+ patients feel unsafe or unwelcome, and can help to
cultivate the sort of environment in which trusting, productive exchanges can take place. When
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paired with verbal signifiers and the use of appropriate and inclusive language,133 these seemingly
small changes can make a world of difference for counteracting the harms of microaggressions
that occur in medical settings. Going beyond this, and thinking about structural changes, there is
also a need to put serious effort into diversifying medical school classes, as well as physicians and
administrators at all levels. For a discussion of the importance of diversity at the level of medical
education and institutional culture, in addition to individual level changes, see Dean et al. (2016).
Though I have just spent a great deal of time pointing to things we should be concerned about with
respect to medical practice, I would be remiss not to note that there is some reason for optimism
about the future of this practice, and its interactions with LGBTQ+ patients. My optimism here, as
both a theorist and a queer person myself, comes as a result of looking to the next generation of
health care providers. There is, for example, reason to believe that the current generation is more
LGBTQ+ inclusive and accepting than previous generations, and that this trend will only continue
(Charlesworth and Banaji 2019; Gates 2017). Within the context of medical training, future health
care providers are pushing for better and more-inclusive preparation and training, which will
provide them with the tools needed to give quality care to all of their patients (see Cohen 2019).
Here is one hopeful story. After having failed to receive what she thought would be sufficient
training to effectively treat queer patients in her medical school’s curriculum, the New York
Medical College Student referenced above (the one who reported her LGBTQ+ medical training
coming in the form of a Buzzfeed video) rallied a group of her peers to approach the administration
about the lack of LGBTQ+ competency in their medical training. The student reports that
administrators were "amazingly receptive" to her presentation and that she quickly gained student
and faculty allies. As a result, the school went from one and a half hours of LGBT-focused content
in the curriculum to seven hours within a matter of two years (!). 134 The student noted that she
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For a helpful overview of trans-inclusive language, see Lowik (2019).

I do not want to imply that this victory – in getting 6 additional hours of LGBTQ+ focused training, is sufficient.
LGBTQ+ health should be woven all throughout the entirety of medical education – not simply tacked on as an extra
discrete unit. However, it is worth celebrating the efforts of one future provider and her peers to start taking steps in
the right direction.
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doesn't think the change would have happened had the students not pushed for it themselves
(Cohen 2019).
This story is not the only one like it. Medical students at Harvard Medical School, for example,
are now similarly pushing for more LGBTQ+ focused medical training. Jessica Halem, Harvard
Medical School’s LGBT program director, reports on the motivation for the recently developed
Sexual and Gender Minorities Health Equity initiative at Harvard, stating that: "The main first
driver truly was medical students organizing and saying 'Hey, I need the curriculum to reflect the
kind of medicine that I came here to study!’” (Cohen 2019). Future medical providers desire to do
right by their patients, including their LGBTQ+ patients, and they know that this starts with having
a proper, queer-centered medical education, with consistent, accurate, and comprehensive
content.135
The hope is that better training will make health care providers feel more prepared, more
comfortable, and more competent with their LGBTQ+ patients. Ideally, it will also help to
overcome – or at least start diminishing – the implicit preferences that health care providers
currently have for heterosexual patients, and the negative associations held against LGBTQ+
patients (see Sabin et al. 2015). All of these improvements will help to decrease the risk of
alienating patients with microaggressive language and actions, can help foster better
communication with them, and ultimately make LGBTQ+ patients feel more comfortable and safe
speaking up in the clinic.136
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Another reason for optimism is that such curricula are being developed for eventual implementation on a wider
scale. The University of Louisville Medical School in Kentucky served as the nation’s pilot site for training future
physicians on the unique health care concerns and issues encountered by people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender (LGBT), gender non-conforming or born with differences of sex development (DSD) (UofL SOM 2015).
For an argument that medical schools have a moral responsibility to train future health providers to respond
professionally to queer patients, see Schuklenk & Smalling (2013).
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There is some empirical reason to believe that this will, in fact, be the case. One study has demonstrated that
patients most prefer to receive sexual health information from their provider who initiates the conversation (45.1%)
and least prefer information from the Internet (25.4%). Patients are most comfortable with providers who are
"knowledgeable about sexual concerns" (74.5%) and "seem comfortable addressing sexual concerns" (68.3%)
(Wittenberg & Gerber 2009). This suggests that queer patients do desire to have fruitful interactions about sexual
health and gender identity with well-trained health care providers, and that they are more likely to do so if they perceive
that their provider is competent with respect to these areas.
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I am made hopeful (at least in a limited, qualified sense) when I see the concrete actions starting
to emerge in this domain, which are aimed at better preparing health care providers to interact with
LGBTQ+ patients, and to do so more respectfully and with greater care for their identities and
experiences. In Canada, for example, an Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto Dalla
Lana School of Public Health, Alex Abramovich, recently co-authored an article in the Canadian
Medical Association Journal (Lam and Abramovich 2019) that provides comprehensive steps for
physicians to follow to become more trans-inclusive and trans-competent in their care delivery.
The article made several tangible recommendations, including asking patients privately at the
beginning of the encounter which pronouns they go by and addressing patients with a genderaffirming approach throughout the encounter (i.e., an approach which does not pathologize gender
variance).137 These seemingly small changes in how health care providers interact with patients
can go a long way to demonstrate their willingness to learn, and desire to respect the humanity of
patients. As I have suggested above, making these changes is a matter of health justice, and a
matter of ensuring LGBTQ+ have the opportunity to be mentally and physically well – something
every human being deserves.

Conclusion
This paper has considered a potential roadblock for queer patients attempting to receive quality
medical care, namely, the influence of microaggressions in clinical encounters. In medical
contexts, microaggressions can have a detrimental impact on core features of the clinical
relationship, most importantly trust and effective communication. Effective communication is a
necessary condition for knowledge transfer between patients and clinicians. Microaggressions
stand in the way of such communication and contribute to the positioning of LGBTQ+ patients as
epistemically inferior. I have argued that in order to overcome these failures of communication
and trust (and ultimately to combat the detrimental impact of microaggressions), health care
providers should aim to establish an epistemic peers relationship with their queer patients, whereby
they respect their queer patients as epistemic equals and as experts in their own right. They should
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For a discussion of this work, see Jaiswal (2019).
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also cultivate practices of listening which aim to diminish their own “arrogant perception” (cf.
Frye 1983), and in which they demonstrate deference when necessary (cf. Thomas 1992). Only
then can health care providers truly hear their queer patients, in a way that makes administering
the highest quality care possible. Finally, I have suggested some easy-to-implement changes to the
physical space of the clinic, which provide “microcues” for LGBTQ+ people to help them perceive
the space as one in which they will be understood and respected. I have also pointed to some
reasons for optimism about the direction in which things are headed – one in which structural
changes are being demanded by the next generation of health providers.
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Chapter 5
5. Paving the Road to Truly Free Speech: Establishing a More Just Free
Speech Infrastructure on Campus and Beyond138

Abstract:
Freedom of speech and a range of related issues have become the subject
of thriving (albeit at times contentious, and even hostile) debate. Unlike
many debates that philosophers and other academics engage in, issues
surrounding freedom of speech – applications, boundaries, and limitations
– have infiltrated popular consciousness as well, bringing the importance
of the debate into even sharper focus. While these debates around the
meaning and scope of free speech have applications in a variety of domains
(civic life, the media, social media, and various other institutions), a
substantial focus in recent years has been on the role of free speech and
free expression on university and college campuses. As such, this paper
considers debates around freedom of speech and expression as they
manifest in those contexts.
Using

one

highly

contested

speech

phenomenon,

namely,

“microaggressions” as my lens, I aim to complicate the current debates
around freedom of speech and expression on college campuses, and in
particular, a recent articulation of the value and benefits of free speech on
university campuses proffered by Philip Pettit (2018). Though Pettit’s
framework for understanding freedom of speech, and specifically his

138

This paper benefited from helpful comments from the audiences at the Southwestern Ontario Feminism and
Philosophy Workshop, Western University’s Freedom of Expression Panel, and the 2019 Public Philosophy Network
Conference. I am also grateful to Lauren Freeman, Carolyn McLeod, and Richard Vernon for helpful commentary on
drafts of this paper.
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“infrastructure” analogy has a great deal of promise, I argue that it is, in
some important ways, limited. Specifically, I argue that his account is not
adequately attentive to the role of power and oppression on our speech
practices. I then provide an expansion of his view which is more suitably
attentive to the influence of power and oppression on speech. I contend
that analyzing Pettit’s free speech framework through the lens of power
and oppression offers a more promising route for thinking about the value
and scope of free speech and expression in college and university settings.
I consider how this adapted view – one which is sufficiently attentive to
power and oppression – can help us understand that the reduction of
microaggressions

and

attempts

to

neutralize

the

harms

of

microaggressions can be thought of as integral parts of a robust, fair, antioppressive free speech infrastructure on university and college campuses.
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Introduction
Freedom of speech and a range of related issues139 have become the subject of thriving (albeit at
times hostile) debate. Unlike many debates that philosophers and other academics engage in,
questions about freedom of speech – its applications, boundaries, and limitations – have infiltrated
popular consciousness as well, bringing the importance of the debate into even sharper focus.140
While debates around the meaning and scope of free speech have applications in a variety of
domains (civic life, the media and journalism, social media, and various other institutions), a
substantial focus in recent years has been on the role of free speech and free expression on
university and college campuses. At least part of the reason for the growing interest in free speech
and free expression on university campuses – at least within the United States and Canada – has
to do with the recent political climate in both places. Specifically, in both places, politicians on the
political right have adopted an increasingly popular view that “free speech is under attack,” (Gelber
2018; Guelzo 2018; Powers 2015) and that the majority of this attack is being launched from within
the academy, in particular by those deemed left-wing (Jesse 2018; Davies 2018; Mackinnon 2019).
Anxieties about “cancel culture” and “cancellation,” especially of right-wing thinkers, abound
(Paul 2020).
In response to what those on the political right see as a crisis of free speech, right-leaning
politicians and pundits have proceeded to demand more, and more demanding, speech protections
to offset this alleged attack. In the United States context, for example, while still in office, the nowformer president of the United States, Donald Trump, threatened in an address to the Conservative

The sorts of related issues that I have in mind include, for example: discussions around “safe spaces” (Freeman
2014; Moody-Adams 2018), content warnings (Freeman 2017; Moody-Adams 2018; Stewart 2019d; Saul 2018),
student protests of speakers (Estlund 2018), instances of civil disobedience (Nussbaum 2018), and no-platforming or
de-platforming (Levy 2019; Simpson and Srinivasan 2018), among others.
139

140

The popular awareness of the free speech debates is at least in part due to academics who have written popular
works on this question, many of whom are participants in manufacturing the “free speech crisis.” Obvious examples
include Jordan Peterson (see Maher 2017) and Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015; 2017;
see discussion in chapter 1 of this dissertation). Helpful clarifications about the debate have been offered in the public
domain by scholars such as Shannon Dea (2018a; 2018b; 2019b), Michael Sandel (BBC 2018), and Jason Stanley
(2018).
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Political Action Conference (CPAC) to issue an executive order to cut off federal funds to public
colleges and universities that failed to adequately “support free speech” (see Shepardson and
Johnson 2019; Wilke 2019).141 In the Canadian province of Ontario, where my current academic
institution is located, sitting Premier Doug Ford issued a similar demand. However, unlike his
American counterpart, his threats were not empty. In August of 2018, Ford notified universities
within his jurisdiction that, should they fail to adopt policies that adequately uphold freedom of
speech and expression, they, too, will be at risk for significant funding cuts (Giovannetti and Hauen
2018).142 Ford proceeded to give Ontario universities until the first day of the new year (January
1, 2019) to design, implement, and enforce wide-ranging free speech policies. 143 The mandate
required that the free speech policies ensure that “schools remain open to discussion and free
inquiry, [do] not shield students from ideas or opinions they find offensive and [will] not allow
students or teachers to obstruct others from expressing their views.” Schools that fail to enforce
the policies up to a satisfactory extent, at determined by Ford’s administration, would face
“reductions to their operating grant funding, proportional to the severity of non-compliance”
(Giovannetti and Hauen 2019).
Of course, an obvious worry in both cases (viz., the United States and Ontario) involves the
question of who gets to design the policies to be implemented? Or in other words, who gets to
decide what speech is permissible or not and by what standards? These are contentious questions.
Whoever designs the free speech policies that govern a particular institutional or social context
have a lot of power to shape the speech norms that will proliferate there. For reasons that will
become obvious in this chapter, this exercise of power is something to be concerned about.

141

Like most things haphazardly demanded by former President Trump, the details of what this would entail in practice
were entirely vague, rendering the threat up to substantial interpretation, and, thereby utterly useless.
142

I have presented these two cases non-chronologically. Ford actually issued his threat first (in August 2018).
Trump’s CPAC speech was in March of 2019.
143

It is worth noting how troubling this is, since Canadian public universities get most of their funding from the state,
making the need to meet Ford’s demands (to his degree of approval) particularly high stakes.
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In light of this recently heightened attention to free speech and free expression on university and
college campuses, the space of the academy will be my primary focus in what follows for thinking
through the problem of free speech. Specifically, I will examine one recent defense of free speech
and its application to college and university campuses (what I will call the “free speech
infrastructure view” offered by Pettit 2018). After drawing out some limitations and assumptions
of the view, I will expand upon it in order to make it more attentive to the ways in which power
and oppression shape speech norms and speech practices on university campuses. Throughout, I
will use one highly debated speech phenomenon, microaggressions, to anchor the discussion. I
will argue that a sufficient “infrastructure” for free speech on campus – one which can
meaningfully and equitably maximize free speech – must attend to the influence of power and
oppression on speech, specifically for marginalized members of our campus communities. This
includes, I will suggest, incorporating norms aimed at minimizing the frequency and/or
neutralizing the impacts of microaggressions on campus.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 5.2, I will give a brief overview of the free speech
debates, particularly as they unfold within the context of university campuses. I will focus
specifically on microaggressions and their relation to campus speech. In section 5.3, I will discuss
Philip Pettit’s 2018 chapter “Two Concepts of Free Speech,” which defends a particular
framework for understanding the value of free speech, using academic contexts as a case study. I
call this the free speech infrastructure view. In section 5.4, I argue that Pettit’s account, as
presented is limited. Specifically, it is limited by a lack of adequate attention to the role of power
and oppression in shaping speech norms, speech communities, and the extent to which people are
able to speak in such a way that is meaningfully free. Like Pettit, I think about speech protections
with reference to the university context. In section 5.5, I will expand upon Pettit’s “free speech
infrastructure” framework as described in section 5.3, aiming to provide nuance in the form of
analyses of power and oppression and their impacts on speech. I contend that Pettit’s general
account – when paired with an adequate analysis of power and oppression – offers a promising
route for thinking about free speech in university settings. This is because, I contend, he gets the
goal right (that is, protecting free speech to the maximal amount equally enjoyable by all) and has
the right approach for getting there (a protective infrastructure of policies and social norms). But,
I argue, an attentiveness to power and oppression must be brought to bear on Pettit’s view, and
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specific norms must be cultivated to work against the corrosive effects of power and oppression in
our speech contexts, specifically academic contexts. In section 5.6, I will consider and respond to
possible objections to the view I have offered. I will then briefly conclude and gesture towards
future directions for philosophical theorizing around this particular issue.
Before moving ahead, a few qualifications are in order.
First, the scope and intention of this paper is to interrogate a question about justification, not to
offer a complete picture of the speech protective infrastructure needed on university campuses. In
other words, my goal is to make a normative claim about what is morally and socially justifiable
with respect to speech restrictions, and the policies and norms that enforce them. I will not offer
guidance on how we might design specific speech policy or speech codes to govern academic
institutions, as I believe these should always be designed with reference to specific campus
contexts. I will offer a few suggestions about possible avenues for norm change, however, which
I believe can be beneficial in most, if not all, campus contexts. I do not take the recommendations
that I offer below to be exhaustive; rather, I offer them as examples of the sorts of norm changes
that can help support a more just speech protective infrastructure within our campus contexts, for
example, by helping to reduce microaggressions and their harmful effects on marginalized
members of our campus communities.
Second, though my focus is on academic speech (or, speech that occurs within campus contexts),
the boundaries of “academic speech” are indistinct. When I refer to academic speech, my focus is
on speech that occurs within the space of the academy itself (i.e., within classrooms, offices,
libraries, etc.). I fully recognize, however, that such a boundary is blurry; social media, blogs, and
other online platforms have radically increased the opportunities for academics and students alike
to speak and be heard outside of the physical walls of the classroom or the larger campus space.
While it is an open (and interesting!) question as to how much this extramural speech should fall
under the umbrella of academic speech, and whether, for instance, professors can or should be held
accountable for speech they make outside of their formal professional role (e.g., on their personal
social media accounts, or qua private citizens), these important questions are beyond my present
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scope.144 Relatedly, I am not referring to speech which happens at informal gatherings which may,
at least to some degree, be connected to the academy in some way. For example, if a group of
graduate students from a philosophy department at university X organize a karaoke night at the
local bar, the speech they engage in in that setting is beyond the scope of my current interest
(though, I think this does raise interesting ethical challenges to be discussed another time). Of
course, there are blurry lines here, too: what about informal gatherings paid for with university
dollars? What about post-conference events, where in some sense, graduate students and faculty
members are still representing their departments and larger universities? I fully acknowledge the
messiness that arises in cases like these, and I think they raise interesting questions about how to
define the boundaries of “academic speech” or speech that occurs in “academic contexts.” That
said, my present purpose is not to locate these limits, and as such, I will be setting these issues
aside.
Third, as noted above, I am locating my present discussion within academic contexts. I am doing
this for a number of reasons. As already noted, there are important debates at present about the
scope and limits of academic freedom and free speech and expression on university campuses.
These often appear, in interesting and polarizing ways, in the public domain. I think there is good
reason to focus on the academic context, and what conclusions we can draw about free speech
when thinking about this particular institutional context. I find the academic context interesting,
because universities have so many important goals: interrogating the truth, producing knowledge,
educating students and the public, but also supporting and enhancing goals of diversity, equity,
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The increase of social media usage raises interesting questions about the degree of freedom professors do or ought
to have with respect to speaking online (see Pettit 2018, 62 on the unique challenges the rise of social media offers to
our general understanding of free speech; also see Warburton 2009, 82-85)). For an important analysis of a case that
makes this question salient, see Protevi’s (2018) discussion of a professor, Steven Salaita, who faced negative
professional consequences as a result of speech made on his social media platform, particularly about the BDS
movement and Israeli activity in Gaza. An ongoing example that makes the debate around extramural speech online
particularly salient is the current so-called ‘gender wars,” between trans-inclusive feminists and “trans-exclusive
radical feminists,” which is largely unfolding on Twitter, FaceBook, and personal blogs, often disconnected from the
formal publication process as well as standard professional norms. For a great analysis of the current “gender wars”
and their relation to the question of academic freedom and extramural speech, see Dea 2019a. I find these sorts of
cases interesting and important, however, they are beyond my present scope.
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and inclusion. As Michael Behrent writes in a 2019 report for the American Association for
University Professors writes:
Many of the most difficult issues surrounding free speech at present are
about balancing unobstructed dialogue with the need to make all
constituencies on campus feel included… In our intensely polarized times,
such balancing of competing demands has become increasingly difficult;
the question of free speech has become, ironically, an issue about which
many on campus are increasingly indisposed to listen to one another.
I find the possible tensions generated by these different institutional goals – “unobstructed
dialogue” on the one hand and the “need to make all constituencies on campus feel included” on
the other – interesting when it comes to thinking about im/permissible speech, and speech
regulations and norms within university contexts. In addition to these reasons, I focus my attention
on the academic context because it is through the lens of the academic context that Pettit explores
the ramifications of his own account.
However, despite my focus on academia, I am not ruling out the possibility that the framework I
go onto advocate for (namely, a revised version of Pettit 2018) can be extended beyond the
academy to other institutions. On the contrary, I think the issues raised in this chapter, regarding
how we ought to think about the nature and protection of free speech, have important implications
for other institutions that share principal values (e.g., justice, fairness, equity, inclusion) with the
academy, including but not limited to the institution of medicine.145 Nevertheless, I will set those
possible extensions of the argument aside for now and focus our attention specifically on the
academic realm.
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I highlight the institution of medicine in particular for a variety of reasons. For one, it is the institution upon which
my research on microaggressions and other harmful speech phenomena primarily focuses (see Freeman and Stewart
2018; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; Stewart 2019a; 2019c). Furthermore, I think there are relevant similarities with respect
to the institutional values that have to be balanced with free speech in either context, academia or medicine (i.e.,
justice, fairness, equity, inclusion) and how speech functions in either context (i.e., across entrenched power
differentials and legitimate and illegitimate differences in authority, power, and credibility).
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Finally, it is worth saying something about what motivates my broader approach of trying to work
within and extend a particular defense of free speech, while also pursuing more justice within the
domain of speech. In debates about the scope and limits of free speech, one compelling avenue for
proponents of greater restrictions on certain sorts of speech, including microaggressions, is to try
to meet free speech defenders or advocates on their own terms. In other words, one strategy for
showing the reasonableness of certain sorts of restrictions on speech is to show either that i)
restricting them is consistent with, or in some cases enhances, the reasons we value free speech in
the first place or, ii) that failing to restrict them runs counter to, or detracts from, the goals of
supporting free speech or the values that undergird it.146 This is the sort of approach I take in what
follows. Doing so is valuable, I contend, insofar as it helps to shrink the apparent ideological
distance between those who are more inclined towards free speech absolutism (i.e., speech policies
that are very liberal with respect to speech, and try to approximate absolute free speech as nearly
as possible) and those who think there are certain sorts of speech (or particular speech acts) that
we might have other interests in restricting or trying to prevent (e.g., those who believe that
pervasive and unchecked microaggressions on university campuses can counteract important
values that universities hold, including but not limited to diversity, equity, and inclusion).
Arguments that ground speech restrictions in the “pro-free speech arguments” of the critics are
both pragmatically valuable insofar as they might make the restrictions seem more reasonable to
the critics, and socially valuable insofar as they show that the ideological divide is exaggerated;
people on either side of the debate generally want and value the same things (namely, the maximal
amount of free speech possible for all), even if they disagree about what exactly that entails and
how to go about achieving it.
This is the sort of approach I am taking in what follows. Specifically, I aim to make use of and
extend one defense of free speech, that of Pettit (2018) and show how, when informed by an
understanding of the impacts of power and oppression on speech, we can get closer to the stated
goal of maximizing free speech for all. I ask the reader to keep the following point in mind while

I have taken this approach, rooted in what I call the “paradox of free speech” elsewhere. For a radio broadcast of a
talk where I argued for restricting microaggressions and slurring speech on university campuses, based on the very
values that underlie our interest in free speech, see Stewart 2019b.
146
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reading the remainder of this chapter: I have chosen to engage with Pettit’s account because I think
there is value in it, even if it is (as I will go onto argue) currently limited. I offer my critical
engagement with Pettit not as an attempt to dismiss his view outright, but rather as an attempt to
develop it and make it more robust.
With these qualifications in mind, let us begin.

Free Speech Debates and the Campus Context
Freedom of speech, in general terms, refers to the notion that individuals and/or communities ought
to be free to engage openly in the expression of thoughts or ideas, without fear of retaliation,
censorship, or legal or social sanction. In other words, this principle is one that aims at protecting
individuals from having their speech controlled or silenced by others. This freedom is not,
however, a purely abstract notion or moral ideal; rather, it is a core value of democratic
governments, enshrined into their constitutions, widely celebrated, and fervently protected.147 It is
also a central value of academic institutions.
We might ask why freedom of speech is viewed as important in the first place. Various answers to
the value question (that is, the question regarding why we do, or ought to, value freedom of speech
in the first place) have been offered. The answer that tends to get disproportionate uptake and
attention in the contemporary dialogue is that of John Stuart Mill in On Liberty. In chapter 2 of On
Liberty, Mill provides a defense of the free flow of ideas, as a means of arriving at the truth (which
no one person alone can arrive at) and in order to minimize the risk of society slipping into
unchallenged dogma. Mill argued that the free expression of, and fair competition between,
differing ideas was the best way to sort truths from falsehoods.
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In the United States context, freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which declares that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (see United States National Archives 2018). In
Canada, this freedom is protected by Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which identifies
“fundamental freedoms” including freedom of speech (see Government of Canada 2019). And, though weaker than
the protection afforded by a national constitution, freedom of speech is recognized and protected at the international
level by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR; see United Nations 2019) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR; see United Nations Human Rights 2019).
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It is likely this line of thinking that has generated the metaphor of “the marketplace of ideas,”
which draws on an economic marketplace analogy to support the notion that when there are more
ideas in circulation, the better ideas will win out. Put another way, the idea is that the most likely
route to the truth is by maximizing the number of ideas in circulation, allowing the truth to interact
with – and ultimately to rise above – errors and half-truths (Warburton 2009, 22). On this
conception, the protection of free speech is construed as instrumentally valuable, that is, valuable
for some other end. In this case, free speech is valuable for its ability to maximize the likelihood
that we will arrive at truth.
It is worth noting that Mill does not use the “marketplace of ideas” phrase himself, and that the
first reference to a “marketplace of ideas” comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in the
1919 case Abrams v. Abrams (1919) (Schultz 2009). Nevertheless, this market metaphor is often
associated with Mill’s thinking, even though some have argued that the metaphor does not
accurately describe the heart of Mill’s view (see Gordon 1997).
The concept of the “marketplace of ideas,” and Mill’s broader defense of free speech and
expression, are often appealed to in ongoing discussions about the role and value of free speech
(see, e.g., Miller 2017; Stanley 2018; Lombardi 2019; Shih 2017).148 Specifically, the marketplace
metaphor very often gets appealed to within debates about speech on campus: a stark example of
this is the use by the Heterodox Academy (a free speech advocacy group, founded by Jonathan
Haidt and Quinn Rosenkranz, aimed at increasing “viewpoint diversity” on college campuses) who
created an illustrated version of chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty as part of their free speech advocacy
materials and regularly publish defenses of speech that rely on Mill’s arguments (Heterdox
Academy 2021).149
Another rather influential view about the value of free speech comes from Alexander Meiklejohn
(1948; also see Purvis 2009). Meiklejohn argued that the value of free speech could be found in
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To hear Pettit discuss the marketplace of ideas, see ABC Radio National (2018).

Their illustrated version of Mill’s On Liberty chapter 2, titled “All Minus One” can be viewed here:
https://heterodoxacademy.org/library/all-minus-one/. An example of a blog they have published drawing on Mill can
be found here. https://heterodoxacademy.org/blog/why-mill-matters-more-than-ever/.
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its connection to a well-functioning democracy. He claimed that in order to effectively preserve
democracy, citizens and voters must be able to freely engage in uninhibited discussion and debate.
This ability allows citizens to be as well positioned as possible to make informed choices about
their self-government. Other scholars and advocates have also demonstrated that free speech is
essential to democratic functioning because it is the means by which citizens are able to critique
their government, and/or voice their dissent (Dry 1994; ACLU 2019). Like Mill’s, this way of
thinking about the value of free speech (i.e., as an essential tool for the preservation of a
functioning democracy) is instrumental; the value of free speech rests on its connection to
something else of value, namely, the preservation of democracy, or the ability for democracy to
flourish.
Both of the aforementioned answers to the value question are instrumental. In other words, they
locate the value of free speech in its ability to support some other good or value or bring about
some other desired end. Another possibility, however, is that the value of free speech is not
instrumental, but rather is intrinsic. For example, some see the ability to speak freely as part of
what makes us autonomous beings, or what allows us to be meaningfully self-determining. On
such a view, then, the ability to speak freely is essential to our very dignity as persons (Scanlon
1972; also see ACLU 2019). Thought of this way, free speech is good in itself, fundamentally
entangled with our ability to act autonomously, our dignity as persons, and thus, perhaps, our very
humanity.
Regardless of which justification we might find most compelling for valuing free speech, it seems
as if there is at least prima facie reason to protect it.150 For our purposes, we will accept this as our
starting point. In other words, we will start from the position that there is value in protecting free
speech and proceed from there. (Moreover, Pettit gives us several reasons for understanding free
speech as protected speech, which I will discuss in section 5.3 below).

Or, as Kent Greenawalt (1989) puts it, there is likely a “presumption in favour of speech.” In other words, we have
strong reason to protect speech, insofar as it is of fundamental importance, but those protections can be overridden.
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The general debate over freedom of speech – at least among those who accept that it is indeed
valuable – largely concerns its boundaries and limitations. Broadly speaking, the central question
involves what conditions, if any, might justify imposing restrictions on freedom of speech. When
such conditions (that is, conditions that justify some restriction) are met, further questions arise,
such as how to go about restricting that speech in practice (e.g., whether legally, or through social
persuasion and norm setting), and by how much (e.g., where to draw lines on free speech, or to
what extent to restrict some type of speech).
We know that, at least in practice, the principle of free speech is not absolute. We restrict the
parameters of free speech to exclude certain speech acts that we have deemed sufficiently harmful
or socially damaging, including (but not always limited to): libel, slander, perjury, “fighting
words,” and in some jurisdictions, obscenity and/or hate speech. Generally, arguments in favour
of restricting some particular sort of speech appeal to Mill’s famous “Harm Principle” (Mill 1859;
see also Warburton 2009, 22-24).151 The harm principle states that individual agents ought to be
free to do whatever they wish up to the point where they begin to cause harm to another person.
Another way of stating the principle is that the only justification for interfering with someone’s
freedom to live their life the way they choose is if that person poses a risk of harm to others
(Warburton 2009, 23). Applied to speech, the harm principle would suggest that one’s free speech
liberties ought to extend up to the point at which they begin to cause a serious risk of or actual
harm to others.
This seems straight forward – people should be free to act up to the point that their actions begin
harming other people. However, applying this principle can be difficult. Doing so requires sorting
out some difficult and contentious questions, such as how to understand harm (see introduction to

While Mill’s “Harm Principle” tends to be the most frequently discussed justification for curtailing speech liberties,
there are other possible justifications as well. For example, an amendment to the ICCPR (see footnote 8) states that
“the exercise of these rights carries ‘special duties and responsibilities’ and may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions when necessary [f]or respect of the rights or reputation of others" or "[f]or the protection of national
security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.” While one could argue that each of these
reasons for restricting speech could amount to harm prevention, I think the ICCPR amendment is getting at something
broader, namely, that there are reasons to restrict speech that are not simply reducible to harm, but might be a matter
of upholding security, order, or even morality. Given space limitations, I focus more narrowly on harm, but I do not
intend to exclude or undermine the many other possible justifications for imposing restrictions of some form or another
on speech.
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this thesis), and what sorts of harms are sufficiently serious to justify imposing restrictions on
speech. Consequently, there is substantial disagreement regarding whether certain sorts of speech
ought to be tolerated, despite their being offensive and/or ignorant, or at what point such speech
crosses into the terrain of being outright harmful, and thus, plausibly open to restriction (Maitra
and McGowan 2012, 1).
Such questions about free speech – where to locate its value and the plausible grounds for its
restriction – are the focus of ongoing debates about academic freedom and free speech on
university or college campuses. While these debates are extensive, I will home in on one particular
locus of ongoing debate – that surrounding microaggressions – and use this focus as a launching
point for considering how we ought to think about academic freedom and free speech on campus
more generally.152
First, let me say something about what microaggressions are, before saying something about why
they are relevant to the present discussion. Microaggressions are commonly understood to refer to
brief and commonplace verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, either intentional or
unintentional, that are rooted in (implicit or explicit) prejudices, stereotypes, or biases. They target
people on the basis of their membership in a social group that is marginalized on the basis of race,
ethnicity, sex, sexuality, gender identity, dis/ability status, or other marginalized identity (see, for
example, Sue 2010; Sue et. al 2007; 2008a; 2008b; Nadal 2013). 153 Consider the following
example: a white person asks a Latinx person where they are from, to which the Latinx person
replies “Uh, Ontario – just like you!” Instead of stopping there, the questioner doubles down and
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Before moving forward, it is worth noting that not everyone thinks the leap from general discussions of free speech
to specific discussions about academic freedom/academic speech is legitimate or clear cut (see for example Simpson
and Srinivasan 2018, 195). While I concede that there is nuance here (i.e., regarding the institution-specific goals and
values of the academy) for our purposes, I am treating the question of academic freedom as a fairly straightforward
application of the larger free speech debates. It is also worth noting that I am treating questions of academic freedom
and free speech on campus as tightly interwoven. While the latter is more general, the former is also relevant, because
I see academic freedom (what one is free to teach, research, publish on, and how campus community members are
permitted to speak) as a manifestation of the question about the scope and boundaries of speech. So, academic
freedom/academic speech are clearly implicated in this question.
153

For the origins of the concept, see Pierce (1970); Pierce et. al (1978). For a recent challenge to the current framing
of microaggressions and a modified conceptualization of microaggression theory, see Freeman and Stewart (2018;
2019a; 2019b; 2019c). Also see introduction and previous chapters of this thesis.
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probes further, asking “no, like, where are you really from?” This constitutes a classic instance of
microaggression: regardless of the questioner’s intentions, the content of their speech has sent a
string of messages about the Latinx person’s identity and belongingness in Ontario. These
messages include that the Latinx person is viewed as “foreign” or “Other,” that they are not
recognizable as a “true Canadian.” Packed into the comments are stereotypes and assumptions
about racial identity (e.g., that non-white people in Canada must be from elsewhere), as well as
coded messages about the Latinx person’s inferiority vis-à-vis the white questioner.
There is vast empirical evidence (Nadal et. al 2011, 2014; Resnick et. al 2019; Solaranzo et. al
2000; Swann et. al 2011; Williams 2017) and theoretical argument (Freeman and Stewart 2018;
Friedlaender 2018; McGowan 2019; Schroer 2015; Stewart 2019a; 2019c; and Brennan 2016 on
‘micro-inequities’) in favour of the view that microaggressions cause significant harm. Moreover,
moral arguments have been offered which contend that the fact that microaggressions cause harm
justifies attempts to minimize microaggressions and their negative consequences in a variety of
settings (see for example chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis). As I have described in the introduction
and chapter 1 of this thesis, microaggressions are a mechanism of, and are continuous with,
structural and systemic oppression. Being oppressed, and having that oppression acted on or
reinforced, is a harm. Microaggressions contribute to the degrading of all sorts of things in which
one is likely to have a vested interest: their epistemic standing, their emotional integrity, their
identity, their being made to feel welcome or included in a particular space, their ability to trust
others, and so on. These setbacks to one’s many significant interests amount to harm, regardless
of anyone’s intentions to cause said harm (again, see introduction to this thesis; see McLeod 2020
for an articulation of this broad sense of harm).
However, despite the vast theoretical research positing that microaggressions are harmful, and the
empirical research which backs up these claims,154 there are still those who doubt their seriousness
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Though throughout this thesis I have pointed to the empirical psychology literature which aims to measure the
negative consequences of microaggressions, it is worth noting the problematic nature of our tendency to only view
such quantifiable evidence as “real” or “objective” evidence. Such empiricist tendencies can erase the significance of
the testimonies of those who live and report being harmed by things like oppression, and more specifically,
microaggressions. For a discussion of this point, see Schroer (2015).
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and who ardently contest any continued research and advocacy around microaggressions (e.g.,
Friedersdorf 2015; Lilienfeld 2017; Haidt 2017; Campbell and Manning 2015; 2018. For a
discussion of their critiques, see chapter 1 of this thesis).
A great deal of the debate around microaggressions – their impact and whether or not attempts to
reduce them are legitimate – has taken place on university campuses. On the one side of the debate,
critics of microaggressions claim that “liberal leaning” teachers and administrators are teaching
students to see oppression and injustice where it “doesn’t really exist” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2017);
and, as a result, are making students “overly sensitive” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2017), thereby
creating a problematic sort of “victimhood culture” on campuses (Campbell and Manning 2018).155
To the extent that words cannot cause any real harm 156 , they contend, attempts to reduce
microaggressions are undue infringements on other students’ and professors’ fundamental rights
to speak openly and freely.
This worry about infringements on speech has played out in some very public ways. For example,
philosopher Kathleen Stock has made claims of being “silenced” and “cancelled” after receiving
backlash for her trans-exclusionary views and comments, which many transfeminists see as
microaggressive or otherwise harmful (see “Open Letter Concerning Transphobia in Philosophy”
2021; see Stock 2021 for her response). For another example, University of Toronto professor
Jordan Peterson (in)famously refuses to use gender neutral pronouns, seeing himself as a “free
speech warrior” fighting against “political correctness” (McBride 2017; Murphy 2016). As a
result, Peterson routinely misgenders trans and non-binary students (speech acts which have been
discussed throughout this thesis as instances of microaggression) and attends free speech rallies
arguing in defense of his right to do so (Murphy 2016). His employer, the University of Toronto,
has said they support his “right to academic freedom,” but do worry that he is in violation of the
Ontario Human Rights Code, and his faculty responsibilities, when he misgenders trans and non-
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For a response to this line of thinking, see chapter 1 of this thesis.

This is an underlying assumption for most of the critics of microaggressions, though it is rarely made explicit. An
exception is Haidt and Lukianoff’s (2017) essay for The Atlantic, titled “Why It’s a Bad Idea to Tell Students Words
are Violence,” in which they explicitly deny that words can be immediately harmful.
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binary students in these ways (Murphy 2016). Peterson refers to the affirmed pronouns of his trans
and non-binary students as “made up words,” a claim which, in and of itself, is microaggressive.
He also refers to his transgender students as “transsexuals” (see Murphy 2016), which is also
deeply problematic (perhaps a microaggression, perhaps something more). The cases of Stock and
Peterson are but two recent and ongoing examples out of many, but they get at the broader point.
Essentially, the worry from the likes of Stock and Peterson is that attempts to reduce
microaggressions and the like – especially those which encourage people to speak, or refrain from
speaking, in particular ways – constitute undue infringements on their freedom of speech,
amounting to inappropriate and unjustified “cancellation.” (And, this argument is made regardless
of the minimal amount of effort involved with changing one’s speech, e.g., effort as minimal as
simply trying one’s best to use a trans student’s appropriate name and pronouns.) Unfortunately,
these stories tend to get a ton of press and attention, and they paint the debate – and what is at stake
in it – in a fairly superficial light.
On the other side of the debate, proponents of microaggression awareness and reduction have
argued that microaggressions need to be understood within their broader social and historical
context, and that doing so helps to make it clear that microaggressions are importantly connected
to ongoing systems of oppression (McTernan 2018; Friedlaender 2018; O’Dowd 2018; Freeman
and Stewart 2020; McClure 2019; Rini 2021). Given their role in perpetuating systems of
oppression and the varied harms microaggressions cause, the proponents argue that there is good
reason to raise awareness of microaggressions and work to reduce their harmful effects (Freeman
and Stewart 2018; Friedlaender 2018; Rini 2015; 2021). They generally contend that this is true
over and above any apparent restrictions such attempts to reduce microaggressions (e.g., requiring
professors to use trans and non-binary students’ preferred pronouns) might impose on one’s ability
to speak absolutely freely (i.e., in a way that is perfectly, or near perfectly, unrestricted). Most
simply, microaggressions theorists contend that there are important positive reasons (e.g.,
pertaining to equity and inclusion) to work to reduce the proliferation and impact of
microaggressions on campus. In what follows, I will argue that there are additional reasons, rooted
in the values of free speech, for reducing microaggressions as well.
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I will return to microaggressions in detail in section 5.5 below, but for now, suffice it to say that
microaggressions are one representative case of the unfolding debates about free speech and
expression on college and university campuses. Before circling back to microaggressions and how
microaggressions ought to factor into discussions of free speech on campus, let’s consider what I
take to be a promising, though limited, way of thinking about the value and justification for
protecting free speech on campus. This is the “free speech infrastructure” model offered by
philosopher Philip Pettit.

Philip Pettit’s Infrastructure Analogy
In a recent chapter titled “Two Concepts of Free Speech,” Philip Pettit sets out to examine the
concept of ‘free speech’ in order to help us get clear(er) on two related questions: first, to what
extent can our speech choices be said to be free? And second, in what sense can speech choices be
thought of as free? Pettit notes that there are two possible answers to the latter question: i) that
people are free to speak insofar as they are unhindered in exercising their speech choices, and ii)
that people are free to speak insofar as they are protected in exercising their speech choices. He
argues that it is conceptually important to distinguish between these two notions of freedom with
respect to speech (Pettit 2018, 61). I will describe each in turn.
Free speech qua unhindered speech is speech that you can conduct without facing (covert or overt)
hindrance from other individuals or officials. Put succinctly, free speech qua unhindered speech is
speech that is free from the removal, replacement, or misrepresentation of speech options by others
(Pettit 2018, 62). Pettit notes that this is a negative freedom, or in other words a freedom in the
sense of non-interference (see Berlin 1969). Pettit sees this sense of free speech, viz., free speech
qua unhindered speech, as problematic. Pettit contends that one is not truly free just in case their
speech is unhindered, because one could simply adapt their speech preferences to their
circumstances. That is to say, in the face of certain speech options being hindered, one could
simply adapt or alter their speech to avoid or circumvent that hindrance, and still be said to have
spoken freely (see Pettit 2018, 63). Quoting Berlin, Pettit notes that on such a view, “the extent of
a man’s negative freedom [would be] a function of what doors, and how many are open to him;
upon what prospects they are open; and how open they are” (Berlin quoted in Pettit 2018, 63). But,
as Pettit notes following Berlin, “to teach a [person] that, if [they] cannot get what [they] want,

223

[they] must learn to want only what [they] can get may contribute to [their] happiness or [their]
security, but it will not increase [their] civil or political freedom” (ibid.).
Take the following example: an adjunct instructor wishes to issue an explicit critique of their
academic institutions, and to do so publicly. This is the speech they truly wish to make. However,
it is a condition of their contract that they cannot make critical comments about the university or
its leadership in the public domain. Consequently, the adjunct professor issues a more vague, less
direct, and thereby less effective critique of the institution. They water down what they otherwise
would have said. For Pettit, that the adjunct professor was able to issue some bit of speech, which
they appear to have chosen, and were seemingly unhindered in doing so, is not sufficient to say
that they were truly free. The speech options the adjunct professor really want to take were
foreclosed; they simply adapted their preferences to what was allowable in the situation. Pettit
contends that this is far too weak a sense of free speech. It is weak because we cannot readily
assume, in such circumstances, that people are in fact saying what they would otherwise say if
certain speech options were not foreclosed. In the case of the adjunct professor, we can clearly say
that they were not saying what they would otherwise say. This is, on Pettit’s view, an inadequate
sense of free speech.
On the other hand, free speech qua protected speech is a stronger requirement for free speech;
notably, protecting speech goes beyond non-interference and actually interferes with the very
possibility of interference by placing obstacles in the way of others to prevent them from
interfering with your speech (Pettit 2018, 64).157 Such protections can include speech protective
laws (see footnote 10) or policies (e.g., campus speech codes), upheld by supportive social norms.
Importantly, meaningfully protecting speech involves placing not only obstacles in the way of
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It is worth noting (and Pettit acknowledges this) that any system or apparatus that aims to protect speech (i.e., by
placing protections in the form of obstacles to others who would interrupt one’s free speech) will be controlled by
someone or some institution, so there will always be some question about who gets to be in control of such a protective
apparatus (Pettit 2018, 65). Pettit contends that such a speech-protective apparatus will most likely come from the
law, with the support of social norms. Notably, Pettit claims that such speech protective apparatuses will not come
from the “whim” of an “elite body” or “autocrat.” He might be wrong about this in practice: e.g., the campus speech
codes discussed in the introduction are such an apparatus, and they were explicitly ordered by those currently in power
and assembled by “elite bodies.”
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people from blocking the speech of others, but rather also enforcing penalties (legal, institutional,
or social) for doing so (Pettit 2018, 65).
Pettit argues that free speech ought to be understood in the second sense; namely, speech is
properly understood to be free to the extent that it is protected. Understanding free speech as
protected speech, Pettit argues, has important practical implications, socially and politically
speaking. Specifically, he claims that while free speech qua unhindered speech is fairly
undemanding (e.g., does not require law or policy to be put in place to formalize protections), the
second notion of free speech – free speech qua protected speech – is both socially and political
demanding (Pettit 2018, 66). It is only by “dint of law and regulation” accompanied by “supportive
social norms,” Pettit argues, “that speech gets to be protected, and gets to count as free” (Pettit
2018, 67). These protections (formal protections and supportive norms), Pettit argues, function to
maximize free speech up to the point that it is “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable for all” (Pettit
2012, 92-107).158 Taken together, these features (laws, policies, and norms) create and sustain the
infrastructure which protects speech and keeps it truly free.
On Pettit’s view, then, putting such laws, policies, and norms in place, then, is not an invasion or
violation of free speech. Rather, laws, policies, and norms are part of what creates and sustains
free speech in the first place. Laws, policies, and the social norms that support them (e.g., norms
of people acting in ways that uphold these speech-protective laws and policies) create the
“infrastructure necessary for people to share in the enjoyment of that ideal” (Pettit 2018, 68).
Insofar as laws and policies are part of the very infrastructure of free speech (and of making speech
maximally free to the highest extent realizable for all), those who claim to embrace free speech
cannot reasonably default to the position of demanding that there be no regulations or restrictive
policies or norms around speech. This is because it is from these laws, policies, and norms that
such a freedom is derived; they are what grant us free speech in any meaningful sense in the first
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It is worth pointing out that while Pettit does not acknowledge the obvious connection to John Rawls, his principle
of speech liberty as being the maximal amount that is co-exercisable and co-enjoyable for all sounds a lot like Rawls’
liberty principle (namely, that each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties, compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all, Rawls 1971).
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place. To the contrary, then, those who claim to support free speech must be committed to
“identifying regulations that can provide the best infrastructure possible for free speech” (Pettit
2018, 68), where this infrastructure is aimed at creating the conditions to maximize the possibility
of free speech for all.
Pettit contends that developing the right protective infrastructure for maximizing free speech has
important benefits which are only realized when speech is suitably protected (in other words, these
benefits do not arise when free speech is only unhindered, but not protected). Moreover, Pettit
argues that protecting speech confers these benefits without incurring “heavy costs” (Pettit 2018,
73). The benefits Pettit argues can only truly arise when speech is meaningfully protected by a
sound free speech infrastructure include: i) speaker status (that is, speakers enjoy a certain sort of
status in relation to others, where everyone is assumed to be equally free to speak); ii) the
possibility of communicating meaningfully via one’s silence (i.e., where one’s silence can be
understood to communicate something other than the fact that their speech was hindered in some
way); and iii) the establishment of greater accountability for one’s speech (including their
silences), insofar as what one says (or doesn’t say) within the context of adequately protected
speech can be properly attributed to them; speakers are thereby required to assume responsibility
for what they do and do not say. Pettit calls these i) the status benefit; ii) the enfranchising benefit,
and iii) the responsibility benefit, respectively (Pettit 2018, 73-77). I will discuss each of these
benefits in section 5.4 below. For now, the general idea for Pettit is that when speech is suitably
protected, each of these benefits will realize. He does not specify exactly what such necessary
protections would entail (and I will try to spell some of this out in section 5.5 below). However, it
is worth flagging that Pettit assumes baseline speech conditions that are relatively just and fair
(e.g., he repeats throughout that he is assuming a “context of virtue,” see Pettit 2018, 77). In what
follows, I will consider Pettit’s view without such an assumption of virtue, replacing such an
assumption with the non-ideal reality of power and oppression which structure our society and
speech contexts.
After articulating his view, Pettit turns to the academic context as a case study. Pettit asks us to
consider the contemporary research institution, in which “a regime of academic freedom has been
established.” Such a regime, Pettit contends, “is bound to ensure protection for various forms of
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speech.” In the academic context, robustly protecting speech, Pettit argues, generates several
benefits: it allows the truth to emerge (a “marketplace” type argument), it brings us collectively
closer to the truth, and “professionalization guards against abuse” because professors and
researchers want to avoid being subjected to “censure and shame” (Pettit 2018, 78). Pettit actively
sets aside the concern that academics and researchers will abuse their academic freedom and
generally protected speech, perhaps too quickly (as I will suggest below) (Pettit 2018, 78).
In presenting his view, Pettit makes various comments which read as overly optimistic about the
extent to which our background speech conditions are already just. One clear example of the extent
to which Pettit seems overly optimistic about our current social and speech conditions comes when
he describes the role of the “economy of esteem,” in disciplining speech (that is, in constraining
the sorts of speech people are likely to engage in, given their interest in personal esteem). The idea
is that speech – even problematic speech – should be protected and that, in most cases, individuals’
desires for respect and esteem will constrain what they actually say. On this, he writes:
“This economy will not work… in the presence of widespread bias or
bigotry, of course, or within an asocial ghetto like the community of
thieves. But in more common, less noxious environments, and certainly in
an environment where virtue applies, it can impose a useful discipline on
how people exercise the opportunities given them by the protection of
speech, guarding against the wayward abuse of those opportunities” (Pettit
2018, 77).
Despite his acknowledgement that widespread bigotry can corrupt the sort of free speech system
he describes, Pettit does not seem to think our actual speech circumstances are like this; on page
76, for example, he references the existence of a “bigoted few” and suggests that intolerance is
rare. He seems to take for granted that we live in a society (and occupy institutions, including
academic institutions) in which a politics of esteem will be effective; in other words, he assumes
that there is not “widespread bias or bigotry” and that “virtue applies” (Pettit 2018, 77). On account
of each, he believes that a politics of esteem will help safeguard against various types of harmful
speech.

227

Perhaps I exist in a different social and political landscape than Pettit (and, I most certainly do),
but I find it challenging to imagine a world in which bias and bigotry are rare, and in which such
a politics of esteem would have the sort of safeguarding effect Pettit describes. To the contrary,
from my vantage point as an LGBTQ+ woman, dealing with invisible disability, who was raised
in a low-income area, the world I see and interact with on a daily basis, is rife with bias and overrun
with bigots; bias and bigotry are certainly not in short supply.159 I would assume that most people
who occupy positions of social disadvantage or marginalization would agree. So, while Pettit
seems to assume that we are already operating under conditions without excessive bias and bigotry
(i.e., that conditions of extreme and corruptive bias and bigotry are exceptions, not the rule), I
believe, to the contrary, that we need to create those conditions: to rebuild our speech infrastructure
in such a way that reduces the influence of bias and the growth of bigotry that can so easily corrupt
it. Bias and bigotry are already part of our speech landscape. They inform our speech norms and
practices. Acknowledging this reality, and trying to push back against it, is essential if we are to
build a speech infrastructure that protects, fairly and equally, the speech of all.

Cracks in the Infrastructure, Or the Influence of Power and
Oppression
Before describing the limitations I see in Pettit’s view as he has presented it, let me reiterate what
I find valuable about the view, and why I find it worth engaging with in the first place. In general,
I find the argument in favor of a “free speech infrastructure” comprised of laws, policies, and
supportive social norms to be the best model for ensuring that speech is truly protected, and is so
for everyone. Such a view allows for the flexibility of drawing not only on law and policy to create
desired speech conditions, but also implicates social and institutional norms. As I will go on to
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I want to be clear here that I am not suggesting that Pettit (or other people who occupy more socially dominant
perspectives) are “perfectly privileged,” and thereby unable to understand oppression in any way. Rather, my point
here is both intersectional and rooted in a commitment to standpoint epistemology. Pettit is, in many ways,
comparatively privileged and occupies a relatively dominant position in society. Taking standpoint seriously, this
impacts how he will see and understand structures of power and oppression. Of course, the lens of intersectionality
offers us the important reminder that power and privilege are not all-encompassing. It is possible that Pettit has some
experience with oppression (e.g., with invisible disability, with immigration status – with any number of things I
cannot and do not know about him and his experiences). This is irrelevant to the core claim, however, which has to
do with relative degrees of power and privilege, and how intersectionally-different life experiences shape our
awareness of and sensitivity to different structures of oppression and manifestations of power.
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show, this inclusion of norms as part of the essential infrastructure for protecting speech is
particularly helpful when it comes to thinking about speech phenomena such as microaggressions,
which we might want to constrain or restrict, but not by way of law or policy. In such cases,
forming and maintaining the right norms will be crucial (e.g., for minimizing things like
microaggressions and their corrosive impact). In addition to finding the infrastructure model
promising, I also find value in Pettit’s articulation of the benefits that would arise when speech is
sufficiently protected (that is, the status benefit, the enfranchising benefit, and the responsibility
benefit). I agree with Pettit that, with the right kind of speech protective infrastructure in place, all
of these benefits would be realized, and that they are valuable benefits worth pursuing. The
attainment of these benefits provides additional reasons to ensure that speech is suitably protected.
For all of these reasons, I find Pettit’s model to be a helpful starting place for thinking about
protecting speech, particularly on university campuses.
However, despite the promise of Pettit’s model, in what follows I will argue that it is limited in its
current form. Specifically, analyses of power and oppression, and their influences on speech, must
be brought to bear on Pettit’s account in order for it to achieve the ends and bring about the benefits
that he proposes. In the remainder of this section, I will highlight how a lack of engagement with
power and oppression causes Pettit to assume too much. In the following section, section 5.5, I
will aim to build upon his view by situating it more squarely within the unjust realities of our
current social and political context, structured as it is by imbalances in power and oppression.
Before I suggest some adaptations to Pettit’s view which help better account for the influence of
power and oppression (which I develop in section 5.4 below), let me first clarify the problematic
assumptions that underlie Pettit’s lack of engagement with power and oppression while setting out
his articulation of the positive benefits of a free speech infrastructure. Making these shortcomings
explicit is significant for figuring out how to account for them when revising the account, and
ultimately for informing how we can start moving toward a more just, more robustly supportive
infrastructure that doesn’t suffer from the same limitations and problematic assumptions.
Consider the first benefit of the speech protective infrastructure Pettit describes, namely, the status
benefit. In describing it, Pettit contends that when a sufficient free speech infrastructure is in place,
each person within that system is marked as equally independent with respect to their speech as
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others in the system. As Pettit describes things, when speech is protected, everyone’s voice is fully
their own and, “absent undue timidity,” they can “look others in the eye without fear or deference”
and know that they are no one’s “lackey or pawn” (Pettit 2018, 74). In such cases, he contends,
“silence is typically going to be significant of approval” (Pettit 1994, 49). Of course, our actual
(read: non-ideal) speech situation is not at all like this.160 In our actual, non-ideal speech contexts,
structured by power and oppression, people are speaking across deeply engrained power
differentials (e.g., raced, gendered, or classed power differentials), and oppressive social norms
which train some people to speak to others from a position of deference (e.g., women are often
socialized and expected to demonstrate deference to men), while other people are empowered to
speak on others’ behalf. (See Alcoff 1991 on speaking for others across differences in power.)
Moreover, routine slights, such as microaggressions, further degrade the equal status of some
speakers. Many factors, informed by power and oppression, position speakers differently and
unequally.
A robustly supportive free speech infrastructure, aimed at justice, would take these facts into
account and work to neutralize the perverse impacts that speaking across unjust power differentials
can have. It is not enough to assume that with speech protective laws and policies in place, and the
broad social desire to uphold them, everyone will necessarily be respected as equals in the domain
of speech. More work is needed to bring about more just speech norms – ones which can respond
to our present speech context, which situates some speakers as always already credible, while
positioning others as lacking credibility (cf. Fricker 2007) or otherwise as untrustworthy. Many
broad scale social changes would have to be implemented in order for all speakers to be in a
position to meaningfully claim and receive the “equal respect of others” that Pettit contends is part
in parcel with this protected status.
Now consider Pettit’s second benefit, what he calls the enfranchising benefit. Pettit contends that
adequate speech protection allows people to effectively communicate their values, even by their
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Here, I am drawing on the distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, where non-ideal theory takes as
its starting point the actual, material conditions [of injustice] in which we find ourselves. For an overview of non-ideal
theory and its value, see Jaggar (2019). For an example of non-ideal theorizing in practice, see Anderson (2010).
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silence.161 Under Pettit’s conceived free speech infrastructure there is a “presumption that when
you do not speak out on some relevant matter… that you are happy with the way things are; [that]
you are happy with the situation...” (Pettit 2018, 75; also see Pettit 1994). For this to be true,
however, we need to be able to differentiate between willful and unwilful (read: compelled)
silences – a point that Pettit does not consider. In other words, we need to have a way of
determining when silence is not freely chosen or exercised, i.e., when it is coerced by social
forces162, which can happen even when free speech is formally protected in the ways Pettit has in
mind.
Consider the following scenario.163 A female graduate student experiences an instance of sexual
misconduct at the hands of her male doctoral supervisor. She is, in many ways, vulnerable vis-àvis her supervisor; he has the power, effectively, to make or break the career she has worked so
hard to obtain. While she desperately wants justice for his sexual wrongdoing – and to avoid this
happening again, to herself or anyone else – she fears the likely consequences of speaking up: she
knows that she is less likely than he is to be believed164 (he is an esteemed professor after all!), she
is likely to be accused of trying to ruin his reputation,165 and she may very well be made out to be
a pariah within her department, or her discipline writ large, all the while never getting the justice

It is worth noting that Pettit’s discussion of the enfranchising benefit in this 2018 chapter is an extension of the
view he develops in a 1994 chapter, “Enfranchising Silence: An Argument for Freedom of Speech.” There he develops
the idea that one important reason for protecting free speech is that doing so “enfranchises silence.” It allows for
“silence itself to become a form of speech” (45). Pettit’s view has been critiqued and challenged by Rae Langton
(2007), who has argued that free speech itself does not enfranchise silence.
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See Dotson (2011), where she describes the phenomenon of “testimonial smothering.” Dotson describes testimonial
smothering as “the truncating of one’s own testimony in order to ensure that the testimony contains only content for
which one’s audience demonstrates testimonial competence” (Dotson 2011, 244). In other words, when a marginalized
speaker recognizes that the content of their speech is particularly risky, or likely to be met with incompetence that
poses further risks, that speaker might engage in a sort of “coerced self-silencing” as a means of self-preservation.
Clearly, in such cases, one’s silence is not an obvious indication of their values, or their approval of the status quo, as
Pettit contends.
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This is a slightly modified version of an example I develop in Stewart (2019e).
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See Fricker (2007) for a helpful analysis of [gendered] credibility deflations.

Manne’s (2018) concept of “himpathy” is relevant here. Manne describes himpathy as our socialized tendency to
give undue credence to concerns about men’s reputations and wellbeing, often at the expense of women (e.g., their
accusers). Our sympathies get tipped, unjustifiably, in his favor.
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she desired in the first place. In other words, by speaking up, she could actually make things worse
for herself, in an already difficult time. Knowing this compels her to silence herself – to smother
her own testimony (cf. Dotson 2011). This silence certainly does not indicate her acceptance of
the status quo; rather, her silence reflects the difficulty involved in speaking up against power
when one is vulnerable.
This sort of example (likely to register as familiar with far too many women graduate students)
renders Pettit’s account of “silence as acceptance” problematic at best, and outright dangerous at
worst. Assuming that silence is necessarily interpretable as an endorsement of the status quo fails
to demonstrate robust awareness of or engagement with the systems of power and oppression that
dictate our speech norms and shape our propensities toward silence (or, when the circumstances
might render silence rational, or even necessary). Again, in an ideal and perfectly just speech
infrastructure, without the influences of power and oppression, Pettit would likely be right – we
could, in such contexts, understand silence as intentional, and as communicating acceptance or
lack of dissent. People just would speak up when something was wrong. But that is not the
infrastructure we currently operate within, despite speech being formally protected, and Pettit’s
analysis needs to take that into account.
Finally, consider the third benefit Pettit describes, the responsibility benefit. The idea is that under
a speech protective infrastructure (that is, a situation in which speech is formally and informally
protected), people can be held responsible for what they do (or do not) say. This is because, Pettit
contends, in situations of protected speech (and where many other idealized conditions hold),
people’s utterances convey attitudes in such a manner that “speakers can be assumed to hold
genuinely to them” (Pettit 2018, 76). Consequently, Pettit contends, when people speak
disagreeable or even abhorrent views, we can blame them, especially when they conform their
attitudes to “the contours of power and popularity” (ibid.) or otherwise fail to speak against the
dominant tide. You have to “be your own man or woman,” Pettit charges, “You have to speak for
yourself” (ibid.). The idea here is that when we are free to speak as we please, we are responsible
for not just speaking in accordance with popular opinion – we have a right, and a responsibility, to
speak out.
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As with the first two benefits, I think such a view is complicated by thinking about the influence
of power (e.g., how power influences speech, and what people can get away with saying) and
oppression (e.g., that which makes it hard to speak out against the status quo). One thing to note
is that, even if we can, in a formal sense, be held accountable for our speech, the extent to which
people experience accountability for their words (and the impact of their words) is itself shaped
by power. For example, Donald Trump, it turns out, can get away with making misogynistic, racist,
and xenophobic comments, with little to no accountability. He can even get away with (in some
sense) inciting an insurrection against the US government (Fandos 2021).166 But, this reality (that
Trump seems to be held less responsible for his words than the average citizen) likely runs counter
to our expectations about how responsibility for speech should be doled out. Intuitively, we likely
think that the greater one’s (social or political) power, the greater responsibility one ought to have
for their words and the impact of those words. Their words can, of course, have greater impact,
given their larger platform and more sizeable audience and influence.167
Even if we were all held equally accountable for our speech and the effects of our speech, the idea
that we would truly be, in a deep sense, individually responsible for all of the content of our speech
still seems misguided. In a society like ours, stratified by power and oppression, and rife with
prejudice, bias, and stereotypes, there is abundant evidence that we are influenced by such
prejudices, biases, and stereotypes held at the level of the social imagination (Fricker 2007). For
example, there is some evidence that we are influenced by implicit biases that are socially informed
(see Brownstein and Saul 2016a, 2016b; Agarwal 2018; Payne et. al 2018). Such biases are
conveyed via – and also exacerbate – microaggressions.
The core idea is that, while we might think it is possible, and permissible, to hold people
accountable for their speech (and, the prejudices and biases that speech might reflect), we can
never assume people’s thoughts, and the spoken manifestations of those thoughts, are entirely their

I say “in some sense” since, as we all know, Trump was impeached (for the second time) for this, though he was
not held accountable in the form of conviction and removal by the Senate.
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See Mackinnon (1987) on the ability of the powerful to have their words count for more. It might follow from this,
at least intuitively, that the degree of responsibility and accountability for the speech of those with significant power
should be better calibrated to that power.
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own. When Pettit says, “you have to be your own man” (Pettit 2018, 76) meaning that you alone
are responsible for the content of your speech, he isn’t adequately attending to the influences of
power, oppression and related social forces, such as prejudicial stereotypes and implicit biases,
that influence our cognition and, ultimately, our speech. In our currently imperfect speech context,
structured by power and oppression, we cannot readily assume that speakers “genuinely hold” to
the content of their utterances (or, their actions more generally, for that matter). In many cases,
this assumption may be expressly false. In order to increase the extent to which we can properly
attribute people’s speech to ideas they genuinely hold, we have to work to decrease the biases,
stereotypes, and prejudices that pervade our social imagination, and consequently corrupt the
content of our speech.
With respect to all three benefits of protected speech, Pettit overestimates the extent to which they
are readily realizable in a society like ours, which is structured and influenced by power and
oppression.
Before switching gears to my positive account of how we might build upon Pettit’s view to better
account for the influences of power and oppression, I want to raise a few more critical points.
Specifically, I want to highlight one further assumption in Pettit’s account, which, like the above,
fails to account for the influences power and oppression have in shaping our speech contexts.
Pettit contends that when people’s speech is sufficiently protected, viz., when they are formally
free to say virtually anything they desire and are formally protected in doing so, there are still
informal mechanisms that will ensure that certain sorts of particularly harmful or damaging speech
do not regularly occur. Specifically, Pettit states that people will generally want to “stand well in
their opinion” and ultimately to “avoid condemnation and shame” (Pettit 2018, 77). They will, he
argues, operate under a sense of discipline imposed by “the economy of esteem” (cf. Brennan and
Pettit 2004). What seems to be missing from Pettit’s argument, however, is an acknowledgement
that power can corrupt one’s sense of esteem and integrity; that is, the pursuit of power can make
it such that holding and expressing abhorrent views becomes perfectly compatible with the pursuit
of esteem, instead of something that would hinder it. Furthermore, to the extent that those in power
make certain abhorrent (e.g., racist, nationalist, xenophobic, homophobic, transphobic, etc.) views
mainstream, the sense of shame that would ideally come with holding and expressing them is
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diminished, and the expected social condemnation is either absent, or ineffective. For instance, in
an American context where those who wield the most social, political, and/or economic power
hold racist views about immigrants and refugees coming to America, holding these views becomes
not only more acceptable, but, in some cases, esteemed (e.g., such that people are celebrated, at
least by those in power, to the extent that they express similar views). And expressing those views
becomes absolutely shameless; to the extent that they are called out or condemned, those with the
greatest power merely double down, increasing the oppressive discourse and its influence. Pettit’s
assumption that the “economy of esteem” will generally prevent a deluge of socially and politically
harmful speech fails, it seems, to account for the corruptive impact of power, status, fame, and the
normalizing of oppressive attitudes.
Of note, however, is that Pettit does not ignore the role of status and fame outright – he just
overestimates their positive impact. He argues that the “best safeguard against the danger of an
inappropriate orthodoxy gaining hold is… the economy of esteem.” In the academic context, for
example, Pettit contends that academics won’t regularly express bigoted or patently false views
because they will want to avoid “mockery” or harms to their status or credibility. More
importantly, if they respect the “economy of esteem,” they “stand to earn the long-term reward of
high esteem and celebrity status” (Pettit 2018, 79). Setting aside how disheartening it is to think
that the only reason academics might have to avoid bigoted speech is their own self-interested
pursuit of self-esteem or fame, it also seems objectively false in practice; some academics appear
to engage in bigoted rhetoric precisely because it gains them popularity or some form of celebrity
status.
As indicated above in setting out Pettit’s view, I think he overestimates the ability (and desire)
people have to regulate their own speech (e.g., he puts too much stock in the force of the “economy
of esteem”). He also vastly underestimates the destructive impact of various sorts of harmful
speech (e.g., by thinking it is rare and instrumentally useful for helping us identify the “bigots
among us”). On account of both, Pettit explicitly states that we should be cautious about “how far
restrictions should run” because, as he sees it, there is an instrumental value in having people voice
bigoted and/or intolerant views, namely, that if bigots don’t speak their views just because they
are prohibited from doing so, we will never know who the bigoted are, and how numerous they
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are (Pettit 2018, 76). To be frank, this is a sacrifice I am willing to make. What Pettit fails to
consider here is that when we impose zero restrictions (in the form of law, policy, or norms) on
bigoted speech, such speech can (and does) proliferate, and often quickly.
Take for instance the mainstreaming of hateful rhetoric upon the election of the former U.S
President, Donald Trump, which correlated with an overall rise in hate speech (Arthur 2019), and
ultimately, a significant increase in hate crime and other violence (Edwards and Rushin 2018;
Hatzipanagos 2018; Feinberg et. al 2019; Sakuma 2019). This is what example of the sort of thing
that can happen when we normalize hateful and bigoted speech, or fail to set or uphold norms
against it. Or, for another and more recent example at the time of my revising this paper (April
2021): the rise in Anti-Asian rhetoric amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to initial
reporting that what had become the COVID-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan, China, former
president Trump immediately began to use phrases such as “China-virus” and “Kung-Flu” (see
Viala-Gaudefoy & Lindaman 2020; Bruce 2020).168 You might think using these terms was some
sort of rhetorical strategy for Trump, aimed at making the virus seem “exotic” and “Other,” and
perhaps to push blame (and thus responsibility) elsewhere. However, his rhetoric, left unchecked
and unchallenged, proliferated. Then, many of his followers (those in the public eye and beyond)
began using this inflammatory and xenophobic language, the effect of which is to personify the
virus and attach it to actual communities of people. As such, the anger and frustration that people
are feeling in response to the personal, social, and economic impacts of the pandemic get
(mis)directed at actual Asian people in our communities. Contrary to Pettit’s contention, such
language does more than make evident who the bigots among us are. Rather, the use of such
language led to tangible hate and violence (see Yam 2021). Moreover, it contributed to the creation
of a social and political climate in which such hate and violence came to be viewed as natural,
normal, inevitable.169
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This is honestly so stupid that I regret typing it into this chapter.

I say “led” here because there is some evidence of causality. A recent study has linked Trump’s inflammatory
language about the pandemic directly to rising anti-Asian sentiment (Reja 2021).
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This is a high price to pay for “knowing who the bigots are,” and certainly a price the targets of
such bigotry should not have to pay. As the calls to #MakeRacistsAfraidAgain and #EndAsianHate
illuminate,170 we might be better off not allowing hateful views and speech reflecting them to
become normal – to proliferate into the mainstream, exacerbating an already-prejudiced social
imagination (Fricker 2007) and more deeply entrenching explicit and implicit biases, which
ultimately lead to harm for socially marginalized people. We might be better, alternatively, to
sanction this speech, whether formally or by way of social norms, in order to better insulate
ourselves from its corrosive effects. We need to invest in strengthening more just foundations for
free speech, ones built on equality and respect, and eliminate those things which threaten the entire
structure – speech that reflects hate and bigotry, however subtle.
Though I have identified virtues of Pettit’s account (for example, his understanding of free speech
as protected speech), and I find his infrastructure analogy particularly compelling and helpful, I
have argued that he assumes far too much. Specifically, Pettit paints an overly positive view of our
current speech situation, failing to adequately account for the impacts that power and oppression
have on that situation. As such, his view reads as an overestimation of the extent to which our
speech infrastructure is already just, or functioning properly; to the contrary, I find much to critique
in our current speech norms and praxis, and the background social and political conditions that
undergird them. Furthermore, while Pettit contends that certain benefits are conferred on speakers
just in case their speech is protected (e.g., that they can anticipate being recognized and regarded
as on equal footing; that their silences could be interpreted as conveying a lack of objection or
otherwise acceptance with the status quo; and that all speakers can be seen as wholly responsible
for the words they speak), I think more work is needed to create conditions that are more conducive
to seeing these benefits – and truly protected speech – extended equally to all speakers, across
differences in power and oppression. To make Pettit’s speech protective infrastructure do what he
intends for it to do – secure the maximum about of free speech enjoyable equally by all – we must
attend to the realities of our imperfect social and political realities, and how they shape speech
norms and praxis. We must consider the role that power and oppression play in impacting speech
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and communication, even if and when it is formally protected. And we must imagine how we can
go about neutralizing the negative effects power and oppression can have on justice and fairness
in the domain of speech.
In what follows, I will build upon the strengths of Pettit’s account of free speech as protected
speech and aim to give it the nuance necessary to achieve his desired aim, namely, modelling a
system that is capable of conferring equal opportunities for speech, up to the maximal amount
consistent with what is “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable for all.” In this way, the basic framework
Pettit offers can be tailored to take account of, and be responsive to, the actual, imperfect
conditions in which we find ourselves.

Road Work: Creating the Infrastructure We Need to Secure Free
Speech for All
I have suggested above that Pettit overestimates the extent to which our current speech situation is
just, and to which it confers the benefits of protected speech equally to all speakers. In this section,
I will argue that a suitably protective free speech infrastructure demands more work that Pettit
assumes; we need to overhaul the broken roads of racism, misogyny, homophobia, and
transphobia, correct for imbalances that benefit some people’s access and relative ease of moving
about the current speech infrastructure, and ultimately re-vamp our protective speech infrastructure
to ensure that all people indeed benefit from those protections equally. My question then is how
do we create the protective infrastructure conditions that better account for the impacts of power
and oppression, and which are better suited to ensure that the protections afforded by formal speech
protections and the broader infrastructure can apply more equally for all, specifically all members
of our campus contexts? Though Pettit is somewhat vague on this point (e.g., what specific norms
are needed), I will suggest that we need both negative norms against certain sorts of speech, such
as microaggressions, as well as positive norms, aimed at offsetting the harms of microaggressions
or reducing them in practice, and generally creating spaces that can foster a meaningful sense of
inclusion and belonging within our campus contexts. The need for such norms – and their relation
to a robust speech protective infrastructure – only become obvious when we attend to power and
oppression and their impacts on speech. This is precisely how I intend to build upon Pettit’s
account. I now turn to revising and extending Pettit’s account.
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First, as noted in section 5.3 above, what Pettit’s account is most clearly lacking is an analysis of
the role of power and systems of oppression on speech, and as a result, his view does not put any
protective infrastructure in place to correct for the imbalances and injustices that power and
oppression create in the domain of speech. Power – having to do with the relational dimensions of
our social and political lives, which organize us in relation to one another, and dictate who is more
effectively able to exert control over themselves and others 171 – infuses our uses of language,
determining not only who gets to speak, but also how, when, and with what force. Power
(particularly social and political power) has a strong influence on credibility, that is, how likely
someone is to be taken as authoritative when they speak, and to have their testimony afforded
appropriate weight. 172 Power is also relevant to whether speech receives proper uptake. For
example, Quill Kukla (2014) has argued that sometimes power can affect the way a speech act
comes off. They describe how “in some circumstances, when a woman deploys standard discursive
conventions in order to produce a speech act with a specific performative force, her utterance can
turn out, in virtue of its uptake, to have a quite different force ‒ a less empowering force ‒ than it
would have if performed by a man” (Kukla 2012, 440). We can extend Kukla’s idea here on
intersectional grounds as well: for example, we might think a Black woman might be even less
likely to receive appropriate uptake relative to a white woman. The idea is that one’s relative social
power is directly connected to their likelihood of receiving proper uptake when they speak.
Systems of structural and systemic oppression also have bearing on how individuals and groups
are (more or less) able to move about the dominant speech infrastructure. Oppression is generally
understood to refer to "the existence of unequal and unjust institutional constraints,” where these
constraints involve harm to some social group and simultaneously benefit another social group
(Cudd 2006, 25, 52; Frye 1983; also see introduction and chapter 1 of this thesis). Such
institutionally structured constraints can include "legal rights, obligations and burdens,
stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, conventions, norms, and practices" (Cudd
2006, 50). Iris Marion Young (1990) describes oppression as “structural phenomena that
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See Fricker (2007); also see Stewart (2019e) for a discussion of the role of gendered power in credibility economies,
particularly around testimonies of sexual violation.
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immobilize or diminish a group” (1990, 42). Oppressive phenomena are structural insofar as they
are not the result of a few people’s choices or policies; rather, their causes are embedded in
unquestioned norms, habits, symbols, and policies, and in unquestioned assumptions underlying
institutional rules and of often ordinary, well-meaning people. 173 Oppressive phenomena are
systemic insofar as an oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group. In other words,
oppression need not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression of one group
by another, but rather can happen in far more nefarious, and at times less than obvious, ways.
Speech and language are conventions that can fall prey to the forces of oppression, such that some
people benefit disproportionately from our collective norms around speech and language use,
while others lose out, or worse yet, experience harm as a result of them. Such relative benefits and
burdens of our systems of speech and language can result from well-intentioned people, acting in
good faith, but still reproducing already oppressive norms, (e.g., Fricker 2007’s articulation of
testimonial injustice, or microaggressions, which will be discussed below).
One would be right to question the extent to which free speech infrastructure, generally developed
and built by those who already hold positions of power (e.g., in law, policy, university
administration, and the like), might function to maintain the status quo – to not upset the current
balance of power, which benefits those who already hold power. And people who tend to be on
the losing end of the current systems of power and oppression have every right to question if there
might be a better way of designing the infrastructure that they too must navigate. As Lynne Tirell
(1998, 139) aptly puts it: “Once we realize that our linguistic categories reflect and are reflected
by our social categories, and once we see that our discursive practices are normative, it is a short
step to see language as an arena of political struggle.” These connections, namely, those between
our social systems (infused with power and oppression as they are) and our discursive practices,
are ones Pettit fails to recognize and interrogate.

173

See discussion in Introduction and chapter 1 of this thesis.

240

And yet, acknowledging and understanding the role that power and oppression play in our speech
norms and discursive practices is integral to getting our protective speech infrastructure right. For
example, Pettit himself is clear about the indispensability of supportive norms in upholding the
speech infrastructure 174 , but fails to consider how oppressive social norms can corrode the
infrastructure, and be continuously reproduced and perpetuated by it. Furthermore, in failing to
account for the significance of power and oppression on our speech norms and praxis, Pettit is not
in a position to analyze all of the (positive) supportive norms that would help offset the harmful
impacts of power and oppression (e.g., those which help us more appropriately respond to the
testimony of the oppressed, such as moral deference (Thomas 1983), or loving attention (Frye
1983). When we realize that our speech norms are corrupted by power and oppression, we can
think about the full range of supportive norms that might be necessary to offset that damage.
Furthermore, the attitudinal norms that Pettit argues are needed to support the speech
infrastructure are impacted by speech itself. In other words, speech and social attitudes have a
bidirectional relationship. If we allow for unlimited and unchecked corrosive speech (i.e., racist
speech, sexist speech, transphobic speech), our social attitudes will undoubtedly continue to be
impacted by them, worsening things like prejudicial stereotypes, implicit biases and negative
cognitive associations. Implicit biases and negative cognitive associations then, in turn, have an
impact on our speech norms and practices (Fricker 2007; Kukla 2012). There is, then, a vicious
cycle between corrosive speech and corrosive attitudes and norms. The more corrosive speech
there is, the worse the norms that support the infrastructure. And the same people keep losing.
For this reason, we should be attentive to the relationship between speech norms on the one hand
(as dictated by and encoded in our free speech infrastructure), and the social attitudes we create,
perpetuate, or amplify on the other. Consequently, we need to create a free speech infrastructure
that takes this bi-directional relationship seriously and works to combat the negative social
attitudes and biases that corrupt speech norms and praxis. We can do so by trying to control for

He says: “Public law may not be enough on its own… [it needs to be] rooted in norms that are supported
attitudinally in your community” (Pettit 2018, 74).
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the amount of biased and prejudicial speech that reifies these social attitudes and biases. Again, to
the extent that these create a vicious cycle, it is necessarily to intervene wherever we can.
To make what I have said more concrete, let’s return to microaggressions. As noted above,
attempts to reduce or minimize microaggressions has been criticized as a violation of free speech.
Such charges have been heightened on university campuses. However, contra the critics, I contend
that not only are attempts to reduce microaggressions compatible with free speech (that is, they
are not violations of academic freedom or free speech as the critics contend), rather they are
essential parts of a well-functioning speech-protective infrastructure, one aimed at justice.
Reducing microaggressions and neutralizing their harmful impacts on speech norms and
communities are supportive norms that can make our speech infrastructure – on campus and
beyond – more equitable and fair.
As noted in earlier discussions of microaggressions throughout this thesis, the force of them lies
in their coded messaging – they can send messages to their targets that they are inferior, “Other,”
unwelcome, unrecognized, or otherwise lesser than, and they do so on the basis of biases or
prejudices (implicit or explicit) about some facet of the target’s marginalized identity. While the
critics of microaggression theory tend to mistakenly discuss microaggressions in isolation, as if
they occur as one-offs, scholars who theorize about microaggressions know that they are harmful
precisely because they are common, routine, and reoccurring (Rini 2021). In other words, the
coded messages of microaggressions compound over time, ultimately causing a variety of harms
to the target (Lombrozo 2017; Mallon and Evans 2019).
Compiled overtime, microaggressions can make their targets more hesitant to speak up, and less
likely to be taken seriously when they do (see discussions in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis). For
the target(s), repeated microaggressions can degrade their self-confidence or self-trust. For
everyone else around, repeated microaggressions reinforce stereotypes and biases about people of
marginalized identities, contributing to negative perceptions and attitudes about them, which again
can be implicit or explicit (see Runyowa 2015 for an overview of these consequences, particularly
as they manifest on campuses; also see Williams 2017). Because repeated microaggressions have
the capacity to affect attitudes (both about ourselves and about others), as well as norms (e.g., what
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sorts of speech are considered normal and acceptable), microaggressions can certainly impact the
speech norms, and the broader speech protective infrastructure, which Pettit describes.
Recall, I have argued above that the relationship between speech, and the supportive norms
required to prop up a speech protective infrastructure, is bi-directional: what we say impacts our
social norms and attitudes; social norms and attitudes create the landscape in which we speak, what
is said, and ultimately the effects our speech has.175 Insofar as pervasive microaggressions have
the capacity to degrade the status of some people as speakers (or indeed, as humans), there is good
reason to consider them when imagining what we want our speech protective infrastructure to look
like, and what sorts of policies and norms we think it ought to include.
Within academic contexts, it is imperative to consider how microaggressions can make certain
(already vulnerable) students and professors less likely to speak (and/or to be taken less seriously
when they do so), a more just speech infrastructure would take this into account, finding ways to
effectively minimize and neutralize microaggressive speech within our campus contexts. Doing
so, I contend, will begin to have a reparative impact on the social norms and attitudes that
ultimately harm marginalized people and ultimately create conditions where marginalized people
are better able to speak and be heard. When our speech protective infrastructure creates conditions
for reducing or neutralizing microaggressions, it helps bring us closer to arriving at the means for
achieving the maximal free speech “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable” for all.176
Though I will not venture to give a comprehensive account of how a situation [mostly] free of
microaggressions can be achieved, it is worth noting a few things that, while requiring fairly
minimal effort, can help minimize microaggressions that often occur in academic settings, or help
offset the harms that occur when they do. Some fairly straightforward things to normalize include
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For a helpful illumination of how this works, see McGowan (2009; 2019). McGowan explains that the exercitive
function of speech is to enact permissibility facts (i.e., to set the background conditions and norms for speech and
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I do not mean to suggest that the reduction of microaggressions and the neutralizing of their corrosive consequences
is the only work that needs to be done to create a fully just speech protective infrastructure. To the contrary, I think
other things are relevant, too. However, microaggressions are an important focus precisely because they are often seen
as a normal and acceptable part of speech (e.g., relative to slurs or hate speech) and they are, as I discussed earlier in
the paper, contentious as to their impacts and attempts to reduce them.

243

having it be routine and expected for everyone to indicate their pronouns (e.g., on their email
signature or Zoom profile name, or when they are being introduced for a talk). Having everyone
indicate their pronouns in this way normalizes this practice, so that it is not only trans and
nonbinary folks needing to do so (and thus outing themselves). Doing so also helps prevent
(unintentional) instances of mispronouncing or misgendering. We can also consider the
importance of being intentional about calling on non-white students and students who are not men
in classroom spaces, talks, etc. Being intentional about bringing people into the discussion can
help offset what too often happens – these students never being called on, and never feeling as if
they have a voice in academic spaces. These sorts of examples are about creating positive norms
that can help offset some frequent microaggressions that occur on university campuses.
Another important, albeit fairly easy, thing to do is to consider the optics of physical spaces on our
campuses. For example, if the philosophy lounge only has photos of older white male philosophers,
we can alter the space to include photos of non-white philosophers, women philosophers, and
queer or trans philosophers. Sometimes adapting the space aesthetically can influence people’s
ability to feel, and to actually be, included. A similar possibility is to work on diversifying syllabi,
so diverse or marginalized students do not receive reading lists comprised of works written
exclusively by white men of European descent. Including a diversity of identities, voices, and
perspectives is one way of signaling an openness to different experiences and ideas in the
classroom (and also, that people other than white men of European descent can (and do!) write
philosophy). Larger scale institutional changes might sometimes be necessary, as well. These
might include renaming buildings that were originally named in honor of white supremacist or
colonial figures, changing mascots that reflect stereotypical caricatures (e.g., of Indigenous
peoples), or removing statues celebrating confederate soldiers. Insofar as our very physical
environments can be microaggressive (i.e., environmental microaggressions), it is important to
take seriously the impact that our built environments can have on our speech communities and
learning atmospheres, and who is likely to feel included or excluded within them.
In terms of norm setting, it is important to establish a community in which people are open to
receiving feedback and constructive criticism when they have committed a microaggression (e.g.,
“When you said ‘X’, it came off in this particular way… This can be problematic because…”) and
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community members are willing to provide such feedback compassionately (e.g., where the end
goal is helping each other learn, grow, and do better). An environment in which microaggressions
are pervasive, yet nobody ever calls them out, is one that ultimately worsens corrosive speech
norms and the stereotypes and biases which undergird them. Cultivating norms of disruption (e.g.,
of disrupting problematic speech and working to alter unhealthy speech norms) is imperative for
creating an environment aimed at reducing the prevalence of microaggressions, and thereby
working toward a more inclusive and just speech infrastructure – one in which all students and
faculty feel able to speak and be heard on equal terms.
Many “micro” things can be done to make spaces feel more welcoming and inclusive, and given
the minimal effort necessary to implement such changes in exchange for a potentially significant
impact, they are worthwhile investment in time and energy.
In the previous section, I suggested that the three benefits Pettit assumes will arise when speech is
protected are unlikely to manifest in a society like ours, which is stratified by unjust power
imbalances and entrenched social oppression, both of which inform our speech norms and praxis.
Ensuring that the benefits Pettit describes (i.e., the status benefit, the enfranchising benefit, and
the responsibility benefit) will obtain for all members of a speech community is only possible
when we are able to offset some of the corrosive impacts that power and oppression have on
speech. Efforts to reduce microaggressions, I contend, can help us go some way toward
neutralizing the effects of power and oppression on our speech norms, helping us come closer to
realizing these three benefits, for all members of our speech communities.
With respect to the status benefit – the idea that when speech is protected everyone has equal status
as a speaker – the reduction of microaggressions in our classrooms and broader campus
communities can help to reduce biases and stigma targeted at those who are typically on the
receiving end of microaggressive speech, namely, people with one or more structurally
marginalized identity. In this regard, it can help assure that they are in fact seen as having equal
status as speakers, or it at least prevents their speaker status from being further degraded or
undermined. With respect to the enfranchising benefit – the idea that when speech is protected
silence is informative – the reduction of microaggressions can help create climates where people
feel more empowered to speak, and more likely to be taken seriously when they do so. This might
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alleviate some of the reasons that people self-silence (instances of silence which do not indicate,
as Pettit contends, their acceptance of or agreement with the status quo). So, a reduction in
microaggressions (and the stereotypes and biases they exacerbate) can help bring us closer to a
context in which silence is informative in the ways Pettit imagines, because there won’t be as much
coerced self-silencing (or, what Dotson 2011 calls “testimonial smothering”). With respect the
responsibility benefit – the idea that when speech is protected we can hold people responsible for
the content of their speech – the reduction of microaggressions in our classroom environments and
larger campus cultures can bring us closer to a situation in which people speak in ways that better
reflect their actual views, and are at least less impacted by prejudicial stereotypes, implicit biases,
and the like. This is because, as has been discussed, microaggressions function to reinforce
stereotypes and biases in the minds of the microaggressor, the microaggressed, and bystanders
alike. Reducing microaggressions, then, plays a role in decreasing prejudicial stereotypes and
biases, and their influence on what people think, believe, and communicate. When this is the case,
we move closer to a scenario like Pettit describes, namely, one in which people’s speech reflects
their genuinely held values or beliefs, which we can then fairly hold them account for. In other
words, when microaggressions are less pervasive and impactful in our speech communities, we
get closer to a situation in which we can meaningfully attribute people’s words to them (e.g., as
their own) and come closer to (appropriately) holding people responsible for the content of their
speech.
My claim here is that despite widespread panic around microaggression awareness trainings and
efforts to reduce microaggressions on university campuses (e.g., Lilienfeld 2017; Haidt 2017) such
efforts do not constitute an undue violation of free speech or of the protection of free speech. To
the contrary, efforts to reduce microaggressions on our campuses can play an important role in
achieving greater free speech and creating speech contexts in which all speakers can receive the
benefits that the protection of free speech is thought to offer. Moreover, the efforts required to
reduce many microaggressions are not particularly onerous, again demonstrating that such efforts
are not undue burdens on free speech and can generate significant benefit for marginalized
speakers.
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Let’s revisit one example provided above. One tangible thing we can do to reduce
microaggressions against our queer, trans, and non-binary students and campus community
members is to normalize widespread sharing of gender pronouns. Doing so helps us to avoid
singling out such students (e.g., if they are the only ones who must regularly indicate their
pronouns), it helps create a community in which indicating your pronouns (and using pronouns
outside the gender binary is normal), and helps to prevent the (often unintended) microaggression
of mispronouning others. Establishing such a positive norm – one in which it is standard practice
to indicate one’s pronouns at community events on or in classroom spaces – is not a violation of
anyone’s free speech. To the contrary, it is one norm that can help create better, and more just,
speech contexts – one in which all speakers feel respected and included.
While implementing and adapting to such norms might constitute an uncomfortable shift for some
people away from the status quo to which they are accustomed (i.e., a speech infrastructure created
and maintained by those who already occupy positions of social, political, and/or institutional
power), making adjustments like these is a necessary step to achieving Pettit’s core aim, namely,
the creation of a speech infrastructure that protects speech equally for all, up to the maximum
amount compatible with realizing equal protections for others. Thinking about the norms we
cultivate, and whether they positively or negatively impact community members’ abilities to speak
and be heard, is an important part of building a solid, and fair, speech infrastructure.

Possible Objections
Before concluding, I would like to consider a few objections to my view and offer responses to
each.
I have argued that we need a speech protective infrastructure on university campuses which
adequately accounts for power and oppression. This includes, I have argued, the implementation
of supportive norms aimed at minimizing microaggressions and neutralizing the harms they bring
about. I have offered a few suggestions about possible norms that could be implemented in the
interest of doing so. However, one might argue that this is superfluous – that we don’t need to
change the speech infrastructure, because structurally oppressed people are free to “speak back,”
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e.g., in the face of persistent microaggressions, or otherwise in response to bias, bigotry, or hate.177
In other words, one might object that instead of working to implement norms to reduce
microaggressions, we ought to instead introduce and support a norm of speaking back to counter
such speech.
First, I want to note that, despite my best efforts, I still find it generally unclear what the proponents
of “speaking back” think this prescription for “more speech” entails. Are targets of
microaggressions or other forms of hateful speech supposed to respond directly to what was said
(e.g., to defend themselves against particular microaggressions and to messages they convey, for
example)? Or, are they supposed to make a rational argument for their equality, or for why such
microaggressions are problematic in harmful? Or, does shouting back an equally offensive remark
count as legitimate speaking back? One might be “free” to do this, but it certainly doesn’t seem
productive, especially in a campus context. Without clear direction for the target of hateful rhetoric
as to what should be done with their abstract right to speak back in the face of microaggressions
or hate, the prescription to simply speak back feels quite obtuse.
Moreover, this vagueness aside, the prescription to respond to microaggressions and other forms
of hateful speech by “speaking back” is most problematic because it puts the burden of response
on the targeted person – the person who has been harmed – to attempt to rectify that harm or
otherwise counter it. This, I believe, puts the burden in the wrong place. By analogy with physical
harm, we would never prescribe “punching back” as a moral rule for someone who has been
physically assaulted (at least, I wouldn’t think so, and not without other protections or means for
recourse in place). And this prescription fails to account for the very same power imbalances and
facts about structural oppression that Pettit fails to consider: as it stands, with our current speech
infrastructure and the norms it ultimately functions to reify, not all speakers are in fact on equal
footing. Furthermore, Laura Beth Nielson has demonstrated that this “speaking back” prescription
is also empirically untenable: empirically speaking, targets of racist speech do not regularly
engage in counter speech (Nielson 2012, 155-156). For many reasons (e.g., fearing for one’s
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safety, thinking the speaker is ignorant and not worth engaging), Nielson reports that targets of
such speech are in fact most likely to try to ignore it, or try to leave the situation, though, ignoring
it does not imply that harm has not occurred, or that whatever hateful speech was exchanged has
not been internalized by the target. The prescription of more speech, or what has been called
‘speaking back,’ simply won’t work without a supportive speech infrastructure that is attentive to
power and oppression, that corrects for systemic credibility imbalances, and which ensures people
aren’t compelled to smother their own testimony in the face of harmful speech. We do not currently
operate within such an infrastructure. Even if we did operate in a perfectly just speech
infrastructure, such that speaking back and being heard was possible, it might still be too heavy a
burden to place upon a person being targeted with hateful rhetoric. The burden is more
appropriately placed on the collective. This is why I have advocated for the joint project of forming
and supporting norms of speech justice, e.g., norms aimed at reducing microaggressions in our
campus contexts.
A different objection might be raised against my broader approach, namely, an approach which is
aimed at justice in the domain of speech (e.g., by way of reducing microaggressions), and which
draws on defenses of free speech and the reasons we have for valuing free speech as a means of
achieving it. An objector might point out here that using defenses of free speech to ultimately argue
for a reduction in certain types of speech, such as microaggressions, is suspect, and especially
when one considers the way these arguments tend to be mobilized in the opposite direction (e.g.,
in defense of those who believe they have a right, rooted in freedom of speech, to commit
microaggressions).
This objection can take two different forms: first, that even with trying to meet the “speech
advocates on their own terms,” they will not be convinced because we have fundamentally
different starting points (i.e., they might genuinely believe they are superior and that their speech
ought to be disproportionately valued and protected, etc.)178; second, one might argue that there is
a better route for arguing in defense of the sort of speech restrictions and norm changes that I am
interested in, which doesn’t rely on using the advocates’ pro-free speech arguments at all.
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The first worry is that even though I am using language and arguments that will resonate with
many pro-free speech thinkers (e.g., my argument is ultimately a defense of free speech, on a
broader scale), some such thinkers are unlikely to be compelled by my argument, because they
might not believe that certain people are in fact equally positioned speakers, worthy of equal
respect as such (i.e., those with significant power might not recognize marginalized people as
legitimate equals in the domain of speech or otherwise). (Note: I do not think Pettit falls in this
camp, though other free speech absolutists might). I don’t have much to say to this, other than
biting the bullet: the objector would be correct that I am unlikely to convince such a person of the
need to create more robustly inclusive speech norms (e.g., those aimed at minimizing
microaggressions). However, the argument is nevertheless worth making, because there are a lot
of middle-ground people who could be convinced, who might, for example, be compelled-but-nottotally-convinced-by the free speech advocates’ arguments, who might similarly be compelled by
what I have said here, and throughout this thesis. In other words, my argument might reach people
on the fence about the free-speech debates or debates around microaggressions more generally,
who can be convinced, even if it cannot penetrate the minds of the bigots. I concede this.
Second, one might argue that it is more convincing to argue in defense of the sort of speech
restrictions that I have in mind without touching the speech advocates’ arguments at all. In Just
Words, Mary Kate McGowan (2019, 163) has made this very argument. She contends that there
are two routes for argumentation about the restriction of certain forms of harmful speech: the one
I have taken here (to use and extend the arguments of the free speech advocates), and the one she
prefers (what she calls the “parity argument”). The first route (the one I have taken) involves
drawing on the values of free speech itself and making arguments based in those values. The
alternative argumentative strategy is to make a “parity argument” (the route McGowan prefers).
This second route involves finding an uncontroversially regulable category of speech, specifying
precisely what the justification for that regulation is, and then arguing that a particular utterance
or category of speech is regulable for the same reasons (McGowan 2019, 164). In other words, this
argument draws on the imperative to treat like cases alike.
McGowan gives an argument for why she prefers the second argumentative route, which, for lack
of space, I won’t rehash here (see McGowan 2019, 165 for this discussion). While I am not sure
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she in fact proves the superiority of this particular argumentative move, I don’t think she (or I)
actually need to. Rather, instead of showing which argument is “best,” insofar as they arrive us at
the same conclusion (namely, a justification for certain sorts of regulations of or norms against the
proliferation of harmful speech), then why not make both arguments? In other words, we can use
all of the argumentative tools we have; after all, two strong arguments in favour of the desired
conclusion is better than one!
Simply put, I am not willing to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” when it comes to free
speech arguments, even if I do think they are at times made from a disingenuous place (see, for
example, Malik 2019 for a discussion of disingenuous claims of “censorship” and how they harm
minorities). There has been a long tradition of insightful theoretical work on the value of free
speech and I think it is a meaningful exercise to engage that work, see how it can be extended, and
apply it to the cases of our contemporary concern. And, as noted above, doing so might have the
added value of helping to shrink the apparent ideological divide in our fragmented and polarized
intellectual and political landscape, and perhaps of being more convincing to those who already
accept arguments for the value of free speech and are strongly committed to them. These possible
advantages aside, I contend that there is room in our theoretical landscape for both sorts of
arguments, and as people concerned with microaggressions and other forms of harmful speech,
our cause is strengthened by making both.

Concluding Remarks
In the proceeding sections, I have described an account of freedom of speech which draws on a
metaphor of infrastructure to show how different elements (law, policies, and norms) come
together to create a system that protects free speech, and, in so doing, confers a series of benefits
upon speakers within that system (Pettit 2018). Though I think this approach is compelling (e.g.,
the idea that speech protection demands the use of law, policies, and social norms), I have pointed
out weaknesses of the view as it has been formulated and advanced by Philip Pettit. Most notably,
I have suggested that Pettit has mischaracterized our speech situation, failing to acknowledge the
strong influence of power and oppression on our speech norms and practices.
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In challenging the underlying assumptions at work in Pettit’s view, I have sought to expand how
we ought to think about the creation of a speech protective infrastructure, so as to make it more
just and more equitable for all speakers. In attempting to neutralize the impacts of power and
oppression on our speech landscape, we venture to create more equal opportunities for socially,
politically, or institutionally vulnerable speakers to speak and be heard – or to at least start moving
us in that direction. In order to create the free speech protective infrastructure we really need –
indeed, the free speech infrastructure Philip Pettit seems to think we already have – we need to
deal with the bias and bigotry that pervade our speech landscape. One way to move in this direction
(though I do not contend that it is the only way) is to work to reduce the prevalence and impact of
microaggressions, acts which further corrode the status of marginalized speakers and reinforce
inequities in our speech landscape. Within the context of university campuses, efforts to reduce
microaggressions are essential to making sure vulnerable students, staff, and faculty members are
meaningfully – and not just superficially – included and, importantly, that the free speech
infrastructure protects them, too.
What I hope to have provided is an argument in favor of thinking more broadly about the
background conditions for speech on university campuses, and at least some of the norms that
must be cultivated to make speech conditions fairer for all within them. What I have not given you
is a complete story about how to achieve this, that is, how to implement all of the right policies
and supportive norms necessary to make it happen.179 On that note, however, it is worth revisiting
the campus speech codes mentioned at the paper’s opening. I find it most appropriate to focus on
my own institution, so I will consider Western University’s policy specifically.
Recall, in August 2018, Ontario Premier Doug Ford ordered all Ontario colleges and universities
to design and implement campus free speech codes, up to a standard established by his office, or
else risk losing much needed provincial funding. Naturally, universities (including my own

In fairness to myself, Pettit doesn’t really do this either. Rather, he notes that his “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable
requirement” could lead us to “argue for other, more surprising regulations” (Pettit 2018, 67). He states that on his
view, for example, the framework he has given would argue against allowing the sort of anonymous commercial and
political speech that currently dominates social media, but he does not personally offer a policy suggestion for how to
do so.
179
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institution, Western University) were compelled to respond, and quickly. At Western, Ford’s call
was responded to via the formation of an ad hoc ‘free expression’ committee, assembled by the
provost and chaired by the Arts and Humanities Dean. Notably, the committee was not comprised
of a representative sample of the most vulnerable or socially marginalized people on Western’s
campus. Consequently, I believe, the resultant policy does the very thing I expressed concern about
above: creates a policy that (even if implicitly) protects the status quo, possibly at the expense of
more marginalized campus community members.
Here is a stark example. The policy states that: “the University recognizes that the legitimate
exercise of free expression has the potential to shock, anger, intimidate, exclude and contribute to
the marginalization of University community members. It can also make it difficult for some people
or groups to exercise their own freedom of expression” (Western University 2018, emphasis
added). I think these words are telling for two reasons. First, the committee recognizes that
unrestrained speech can (and likely will) result in harmful consequences to marginalized students,
including intimidation, exclusion, and further marginalization. When “marginalization” is
understood as a “face of oppression” (that is, a mechanism of oppression or a way that oppression
manifests, cf. Young 1990), openly suggesting that it is permissible to further marginalize students
seems particularly problematic, coming from an institution charged with serving all of its students
equally, and which is, at least superficially, committed to the values of diversity, equity, and
inclusion. Second, the committee recognizes that one of the consequences of unrestrained free
speech for some is the loss of free speech for others. The ad hoc committee is willing to accept
this tradeoff. I am not. There has to be a better way to strike a balance: to create fair speech
conditions for all. Our institutions must be committed to finding it.
In closing, I leave you with the following questions: What would our campus speech codes look
like if we took the arguments above seriously, and we attempted to use them as the blueprint for a
more just and equally protective speech infrastructure? What explicit policies would be
implemented? What norms would we work to put into place? What norms would we begin to
challenge? What sorts of speech would we welcome? What sorts of speech would we start to resist?
How can we ensure that we build an infrastructure that protects the more vulnerable speakers on
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our campus community, and not just those with greater power? How do we start to correct for the
corrosive influence of power and oppression on our speech norms?
I hope we figure this out. The debate feels more contentious than ever, and some of our most
important voices (those of our marginalized students, staff, and faculty members) hang in the
balance.
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Conclusion
VI.I. Recap: What This Dissertation Has Accomplished
This dissertation has presented a collection of integrated articles which, taken together, aim to offer
a robust philosophical picture of the phenomenon of microaggressions. Throughout the
dissertation, I have ventured to make good on three distinct aims. These three aims are conceptual,
epistemological, and moral. In these concluding remarks, I will first reflect on the ways in which
I have made progress on each of these aims in the dissertation. I will then mention some avenues
for future development of my research on microaggressions.
In putting together this dissertation, I aimed to shed light on the following issues: how we ought
to understand microaggressions conceptually; what links together diverse comments and actions
as instances of the same thing; how we might defend the study of microaggression in the face of
intense skepticism about their seriousness; how we should categorize different types of
microaggressions; how we might understand the impacts of microaggressions for those on the
receiving end; and finally, how microaggressions influence and shape the relationships of
marginalized people to institutions such as medicine and academia. Overall, my goal was to offer
a robust philosophical analysis that could help strengthen the case that microaggressions, with their
ability to impact our social and political lives in subtle but significant ways, are worthy of our
moral attention.
I believe I have responded to these issues and met these goals in a number of ways. Let me take
each of my primary aims – the conceptual aim, the epistemological aim, and the moral aim – in
turn, to reflect on the ways I have made good on each.
First, as I noted in the introduction to the thesis, the conceptual aim of the dissertation was to make
progress toward an understanding of what microaggressions are, and how we should understand
and categorize them. As I noted in chapter 2, philosophers had not yet made use of their unique
training and skills in analyzing concepts to attempt to clarify what microaggressions are, or how
we should understand them. Given growing criticism and skepticism about the microaggression
concept, I take this to be a mistake. The central motivation guiding chapter 2 is to respond to

268

concerns about the microaggression concept, which are generated by the difficulty involved in
arriving a precise definition of it. In response, chapter 2 makes clear that philosophers have many
ways of making sense of concepts that resist fixed definition, including the one I opt for, namely,
a family resemblance approach.
A central conceptual question driving my investigation in chapter 2 was the following: “What
unifies the seemingly vast instances of what we call ‘microaggression’ together into one coherent
concept?” In response, I ventured to give form to what links diverse instances of microaggressions
together. I did so by employing a Wittgenstein-inspired “family resemblance” account of the
concept of microaggression. I set out common conditions which contribute to this resemblance
and make microaggressions (as different as they may be in practice) identifiable as instances of
the same thing. I argued that such an approach is one possible route for making sense of the
microaggression concept.
In chapter 3, I aimed to address the issue of how we should approach conceptualizing and
categorizing microaggressions, e.g., in theory and research. I advocated for a novel harm-based
account of microaggressions, which reflects a substantive departure from the dominant act-based
understanding of microaggressions, handed down to us from psychologist Derald Wing Sue
(2010). This account of microaggressions argues that microaggressions ought to be theorized from
the perspective of those on the receiving end, e.g., members of structurally oppressed groups.
Taken together, these two chapters (chapters 2 and 3), offer an account of how we ought to
understand and categorize microaggressions. On account of both, chapters 2 and 3 have progressed
my conceptual aim.
The second aim of the dissertation was epistemological. The thrust of this aim was to try to make
sense of what epistemological commitments ought to guide our thinking about microaggressions.
As Schroer (2015) has argued (and as I discuss in the introduction to this thesis) there is a tendency
to “scientize” research on oppressive phenomena – to try to apply standards of “objectivity” and
“empiricism” to the study of phenomena which are, at their core, lived, felt experiences.
Microaggressions, I have argued, are best understood when examined from the perspective of those
on the receiving end (see chapter 3). Testimony, I believe, is a valuable form of evidence when
examining oppressive phenomena, including microaggressions. In this thesis, and specifically in
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chapters 1, 2, and 3, I have tried to tease out and clarify what epistemological frameworks I believe
ought to guide continued microaggressions research. I have argued (in chapters 1 and 2) that
feminist standpoint epistemology offers the best epistemological starting point for theorizing
microaggressions. Feminist standpoint theory contends that those on the receiving end of
oppression are generally better suited to identify, recognize, understand, and name instances of
that oppression (Toole 2019; Wylie 2013). Following this theory, I have argued that
microaggressions should be theorized from the perspective of those on the receiving end of
oppression and oppressive phenomena (see chapter 3), that doing so is more likely to help us “get
it right” with respect to understanding microaggressions, identifying them when they occur (see
chapter 2), getting clearer about why they matter morally speaking (see chapter 2), and that
invoking feminist standpoint epistemology can help microaggressions researchers respond to their
most vocal critics (see chapter 1). In each of these ways, this thesis has advanced its
epistemological aim.
The third and final aim of the dissertation was a moral one. Following the trajectory of Chester
Pierce (1970), I believe that microaggressions are tightly connected to power, oppression, and
privilege (see discussion of these concepts in the introduction of this thesis, and the discussion of
oppression in chapter 1). The thrust of the moral aim was to provide some analysis of the moral
significance of microaggressions, including clarifying the unique ways in which microaggressions
are harmful (see chapter 3), and the way those harms manifest in particular institutional contexts,
such as medical contexts (see chapter 4) and academic contexts (see chapter 5). Across these
chapters, I shed light on the ways in which microaggressions can degrade important moral
relationships, including ones of trust, in these contexts (see chapters 3 and 4). I also shed light on
the impact microaggressions have on the equal standing of structurally oppressed people in
academic spaces: on their epistemic standing (e.g., whether or not they are recognized and regarded
as a knower), and the standing with respect to the contributions of their speech (e.g., whether they
are likely to be taken seriously, or given uptake, when they speak) (see chapter 5). I have argued
that microaggressions (and the social facts about power and oppression which they reflect) must
be accounted for in our attempts to create the most robust free speech atmospheres possible. This
is because, I have argued, pervasive microaggressions can threaten the ability of structurally
oppressed people to speak freely, or to be truly heard when they do so (see chapter 5).
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Taken together, these chapters offer new ways of thinking about microaggressions, which are
informed by insights from feminist philosophy, philosophy of language, ethics, and political
philosophy. They will, I hope, contribute to a growing conversation about microaggressions among
philosophers, and hopefully one between philosophers and those engaging in the empirical study
of microaggressions (e.g., psychologists and sociologists).

VI.II. What’s Next?: Future Avenues for Philosophical Research on
Microaggressions
I have just set out what I believe I have achieved with this dissertation. Now let me acknowledge
some areas which I have not had the opportunity to develop here. In future work I hope to advance
some of these questions, which, I believe, will add value to the emerging literature on the
philosophy of microaggressions.
One question this thesis has not ventured to resolve, and which I hope to explore in future work,
involves how we ought to draw boundaries between microaggressions and other related, but
meaningfully different, oppressive acts. For example, there is an important theoretical and practical
question regarding how to separate out microaggressions from another harmful speech
phenomena: slurs. Bringing microaggression theory into dialogue with the vast philosophical
literature on slurs can help gain conceptual clarification of both phenomena. Taking the lead from
the robust philosophical work on slurs, philosophers working on microaggressions should also
work to clarify the mechanisms by which microaggressions transmit bits of social meaning, or in
other words, how exactly microaggressions do things like reify stereotypes and reinforce social
biases.
Relatedly, there is a difficult practical question regarding when, if ever, microaggressions,
constitute [legally or otherwise] actionable “hate speech.” While some instances of
microaggression seem far from rising to this level, others (e.g., deadnaming a trans person) might
plausibly seem closer. Much like slurs, the philosophical and legal literatures on hate speech are
fertile ground for working out the conceptual and practical boundaries of the phenomena. I
recognize that, as far as this dissertation is concerned, these theoretical and practical puzzles
remain unresolved. This is a critical area for future exploration.
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Another area for future development of this research involves the “scaling up” of the analysis. In
other words, though I have focused in this dissertation on the way microaggressions impact one’s
social standing, as well as their relationships to institutions such as medicine and academia, a future
project will examine the role microaggressions play in shaping one’s democratic standing.
Specifically, I want to examine the extent to which microaggressions influence “democratic
equality” (e.g. being recognized and treated as a fully equal member of a democratic society, cf.
Anderson 1999) and democratic participation (e.g., the ability to participate fully and equally in
democratic discussion, deliberation, and debate). My intuition is that microaggressions can be
shown to impede one’s ability to be a full and equal participant in a democratic society, viz., to be
a full democratic equal.
A final area for future research involves investigating the links between microaggressions and
dehumanization. Many philosophers have argued that language can be an important tool of
dehumanization. Dehumanization, as David Livingston Smith (2012) describes it, is a response to
conflicting motives. On the one hand, there is some desire to harm some group of people. On the
other hand, it goes against our wiring as members of an inherently social species to actually carry
out harm to other humans, and more specifically, to kill, torture, or seriously degrade them.
Dehumanization, he argues, is a way of subverting those inhibitions – of getting around our
ingrained inclinations not to cause serious harm to other humans. The work around is to strip to
groups in question – those who we desire to cause harm to – of that thing which stands in our way
of carrying out such harm, namely, their humanity. The language used to describe groups of people
is one tool for breaking down our sense of their humanity. As Lynne Tirell puts it, “Speech acts
establish and reinforce a system of permissions and prohibitions that fuel social hierarchy” (2012,
175). The language we use to describe groups of people enact permissibility structures that
determine what is and isn’t viewed as acceptable treatment of them. Microaggressions are one type
of speech which can contribute to the dehumanization of certain groups: they effect how we
perceive, and ultimately how we treat, others. Spelling out the connections between
microaggressions and dehumanization is one avenue of analysis which can help further illuminate
the moral and social significance of microaggressions.
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By way of conclusion, the philosophical work done on microaggressions thus far, and the work
that remains to be done, point to one overarching idea: language matters and the way we use
language can be an incredibly powerful force in our social worlds. And, to quote a character from
one of my favorite comic book franchises (Spider-Man’s Benjamin Parker, or “Uncle Ben”), “With
great power comes great responsibility.” Attention to microaggressions renders unmistakably
evident that our words hold great power – power to include or exclude others, power to influence
our moral relationships with one another, and power to shape our social worlds in profound ways.
Such power ought to compel all of us to take greater responsibility for our words and their effects
in the world and upon those around us. We all have the ability and the power to hold ourselves and
others accountable for our words – and we should.
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